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ABSTRACT 
The studies reported in this thesis were designed to address several important issues 
in symptom-specific cognitive models o f psychosis. The design o f these studies was guided 
by a commitment to the continuity hypothesis of psychosis, which holds that psychotic 
experiences exist on a continuum stretching into the healthy population. The thesis firstly 
examines a two-factor cognitive model o f persecutory ideation, focusing primarily on the 
roles of thought suppression, intrusive thoughts, anxiety, social rank, and the jumping to 
conclusions bias. The thesis then turns to an examination o f cognitive factors involved in 
hallucinations and, in particular, auditory verbal hallucinations. Chapters in this section 
describe a series o f experimental and theoretical studies o f the relations between intrusive 
thoughts and hallucinations, agency and hallucinations, and the role of inner speech in 
auditory verbal hallucinations. 
Two-factor models o f persecutory delusion (PD) formation propose that in the first 
stage of PD formation an initial implausible idea is triggered. The second stage of PD 
formation is then the uncritical adoption o f such a thought as a belief, which may be due to 
cognitive biases such as the jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias often present in those with 
PDs. The first study (Chapter I ) investigated whether thought suppression, and its 
interaction with anxiety, was associated with levels of non-clinical persecutory delusion-
Hke beliefs (PDLBs). It was hypothesised that thought suppression could play a role in the 
formation and maintenance o f PDLBs through its tendency to lead to intrusive thoughts, 
and to trigger initial implausible ideas. Consistent with this proposal, thought suppression 
was positively associated with PDLBs only when anxiety was high. 
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The second study (Chapter 2) examined a prediction o f the two-factor model, 
namely that a second-stage factor, the jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias, should interact 
with first-stage factors, specifically social anxiety, social rank, anomalous experiences and 
thought suppression. Consistent with the two-factor model, the JTC bias was found not to 
be an independent predictor o f PDLB levels, but its interaction with social rank was a 
significant predictor o f PDLBs. I t was concluded that although evidence was found for the 
two-factor model, the presence of the JTC bias was neither a sufficient nor necessary 
condition for PDLB formation. 
In addition to being postulated to play a role in persecutory delusion formation, 
intrusive thoughts have been implicated in the formation of hallucinations, and particularly 
auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs). The third study (Chapter 3) created a new tool for 
assessing hypnagogic and hypnopompic (H&H) hallucinations, and showed that the 
presence of auditory H & H hallucinations, but not visual or felt-presence H & H 
hallucinations, was associated with a greater tendency to experience intrusions. The fourth 
study (Chapter 4) developed an extended model of AVHs in which rumination, as well as 
thought suppression, were proposed to be involved in the formation o f AVHs, through their 
creation of intrusive thoughts. This model was tested in a healthy sample of individuals 
using structural equation modelling, and the proposed model was found to be a good fit to 
the data. 
The study on rumination and AVHs highlighted that agency disruption factors are 
likely to be involved in leading these self-generated cognidons to be experienced as alien. 
A theoretical analysis (Chapter 5) was made of the mechanisms likely to be involved in this 
disruption of agency, involving the concept o f a neurocognitive action self-monitoring 
system (NASS) and a breakdown in the processes leading to the illusion of conscious w i l l . 
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A consideration was also given to how a Vygotskian conception of inner speech could 
contribute to inner speech models of AVHs. The next study (Chapter 6) then performed an 
empirical test o f the proposal that the disruption of agency in AVHs is associated with a 
faulty NASS. Subliminal primes were used as a proxy for the predicted state proposed to 
exist in the NASS, which leads to the experience o f agency. It was proposed that those 
prone to hallucinations would be less able to use primes to enhance their experience o f 
agency, due to deficits in their NASS. A statistically significant trend was found for the 
more hallucination-prone to be less able to use subliminal primes, but this effect was only 
found in women. It was concluded that although this was a promising finding, the effect 
was too small and gender-specific to be practical to test in a clinical sample o f patients with 
AVHs. 
The proposal that AVHs result from a breakdown in the NASS, specifically a 
corollary discharge deficit between speech production and reception areas, has been 
claimed to be supported by electrophysiological event-related potential (ERP) studies. 
However, only a simplistic conception o f inner speech has thus far been investigated in 
ERP studies, and the potential confoimding effects o f attention have not been considered. 
The N l ERP component response to auditory stimuli diiring inner speech was studied in a 
sample of healthy volunteers (Chapter 7). Although dampening o f the N l response was 
found during all types of inner speech, as compared to a silent baseline condition, 
dampening was also found during a mental rotation task. It was concluded that dampening 
o f the N l ERP component during inner speech is due to attentional factors, and is not 
indicative o f a corollary discharge mechanism. Finally, a theoretical analysis considers 
whether inner speech models o f AVHs are able to satisfactorily account for the 
phenomenology o f the experience (Chapter 8). It is concluded that subcategorisation o f 
X I X 
auditory hallucinations may be necessary, with memory-based, inner speech-based, and 
ictal-based models each accounting for a subcategory o f auditory hallucinations. The 
concept of the dynamic developmental progression of AVHs is introduced and avenues for 
future research in this area highlighted. 
X X 
General Introduction 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
The term 'schizophrenia' may well be the most feared and least understood in mental 
health. Given that those diagnosed with this condition have a life expectancy 20% less than 
the general population (Newman & Bland, 1991), and face the stigma associated with this 
"sacred symbol o f psychiatry" (Szasz, 1979, p. 1), there is reason for trepidation. However, 
in the past two decades in particular, there have been some profound and wide-ranging 
critiques o f the concept o f schizophrenia, which have led clinicians and researchers to 
rethink how we should approach and study the experiences associated with psychotic 
illnesses. 
Complaint-based approaches to psychopathology 
An extensive scientific literature has arisen which has questioned the reliability and 
validity o f the diagnosis o f schizophrenia (e.g., Bentall, 2003, 2006; Boyle, 1990). For 
example, Bentall, Jackson and Pilgrim (1988) reviewed data on the symptoms, course, and 
outcome of psychotic disorders and concluded that the diagnosis of schizophrenia lacked 
predictive validity. Other studies have accumulated evidence against the assumption tiiat 
psychotic experiences are symptoms of discrete diseases such as schizophrenia (Bentall & 
Femyhough, 2008). For example, Johnstone et al. (1988) found that response to medication 
was predicted not by the diagnosis o f patients (such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder) 
but by the complaints they reported. As Frith (1992) notes, such studies "provide support at 
the biological level for the proposal that it is a more fruitful research strategy to study 
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patients with certain symptoms rather than patients in particular diagnostic categories" (p. 
12) 
A similar symptom-oriented research strategy has been strongly advocated by 
Bentall (2003, 2006). However, in line with the argument that experiences such as 
hallucinations are not necessarily 'symptoms' of mental illness (Romme «& Escher, 1993) 
Bentall uses the term 'complaint' rather than symptom. Bentall (2006) has suggested that 
we should "abandon psychiatric diagnoses altogether and... instead attempt to explain the 
specific complaints ('symptoms') that patients bring to our attention" (p. 220), and that 
"once these complaints have each been explained... there w i l l be no 'schizophrenia' . . . left 
over to accoxmt for" (p. 224). Such an approach has resulted in a burgeoning literature on 
the cognitive mechanisms underlying specific complaints such as hallucinations (e.g.. Frith, 
1992; David, 2004; Seal, Aleman & McGuire, 2004; Leudar & Thomas, 2000) and 
delusions (e.g., Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002; Garety & 
Freeman, 1999; Langdon, Comer, McLaren, Ward, & Coltheart, 2006). 
The importance of such an approach has been imderscored by resulting advances in 
cognitive-behavioural interventions for those distressed by such experiences (e.g.. Rector & 
Beck, 2001; Dickerson, 2000). A series o f randomised controlled trials of cognitive 
behavioural therapy for hallucinations and delusions have found that interventions targeted 
at these specific complaints can decrease symptom frequency and associated distress (e.g., 
Sensky et al., 2006). In Hne with the utility of a complaint-based approach, this thesis wi l l 
focus on two specific complaints often associated with patients with a diagnosis o f 
schizophrenia, namely persecutory delusions and auditory verbal hallucinations. 
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Persecutory delusions 
Freeman and Garety (2000) define a belief as being persecutory i f the individual 
believes that "harm is occurring, or is going to occur, to him or her" and that "the 
persecutor has the intention to cause harm" (p. 412). Such beliefs are more likely to be 
considered delusions the more they are implausible, unfounded, strongly held, not shared 
by others, distressing and preoccupying (Freeman, 2007). This reflects the American 
Psychological Association's (DSM-IV-TR, 2000) definition of delusion as a "false belief 
based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what 
almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious 
proof or evidence to the contrary" (p. 821). Persecutory delusions are traditionally 
associated with schizophrenia. Indeed, Sartorius et al. (1986) found that such delusions 
occur in nearly 50% of patients with a diagnosis o f schizophrenia. However, persecutory 
delusions are also found in other conditions such as bipolar disorder (Goodwin & Jamison, 
1990) and post-traumatic stress disorder (Butler, Mueser, Sprock, & Braff, 1996). 
The continuity hypothesis of persecutory delusions 
Many have argued that, rather than understanding persecutory delusions as discrete, 
categorical entities, qualitatively different to more common persecutory ideation, they 
should be understood as existing on a continuum with normal experiences (e.g.. Van Os & 
Verdoux, 2003). In the realm of physical health. Rose and Barker (1978) have argued that 
characteristics such as blood pressure and glucose tolerance exist on a continuum in the 
general population, and that an essentially arbitrary line is drawn in clinical practice, above 
which the individual is said to belong in the categorical disease states o f hypertension and 
diabetes respectively. Johns and van Os (2001) draw a parallel between this and psychotic 
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experiences, arguing that "that psychosis exists as a continuum of experiences with a 
distribution in the general population" (p. 1137). Indeed, a recent systematic review of 
studies assessing subclinical psychotic experiences in the general population found a 
median prevalence rate of delusions of 6% and a median incidence rate of around 4% (van 
Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & Krabbendam, 2009), although data on 
specificailly persecutory delusions was not reported. 
By this argument, persecutory delusions commonly found in patients with 
schizophrenia would represent the extreme form of experiences also found in a milder form 
in the general population (Freeman, 2007). Freeman illustrates this by suggesting that a 
clinically relevant persecutory delusion about government attempts to k i l l the person could 
represent an amplification of a non-clinical delusion about neighbours trying to get at the 
person, which could in turn be considered as related to everyday suspicions about the 
intentions of others. 
The continuity assumption is consistent with findings that persecutory ideation is 
not an uncommon experience in the general population. For example, Eaton, Romanoski, 
Anthony, and Nestadt (1991), using the Diagnostic Interview Schedule (Robins, Helzer, 
Croughan, & Ratcliff, 1981), found that 5% of healthy adults endorsed an item indicating 
that they believed people had been trying to hurt them during the past month. This 
experience was rated clinically relevant in a fifth o f these 5% of participants. Similarly, 
Olfson et al. (2002) found that, in a sample o f over 1000 healthy adults, 10.6% expressed 
the belief that others were spying on or following them and 6.9% believed that people were 
plotting or trying to poison them. In a student sample. Freeman et al. (2005) found that 5% 
of respondents thought (with at least a weekly fi-equency) that there was the possibility o f a 
conspiracy against them, and that 8% had a suspicion that someone 'had it in for them', and 
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that the same percentage o f students believed someone would harm them i f given the 
opportunity. In an influential recent review, Freeman (2007) concluded that a "conservative 
estimate is that 10-15% of the general population regularly experience paranoid thoughts, 
though such figures hide marked differences in content and severity" (p. 430). Freeman 
(2007) further observed that " I t is also likely that the studies underestimate the true 
frequency o f paranoid thoughts because large epidemiological studies from a psychiatric 
perspective are unlikely to record more plausible fleeting everyday instances o f paranoid 
thinking" (p. 430). 
Auditory verbal hallucinations 
The second experience this thesis w i l l focus on is auditory verbal hallucinations, 
colloquially referred to as 'hearing voices'. Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs), the 
experience of perceiving speech without corresponding external stimulation (Stephane, 
Barton, & Boutros, 2001), have been documented in humankind throughout recorded 
history (Leudar & Thomas, 2000). Again, such experiences are traditionally associated with 
schizophrenia. Studies have found that between 60 and 74% of those with schizophrenia 
report AVHs (Wing, Cooper, & Sartorius, 1974; Slade & Bentall, 1988). Furthermore, 
Sartorius et al. (1986) found that the monthly prevalence of AVHs in such patients was also 
within this range. In contrast to persecutory delusions, a number o f rich and detailed studies 
have been made of the occurrence of AVHs throughout history (e.g., Leudar & Thomas, 
2000; Schmidt, 2002). A consideration o f this plentiful history shows that not only are they 
not necessarily a sign o f mental illness but, as with persecutory delusions, they appear to 
exist on a continuum stretching into the general population. 
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A brief history of hearing voices' 
In Western Europe, between around 500 and 1500 A.D. , individuals who reported 
hearing voices or seeing visions were not typically considered mad, but regarded by their 
peers as having actual perceptual experiences (Kroll & Bachrach, 1982). Such experiences 
could be understood as communications fi-om spiritual beings (God, the Devil, etc.), as 
mere imaginings, or as resulting fi-om illness (Watkins, 1998). As late as the seventeenth 
century, the explanation o f hallucinations as religious madness was still common (Porter, 
2002). However, by the start o f the eighteenth century, opinion was shifting towards a 
conception o f hallucinations as illness. Works such as William Battie's Treatise on 
Madness (1758) were formative in identifying lunacy with false perceptions such as 
reported conversations with angels (Schmidt, 2002). As Schmidt (2002) puts it , 
"Enlightenment epistemologies... demanded the disciplining of religious enthusiasm, a 
confinement o f those 'unguarded fancies o f a man's own brain' within a secure domain 
from which reason and the state might avoid contamination" (p. 191) 
In 1817 experiences such as hearing voices and seeing visions were subsumed into 
the first medical definition of'hallucination' by Esquirol. It was during this period of 
history that, for the first time, medicine claimed as part o f its domain experiences that had 
tradifionally fallen under the authority o f the church (James, 1995). Indeed, Schmidt (2002) 
has argued that medical psychiatry was created precisely in order politically to contain 
delusions o f religious fervour. A number o f events around the end of the nineteenth-century 
provided an impetus for considering hallucinations as non-pathological. Firstly, large-scale 
' This review is partly taken from a more detailed consideration o f the history o f 
hallucinations published as Jones, S.R., & Femyhough, C. (2008). Speaking back to the 
spirits: the voices and visions o f Emanuel Swedenborg. History of the Human Sciences, 21, 
1-31. 
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empirical investigations of hallucinatory experiences in the normal population began. In a 
survey o f 17,000 normal participants, the Report on the Census o f Hallucinations (Sidgwick 
et al., 1894, p. 33) asked the question 'Have you ever, when believing yourself to be 
completely awake, had a vivid impression of seeing or being touched by a living being or 
inanimate object, or o f hearing a voice: which irnpression, so far as you could discover, was 
not due to any external physical cause?' Ten percent o f respondents replied in the 
affirmative, though approximately half reported these experiences occurring either as they 
were falling asleep or waking up. In terms o f the modality of the hallucinations, 56% were 
solely visual, 23% solely auditory, and 6% involved combined visual and auditory 
hallucinations. 
Secondly, William James's publication of The Varieties of Religious Experience in 
1902 argued for alternative ways to understand religious experiences. James (1902, p. 35) 
noted that what he termed medical materialism "finishes up Saint Paul by calling his vision 
on the road to Damascus a discharging lesion of the occipital cortex, he being an 
epileptic... snuffs out Saint Teresa as an hysteric, [and] Saint Francis o f Assisi as an 
hereditary degenerate". James clairned such an approach was simple-minded, and argued 
that experiences such as hallucinations should be dealt with not by "superficial medical 
talk" but by an inquiry into "their fiiiits for l i fe" (p. 398). 
Not a necessary signifier of mental illness 
Today, it is now generally accepted that hallucinations do not necessarily imply 
mental illness. The contemporary reconstruction of the nineteenth-century concept of 
hallucinations in the sane (de Boismont, 1860) may be traced back to the interactions o f one 
psychiatrist, Marius Romme, with a particular patient, Patsy Hague. Romme was led to 
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investigate the presence of specifically auditory hallucinations (voice-hearing) in the 
general population after a discussion with Hague who herself heard voices. These meetings 
directly led to a television appearance by Romme requesting voice-hearers to contact him. 
O f the 173 respondents who agreed to complete a questionnaire, 76 o f these were not in 
psychiatric care (Romme, Honig, Noorthoom, & Escher, 1992). This and later work led to 
Romme being confronted by a large number o f "well-balanced, healthy people, who 
happened to hear voices" (Romme & Escher, 1993, p. 59). 
This work by Rornme and Escher (1993) provided the impetus for a series o f studies 
into psychosis-like experiences in the general population, similar to those at the end o f the 
19^ *' century. These studies provided further evidence that otherwise healthy individuals 
may experience hallucinations in the absence of the social dysfiinction or distress 
associated with clinical psychosis (Johns & van Os, 2001; Posey & Losch, 1983; Tien, 
1991). As a result of such work, a growing woridwide movement exists today based around 
the view that hallucinating does not necessarily imply mental illness (Romme & Escher, 
1993). For example, in the United Kingdom this has led to the creation of a large user-
movement, the Hearing Voices Network, with parallel organisations now existing 
throughout the world. Although such individuals' experiences are predominantly auditory, 
members o f the Hearing Voices Network also experience hallucinations in a range of other 
modalities, for example, visual and tactile (ibid). This movement has resulted in a large 
number o f such individuals rejecting the label of'patient ' , and the reinvention by such 
individuals, partly in partnership with psychiatrists, o f the paradigm of hallucinations in the 
sane, and the development of the concept of the healthy voice-hearer (ibid). 
There is a gathering consensus that whether an individual experiencing voices 
and/or visions receives a psychiatric diagnosis depends much on the emotional content of 
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their experience, and their emofional response to it. For example, voice-hearers' 
interpretation of their voices, not just the experience of the voice-hearing per se, is an 
important determinant o f the amount o f resulting distress and social/occupational disability 
(Krabbendam et al., 2004). In this fi-amewdrk, social representations (Moscovici, 1988) of 
voices and visions as being coterminous with madness and insanity may act as self-
fu l f i l l ing prophecies through their impact on how individuals who have these experiences 
interpret them. Today many individuals who experience voices and visions are able to lead 
productive lives, and encounter their experiences in a non-psychiatric, non-mental illness 
discourse. Contemporary examples o f this include a prominent Professor of Mathematics 
who reports receiving beneficial mathematical insights from her voices (Malone, 2006) and 
a leading pianist who hears a voice that illuminates his playing as well as experiencing a 
number o f anomalous visual experiences (ibid). In line with such examples, Leudar has 
argued that "hearing voices (and the experiences we may categorize as hallucinations) 
should be judged as sane or insane in terms of their consequences for life. They are not in 
themselves signs o f madness, any more than, say, thinking and remembering" (David & 
Leudar, 2001, p. 256). 
The continuum hypothesis of hallucinations 
Aleman and Larei (2008) have identified four key components of the assumption of 
continuity in hallucinatory experiences. The first is the distributional component. This 
refers to the assumption that hallucinations "should be present in not only subjects 
identified as clinical cases but also in a proportion of subjects from the general population 
who do not f i i l f i l the clinical criteria o f a patient" (p. 83). There is substantial evidence for 
this proposal. Firstly, in the recent systematic review of incidence and prevalence studies of 
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population rates o f subclinical psychotic experiences highlighted earlier in this 
Introduction, van Os et al. (2009) found the median prevalence fate o f hallucinations (data 
on specific modalities was not reported) to be 4% and a median incidence rate o f around 
2%. This was in-line with eariier studies that found that the annual prevalence o f 
hallucinatory experiences in the general population (in both the visual and auditory 
modality) to be 4% (Johns et al., 1998). Secondly there is good evidence that specifically 
A V H S are a not uncommon experience in the general population. For example, Posey & 
Losch (1993) found brief AVHs had been experienced in wakeful situations by 7 1 % of 
university students. In addition to simple AVHs such as hearing one's name called 
(experienced by 36% of participants), more complex AVHs were also reported, including 
AVHs offering advice (experienced by 10% o f participants). In non-student samples 
significant rates o f AVHs have also been reported. For example, Verdoux et al. (1998) 
found that 5% of patients attending a GP surgery (who did not have a diagnosis o f a 
psychotic disorder) reported having experienced hearing voices conversing or giving 
commands. Other studies have found that 2% of the general population aimually experience 
AVHs when completely awake (Tien, 1991). Such prevalences are comparable to the 
prevalence o f persecutory ideation identified in the previous section. 
The second component o f the continuum hypothesis identified by Aleman and Laroi 
(2008) is the phendmenological component. This stipulates that there should be 
phenomenological similarity between hallucinations in clinical and non-clinical samples. 
Consistent with this proposal, AVHs in clinical sarnples, aside from their increased 
probability o f being the voice o f a public figure and their tendency to cause distress, have 
been found to be very similar, phenomenologically, to those voices reported in non-clinical 
samples (Leudar et al., 1997). Thirdly, Aleman and Laroi identify the developmental 
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component o f the continuum hypothesis. This entails that factors identified as important 
risk factors in clinical cases o f hallucinations be associated with the prevalence of 
hallucinations in non-clinical samples too. Importantly, Alemah and Laroi note that "this 
would suggest a developmental mechanism genesis, which is applicable to both clinical and 
non-clinical samples" (p. 83). This also receives empirical support. For example, trauma 
has been identified as an important precursor to hallucinations in both clinical (Read & 
Argyle, 1999) and non-clinical (Morrison & Peterson, 2003) samples. In line with this, 
Johns and van Os (2001) note that there is "evidence that psychological mechanisms 
associated with psychotic symptoms also operate in non-patient samples, and further study 
of these could greatly contribute to our understanding o f psychosis" (p. 1134). Finally, 
there is what Aleman and Lar0i term the etiological component. This entails that clinical 
and non-clinical populations should "share common ground in terms of the cognitive and 
emotional mechanisms underlying hallucinations" (p. 83). In considering this, Aleman and 
Laroi conclude that a cognitive approach is "particularly pertinent and fiiiitfial in the 
context o f hallucinations" (p. 84). In conclusion, the available evidence appears to strongly 
favour the continuum hypothesis of hallucinations, and an approach to these experiences 
that examines cognitive mechanisms underlying hallucination-proneness in non-clinical 
subjects. 
Ethical considerations 
A l l studies reported in this thesis received approval from the Durham University 
Ethics Advisory Sub-Committee in the Department o f Psychology. The studies were 
performed in accordance with the British Psychological Society (BPS) Code of Ethics and 
Conduct (BPS, 2006), the Economic and Social Research Council Research Ethics 
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Framework, and the Medical Research Council Ethics and Research Guidance. Studies 
conducted through on-line questionnaires present a new ethical challenge, considered in the 
BPS guidelines on internet-mediated research (BPS, 2007). As the BPS (2007) notes, 
obtaining informed consent on-line is problematic as " i t is both possible and indeed 
relatively usual for individuals to access web sites without reading instructions, 
explanations or terms and conditions" (p. 4). Hence, wherever possible, websites used for 
data collection were designed so that participants could not proceed to take part in the study 
until they had clicked radio buttons to indicate that, 1) they consented to take part in the 
study, 2) they understood that they were free to withdraw from the study at any point, and 
to stop answering the questionnaires, and 3) they understood that all their answers were 
given anonymously. When this was not possible, participants were told via text on the first 
page o f the website, and in the invitational e-mail, that they were free to stop answering the 
questionnaires at any point, in which event their data would not be used in the study. It was 
also made clear that participation was voluntary and that all answers were given 
anonymously, with the exception o f basic demographic data. At the end of the on-line 
studies participants were presented with a wide range o f sources o f support that they could 
contact about any issues that were likely to have been raised by the study. They were also 
given the author's e-mail address in case of any fiirther questions about the study's aims, 
design, and results. 
The electrophysiological study reported in Chapter 7 raised additional ethical issues, 
as it involved the placement of conducting gel in the participant's hair, and was a lengthy 
process. Potential participants were given a detailed information sheet (Appendix D) before 
consenting. This gave information on key features of the study such as the potential risks o f 
taking part, what participants should expect to happen to them and in what order, and what 
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they would be paid for participation. Participants all gave signed informed consent to take 
part in the study. 
Chapters 2 and 6 both involved a mild degree of deception. In the study reported in 
Chapter 2, participants were told that they would be shown beads that were being randomly 
drawn from ajar. In fact, as is standard practice in this widely used task (e.g., Freeman, 
Pugh, & Garety, 2008), the beads were always presented to the participants in a predefined 
non-random order. This was done in order to provide a consistent sequence of beads and to 
avoid the confounding effects of different participants encountering different sequences of 
beads. It was considered that this deception was minimal and unlikely to lead to the 
participants experiencing any distress. In the study reported in Chapter 6, participants were 
asked to guess whether a square shown oh a computer screen represented the end-point of 
their own action, or whether it was a result of the computer's actions. However, in order for 
priming to take place, the final landing position of the square had to be predefined (in 
accordance with standard practice in this task), such that participants were misled about the 
causal efficacy of their acfions. That said, the degree of deception was again considered to 
be mild. Participants were fiilly debriefed immediately after the experiment and no distress 
found to result. 
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Chapter 1 
Thought suppression and persecutory delusion-like beliefs in a non-
clinical sample ^ 
ABSTRACT 
Thought suppression may play a role in the formation and/or maintenance of persecutory 
delusions, although this possibility has not yet been empirically studied. We investigated 
thought suppression levels in relation to the presence of persecutory delusion-like beliefs 
(PDLBs), and hypothesized that only when levels of anxiety or negative affect were high 
would thought suppression predict levels of PDLBs. Thought suppression, anxiety, 
negative affect, social desirability, and persecutory ideation were assessed in a non-clinical 
sample (N = 184) using online questionnaires. When gender, anxiety, and negative affect 
were controlled, the interaction between thought suppression and anxiety predicted levels 
of PDLBs. Further analysis of this interaction showed that thought suppression was 
positively associated with PDLBs only when anxiety was high. Neither thought suppression 
by itself, nor the two-way interaction between negative affect and thought suppression, nor 
the three-way interaction between negative affect, anxiety, and thought suppression, were 
predictors of PDLB levels. The results are consistent with a proposed interaction between 
thought suppression and anxiety in the development of PDLBs. Possible causal 
mechanisms underlying this relation are considered ftirther, future research in the area 
proposed, and potential clinical implications examined. 
^ Chapter published as: Jones, S. R., & Femyhough, C. (2008). Thought suppression and persecutory 
delusion-li]<e beliefs in a non-clinical sample. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 13, 281-295. 
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Introduction 
Persecutory delusions (PDs) are one of the most commonly held types of delusional belief 
(Ga;rety, Everitt, & Hemsley, 1988; Jorgensen & Jensen, 1994), and are found cross-
culturally (Stompe et al., 1999). As Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, and Bebbington 
(2002) note, possession of persecutory beliefs may have severe consequences, with their 
presence being a predictor of admission to hospital (Castle, Phelan, Wessely, & Murray, 
1994). Successful cognitive modelling of the formation and maintenance of PDs is an 
important step towards the improvement of treatments for such distressing beliefs (Garety 
& Freeman, 1999). 
Two-factor models of the formation of delusions (e.g., Davies, Coltheart, Langdon, 
& Breen, 2001) suggest a two-stage process with each stage in turn being associated with 
specific cognitive deficits/biases. Langdon, Comer, McLaren, Ward, and Coltheart (2006) 
suggest that the first of these stages, in the case of PDs, is the triggering of "an inifial 
implausible thought" (p. 700), such as 'X hates me', which is not justified in the 
circumstances. Once this thought is triggered, the second stage of PD formation is the 
uncritical adoption of such a thought as a belief The uncritical acceptance of implausible 
thoughts as delusional beliefs may be due to cognifive biases such as the jumping-to-
conclusions bias often present in those with PDs (Freerhan, 2007). One limitation of this 
model is that it does not address the multidimensional nature of PDs. Freeman (2007) has 
argued that such a multidimensional understanding of delusional experience is needed, 
allowing for the possibility that each dimension (the content of the PD, the conviction with 
which the PD is held, the distress caused by the PD, and the resistance to change of the PD) 
may be influenced by different factors. 
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Affective processes undoubtedly play a key role in PDs. Freernan and colleagues' 
cognitive models of PDs emphasise that they are direct reflections of emotional concerns 
(e.g.. Freeman et al., 2002; Freeman et al., 2004; Green et al., 2006). Two specific 
emotional factors that appear likely to be involved in many of the dimensions of PDs are 
anxiety and negative affect. Negative affect has been found to be associated with PDs, and 
more strongly so than with other types of delusion types (Appelbaum, Robbins, & Roth, 
1999). However, it is anxiety that has been proposed to be the key emotion with regard to 
PD formation (Freeman et al., 2002, Freenian, 2007). Extensive empirical evidence has 
been provided for a relation between anxiety and PDs (Freeman & Garety, 1999; Startup, 
Freeman, & Garety, 2007), with anxiety being associated with the persistence of PDs at a 
three-month follow-up (Startup et al., 2007). Furthermore, the content of paranoid ideation 
in non-clinical samples has been found to build upon an individual's own interpersonal 
anxieties (Freeman, et al., 2005). 
The way in which an individual deals with anxiety and negative affect is also likely 
to be an important factor in both the generation and maintenance of PDs, as well as in the 
distress and conviction with which they are held. In Wells and Matthews' (1994, 1996) 
Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model, vulnerability to, and maintenance of, 
many psychological disorders are understood as resulting fi-om an individual's 
metacognitive beliefs which provide a framework for interpreting cognitive events. In line 
with this proposal. Freeman and Garety (1999) used the Thought Control Questionnaire 
(TCQ; Wells & Davies, 1994) to examine the relation between PDs (in patients with 
schizophrenia) and strategies used to try and suppress or control unwanted thoughts. None 
of the thought-control strategies assessed by the TCQ, namely distraction, social control 
(asking friends i f they have the same thoughts), worry (focusing on other negative 
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thoughts), punishment, and re-appraisal (trying to reinterpret the thought), were found to 
differentiate a control group consisting of patients with Generalized Anxiety Disorder from 
patients with PDs. Levels of anxiety were also found not to differ between the two groups. 
However, it was found that the presence of meta-worry (assessed by the single question 
'Do you worry that you cannot control your thoughts about the belief [the PD] as well as 
you would like?') was related to the amount of delusional distress experienced by the 
patients. Freeman and Garety interpret this to mean that PDs become most upsetting when 
"the individual has worries about not being able to control his or her thoughts about the 
belief (p. 59). Similarly, Freeman (2007) has noted that "Worry may keep the suspicions 
in mind and develop the content in a catastrophising manner" (p. 450). 
Another cognitive strategy that may, paradoxically, lead to such suspicions staying 
in mind is attempting to suppress such thoughts. Laboratory studies have shown that the 
process of attempting to suppress a thought can lead to the suppressed thought rebounding 
and becoming chronically accessible (Clark, Winton, & Thynn, 1993; Lavy & van den 
Hout, 1990; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). In one such study two groups of 
participants were asked to think about a white bear. One group suppressed thoughts of the 
bear, while the other group did not. It was found that the group that had suppressed 
thoughts of the bear reported a greater number of occurrences of thoughts of the bear in the 
post-suppression period, compared to the group who had not suppressed thoughts of the 
bear (Wegner et al., 1987). This finding of increased frequency of thoughts about the target 
following thought suppression is termed post-suppression rebound (WenzlafF & Wegner, 
2000). Although other laboratory groups have failed to replicate such findings (e.g., Kelly 
& Kahn, 1994), when longitudinal studies have been performed outside the laboratory over 
a period of days, post-suppression rebound for personally relevant intrusive thoughts has 
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been found (Borton & Casey, 2006). It has also been demonstrated that, when thought 
suppression occurs under cognitive load, the thought becomes more accessible than i f it is 
not being suppressed (Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner, Erber & Zanakos, 1993). This 
effect is termed the hyperaccessibility of suppressed thoughts (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). 
Given such effects of thought suppression there are a number of good reasons to 
believe that this concept may be important within a multidimensional model of PDs. 
Firstly, based on a range of studies such as those showing that thought suppression is 
predictive of post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms following trauma (Aaron, Zaglul, & 
Emery, 1999) and perseverance of PTSD symptoms (Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998), 
Wegner and Smart (1997) have proposed that "when thought suppression accompanies 
psychological disorders, it may exacerbate them and magnify their symptoms" (p. 992). 
This is consistent with the findings that use of thought suppression is associated with 
anxiety (Muris, Merckelbach, & Horselenberg, 1996; Wegner & Zanakos 1994) and 
psychological distress (e.g., Cheavens et al., 2005; Rosenthal, Rasmussen Hall, Palm, 
Batten, & Follette, 2005). 
Wegner and Smart's (1997) proposal opens up the possibility that thought 
suppression may play a role in the development and/or maintenance of PDs. Firstly, 
attempting to suppress fledgling persecutory thoughts may lead to their amplification 
through their resultant hyperaccessibility and through post-suppression rebound. As 
chronically accessible thoughts serve as filters through which we see the world (Newman 
Duff, & Baumeister, 1997), an individual suppressing fledgling persecutory thoughts may, 
through these thoughts becoming chronically hyperaccessible, become more likely to 
interpret events and actions as persecutory. When coupled with increased occurrences of 
the thought due to post-suppression rebound, the result may be an increased intensity of the 
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associated persecutory beliefs. Secondly, attempting to suppress fiilly-formed PDs may act 
as a maintenance factor for such beliefs, through the twin effects of hyperaccessibility and 
post-suppression rebound. Such a method of dealing with such thoughts may also be 
associated with increased distress, increased conviction, and resistance to change of the PD. 
There are therefore several (potentially overlapping) reasons for expecting a relation 
between thought suppression and PDs. Although Freeman and Garety (1999) have already 
noted that attempts to suppress worry may increase the frequency of worry, the relation of 
thought suppression to PDs has not yet been empirically examined. The only evidence 
suggestive of a relation comes from the findings that a) persecutory ideation in the healthy 
population is related to metacognitive beliefs about the uncontroUability and dangerousness 
of thoughts (Larei & van der Linden, 2005 a) and b) beliefs about the imcontrollability and 
dangerousness of thoughts are associated with higher levels of thought suppression (Jones 
& Femyhough, 2006). However, Larei and van der Linden's study was not replicated when 
anxiety levels were controlled (Garcia-Montes, Cangas, Perez-Alvarez, Hidalgo, & 
Gutierrez, 2005). Furthermore, Larei and van der Linden used a rneasure of persecutory 
ideation that has been argued not to be psychoinetrically valid (Jones & Femyhough, 2007). 
We hence designed our study to perform the first, preliminary, investigation of the 
relation between persecutory ideation and thought suppression. In line with evidence that 
PDs exist on a continuum into the healthy population (Fenigstein, 1997; Johns & van Os, 
2001; Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004), we examined relations between persecutory 
delusion-like beliefs (PDLBs), thought suppression, anxiety and negative affect in a non-
clinical sample. I f thought suppression is associated with clinically relevant persecutory 
delusions, such a relationship is likely to be found in relation to PDLBs in the non-clinical 
population. Given Freeman's (2007) proposal that anxiety is key to the formation of PDs, 
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as well as the potential role of negative affect discussed above, we proposed that thought 
suppression would only predict levels of PDLBs when anxiety and/or negative affect were 
high. This led to a number of specific hypotheses. We firstly predicted that, when anxiety 
and negative affect were confrolled using a multiple linear regression, thought suppression 
levels would not explain any unique Variance in PDLBs. Our next two hypotheses were that 
the two-way interactions between anxiety and thought suppression (Hypothesis 2), and 
between negative affect and thought suppression (Hypothesis 3) would be predictors of 
PDLBS. Our fourth hypothesis was that the three-way interaction between anxiety, negative 
affect, and thought suppression would be a predictor of PDLBs, with thought suppression 
predicting PDLB levels most strongly when both anxiety and negative affect were high. 
Such hypotheses meet Freeman's (2007, p. 451) call for the "testing for interactions 
between variables" in PD research. 
We assessed levels of PDLBs using the Persecutory Ideation Questiormaire 
(McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2006). No evidence yet exists on the extent to which 
participants' responses on this instrument are related to what they believe are socially 
a:ppropriate responses. In comparison, scores on other psychopathology questionnaires 
(such as the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale) have been shown to have no relation to 
participants' tendencies to give socially appropriate responses (Young, Bentall, Slade, & 
Dewey, 1987; Larei & van der Linden, 2005b). The study was hence designed to examine 
whether individuals' levels of social desirability bias predicted their scores on the PIQ, as a 
means of ensuring that any relation between PIQ and thought suppression was not 
confounded by this variable. Our final hypothesis (Hypothesis 5) was thus that participants' 
levels of social desirability bias would not predict their PIQ scores. 
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Method 
Participants 
An e-mail was sent to undergraduates enrolled on a range of different programs at a 
British university informing them of a website where they could take part in a study. No 
incentive was offered for participants to take part. As a result of this, 183 undergraduates 
(76 males and 107 females) participated. The mean age of participants was 18.5 years {SD 
= 1.3). 
Measures 
Thought suppression: The White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & 
Zanakos, 1994) is a fi-equently used research tool to measure the "conscious desire to 
suppress thoughts" (p. 637). However, it has been argued that the WBSI taps levels of 
intrusive thoughts as well as thought suppression (Muris et al., 1996; Rassin, 2003). Thus, 
Muris et al. created a "corrected" version of the W B S I , the WBSIsup, which constitutes the 
items remaining on the original W B S I after items 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9 have been removed. The 
remaining 10-item scale includes items such as " I always try to put problems out of mind". 
This measure has been shown to have satisfactory reliability and validity (Jones & 
Femyhough, 2006; Muris et al., 1996). The WBSIsup was used as a measure of the 
conscious desire to suppress thoughts. Items are rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging 
fi-om "Strongly Agree" (5) to "Strongly Disagree" (I) . Total scores on the WBSIsup can 
hence range from 10 to 50. 
Proneness to persecutory delusion-like beliefs: The Persecutory Ideation 
Questionnaire (PIQ; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2006) is a 10-item questionnaire 
designed to measure persecutory ideation in both clinical and non-clinical samples. Items 
are rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "Very True" (4) to "Very Untrue" (0). 
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The total P I Q score can hence range from 0 to 40. This measure has been shown to have 
good reliability and validity (ibid). 
Negative affect: Negative affect was assessed using the 10 items assessing negative 
affective states on the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). We refer to this 10-item subscale of the P A N A S as P A N A S N - Participants 
rate the extent to which they have experienced such affective states in the past week on a 
five-point Likert scale ranging from "Extremely" (5) to "Very slightly or not at al l" (1). 
Total scores on the P A N A S N can hence range from 10 to 50. This measure has been shown 
to have good reliability and validity (ibid). 
Anxiety: Anxiety was assessed using the Manifest Anxiety Scale (TMAS; Taylor, 
1953). This is a 50-item self-report questionnaire with response options of true or false 
available for each question. Total scores can range from 0 to 50, with higher scores 
representing greater levels o f anxiety. This has been found to possess satisfactory 
psychometric properties (ibid). 
Social desirability: This was assessed using the Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). This is a 33-item self-report scale which 
assesses participants' tendencies to give socially appropriate responses. A series of items, 
such as " I never resent being asked to return a favor" are rated as true or false. Total scores 
can range from 0 to 33 with higher scores representing a greater tendency to give socially 
appropriate responses. This has been found to have satisfactory psychometric properties 
(ibid). 
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Resuhs 
Mean scores, standard deviations, ranges and Cronbach's alphas for all scales are 
presented in Table 1.1. Alphas for all scales were greater than 0.7. The descriptive statistics 
for the PIQ data reported here were previously published in Jones, Femyhough, de-Wit, and 
Meins (2008). 
Table 1.1 
Descriptive statistics for variables under investigation 
Mean (SD) Range Cronbach's alpha 
PIQ 1.21 (5.14) 0-24 .87 
WBSIsup 32.87 (6.97) 11-50 .85 
TMAS 19.79(10.06) 0-48 .91 
P A N A S N 22.74 (8.43) 10-49 .87 
Soc-Des 15.75 (4.83) 6-28 .73 
PIQ = Persecutory Ideation Questionnaire, WBSIsup = White Bear Suppression Inventory 
Corrected, P A N A S N = Positive and Negative Affect Scale - negative items only, TMAS = 
Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, Soc-Des = Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
The mean PIQ score of 7.23 was somewhat lower than the previous administration 
o f this questionnaire to university students, which found a mean score o f 9.11 (McKay et 
al., 2006). Bivariate zero-order correlations among the variables are presented in Table 1.2. 
PIQ scores correlated positively with T M A S , P A N A S N , and WBSIsup, but negatively with 
social desirability. 
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Parametric statistical analysis was performed using a hierarchical multiple linear 
regression with PIQ score as the dependent variable. The assimiption of independence of 
residuals was assured, as the Durbin-Watson value of the model was 2.00. A Kolrnogorov-
Smimov test indicated that the standardized residuals did not deviate significantly from 
normality (D = 0.06, p> 0.05). Examination o f a plot o f standardized residuals against 
standardized predicted values suggested no violation o f the assumption of 
homoscedasticity. 
Table 1.2 
Bivariate correlations between variables under investigation 
P I Q WBSlsup TMAS P A N A S N Soc-Des 
P I Q - .40* .55* .43* -.39* 
WBSlsup - .58* .52* -.44* 
TMAS - .67* - .51* 
P A N A S N - -.50* 
SoG-Des 
* p <. 001 
The variables known to be associated with persecutory ideation ( T M A S and P A N A S N ) 
were entered in a first step (Field, 2000). Gender was also entered in the first step as 
paranoid ideation is more common in young men than women ( A P A , 2000; Reich, 1987). 
Age was not entered due to the homogeneous nature o f the sample, and its non-significant 
correlation with P I Q scores (r = -.04, n.s.). This model was a significant predictor of P I Q 
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scores, = .34, F(3,179) = 30.28,p < .001. Both TMAS, p = .48,p < .001, and gender 
(higher scores in males), p = .18,p < .01, were significant predictors of PIQ scores, but 
P A N A S N was not, p = .14, n.s. 
Table 1.3 
Results o f hierarchical multiple linear regression of PIQ scores 
P 
Gender .14 <.05 
T M A S .39 <.001 
P A N A S N .08 .42 
WBSIsup .11 .21 
WBSIsup * T M A S .26 <.01 
WBSIsup * P A N A S N -.14 .16 
WBSIsup * P A N A S N * T M A S .01 .98 
Soc-Des -.12 .11 
Note: Bold type indicates significant result. 
The remaining variables under investigation, namely WBSIsup, its two-way interaction with 
T M A S , its two-way interaction with P A N A S N , its three-way interaction with both T M A S 
and P A N A S N , and social desirability, were then entered in a second step (Field, 2005). 
WBSIsup, T M A S and P A N A S N scores were centered prior to forming the multiplicative 
term as recommended by Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan (1990) in order to remove 
multicollinearity from the data. This step was significant, AR^ = .045, ZiF(3,173) = 2.5l,p 
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< .05. The overall model was also significant, F(9,173) = 13.40,/j < .001. The results for 
this overall model are presented in Table 1.3. 
Figure 1.1 
Analysis of interaction between anxiety (TMAS) and thought suppression (WBSlsup) on 
persecutory ideation (PIQ). 
TMAS 
-WBSlsup (mean plus 1 SD) 
-WBSlsup (mean) 
-WBSlsup (mean less 1 SD) 
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In this model gender and T M A S remained significant predictors o f PIQ, with P A N A S N still 
not predicting PIQ scores. This model also showed WBSIsup, its two-way interaction with 
P A N A S N , and its three-way interaction with P A N A S N and T M A S , not to be significant 
predictors of PIQ. Social desirability was not a predictor of PIQ scores. However, the two-
way interaction between WBSIsup and T M A S was a significant predictor o f PIQ scores. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the significant two-way interacfion between WBSIsup and 
TMAS. In preparing this figure, the model's regression equation was used over the range of 
TMAS scores, for high, average and low values o f thought suppression (defined as mean 
score plus one standard deviation, mean score, and mean score less one standard deviation, 
respectively) with all other predictors at mean levels. Figure 1.1 demonstrates that thought 
suppression has a greater effect on PIQ scores when anxiety levels are high. 
Discussion 
The study reported here was designed as a preliminary investigation of the relation 
between thought suppression and persecutory ideation. Zero-order correlations showed that 
both anxiety and negative affect correlated positively with levels of PDLBs. However, 
regression analysis showed that only anxiety explained a significant amount o f imique 
variance in PDLB levels with anxiety, but not negative affect, predicting PDLB levels. This 
supports Freeman and colleagues' (Freeman et al., 2002, Freeman, 2007) contention that 
anxiety is the key emotion in PDs. Gender was also found to be a significant predictor of 
PDLBs, with males reporting higher PIQ levels than females. This is in line with the greater 
prevalence of paranoid personality disorder in males than females (APA, 2000). 
Although a positive zero-order correlation was found between thought suppression 
and PDLBs, in line with our first hypothesis thought suppression was found not to predict 
any unique variance in levels o f PDLBs. Our second hypothesis was also supported, with 
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the two-way interaction between anxiety and thought suppression being a significant 
predictor o f PDLBs. Further analysis showed that it was only when anxiety levels were 
high that thought suppression had a significant effect on PDLBs. Our third and fourth 
hypotheses, that there would be a two-way interaction between negative affect and thought 
suppression, and a three-way interaction between negative affect, anxiety and thought 
suppression, were not supported. Finally, in line with our fifth hypothesis, participants' 
levels o f social desirability bias did predict their PDLB levels. 
The present study was thus able for the first time to establish a relation between 
thought suppression and PDLBs. That said, only a relatively small amount o f variance 
(4.5%) in persecutory ideation was accounted for by the interaction between thought 
suppression and anxiety. The statistical significance o f this variance component presumably 
results fi-om the relatively large sample size employed. I f thought suppression does play a 
role in PDLBs, it clearly must do so in conjunction with a range of other factors. Some 
possible relevant factors identified by Freeman (2007) include anomalous experiences 
(such as hallucinations, which may in turn be related to illegal drug use), interpersonal 
sensitivity, reasoning biases (e.g., the jumping to conclusions bias), isolation and trauma. 
Thought suppression is hence likely to have a role only as part o f a multi-factorial 
explanation o f PDs. 
Some caveats need to be made about these findings. Firstly, this was a correlational 
study, which could not determine whether thought suppression, via its putative twin effects 
of post-suppression rebound and hyperaccessibility o f the thought, plays a role in the 
development o f PDs, in their maintenance, or both. Secondly, although it is possible that 
our use o f online questionnaires may have led to unrepresentative patterns of responding, 
studies have shown that data collected by such questionnaires (including the measure o f 
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persecutory ideation used in this study) are consistent with those collected by more 
traditional methods (e.g., Jones et al., 2008). 
The present findings suggest a number of avenues for future research. Firstly, the 
models o f PDs discussed in the Introduction suggest that, in addition to an initial 
implausible thought, cognitive biases such as the jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) bias are 
also needed for PDs to form. It would hence be profitable to replicate our study whilst 
concurrently assessing levels o f the JTC bias. That said, no relation between the JTC bias 
and paranoid thinking was found in a recent study with non-clinical participants (Freeman 
et al., 2005). This may be due to biases in reasoning being more subtle outside o f acute 
delusional states, and/or the small size of the sample (N = 30). Alternatively, there may be 
no direct relation between levels of JTC bias and PDLBs; instead, JTC bias may only 
predict levels of PDLBs through its interaction with other variables. On the basis of the 
present findings, we would expect two-way interactions between the JTC bias and both 
anxiety and thought suppression in predicting PDLBs. Specifically, the JTC bias should 
only predict PDLBs when anxiety is high, and thought suppression should only predict 
PDLBs when the JTC bias is high. In terms o f the three-way interaction, thought 
suppression should have its strongest predictive value in relation to PDLBs when both 
anxiety and JTC bias levels are high. 
It is also possible that the relation between thought suppression and PDLBs may be 
due to other mechanisms than those discussed above. One possibility is that thought 
suppression is associated with PDLBs due to its potential to lead to defensive projection, 
defined by Newman et al. (1997) as "the act o f perceiving in other people those 
characteristics that one wishe[s] to deny in oneself (p. 980). It has been empirically 
demonsfrated that suppressing one's negative traits leads to the perception of increased 
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levels o f such traits in other people (Newman et al., 1997). This finding suggests that a 
contributing factor to the generation o f the initial implausible or unjustified thought with 
persecutory content, highlighted in Davies et al.'s (2001) two-factor model o f PDs 
discussed above, might be suppression o f ego-dystonic thoughts (negative thoughts about 
the self that are threatening to one's self-image). Specifically, suppression of an ego-
dystonic thought (e.g., " I am not trustworthy"), resulting in that thought becoming 
hyperaccessible, could in turn predispose an individual to perceive the associated trait in 
other people's behaviour, resulting in thoughts with a persecutory flavour. Such a 
hypothesis could be tested through investigating whether suppressing thoughts about 
specific negative traits in the self leads to increased attributions of persecutory intent to 
ambiguous behaviours. 
The present findings w i l l also need to be replicated in a clinical population. Such a 
study could attempt to establish whether thought suppression plays a causal role in PD 
formafion. This could be done by examining levels of thought suppression in patients with 
PDs and patients with generalised anxiety disorder. I f thought suppression plays a causal 
role in PD formation, we would expect patients with PDs to have higher thought 
suppression levels than controls matched for anxiety levels (when controlling for the JTC 
bias). Another approach would be to examine longitudinally these variables in individuals 
at high risk of developing PDs, with a view to determining whether the proposed causal 
factors in PD formation are present before the onset of the dysfunctional beliefs. 
In conclusion, the present study provided preliminary evidence that thought 
suppression is associated with PDLBs. Future research is needed to establish whether 
thought suppression plays a role in the development and/or maintenance o f clinically 
relevant PDs. Any such findings would have clear implications for treatment. One 
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therapeutic ipossibility might be for patients to be encouraged openly to^  express the 
thoughtsithey ihaveibeenisuppressing. Xn iight'of Sparrow and Wegrier's.(2006) findings^ 
that intrusive thoughts; may be deactivated iby merely iexpressing them, this woiild !be 
expectedl to ihave 'beneficial effects;for !the ipatients. Such studies should help to test the 
vai idity o f our iproposal that there iis a' role for thought suppressibii' in cognitive models of 
PD formation. 
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Chapter 2 
Anxiety, anomalous experiences, jumping to conclusions and persecutory 
delusion-like beliefs 
ABSTRACT 
Two-factor models o f persecutory delusions suggest that they are formed in two stages. The 
first involves the generation of an initial implausible thought that is subsequently 
uncritically accepted as a belief through the operation o f second-stage factors, such as the 
jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias. Drawing on a healthy non-clinical sample (N = 165), 
the present study tested the hypothesis that the JTC bias would not be an independent 
predictor o f persecutory delusion-like beliefs (PDLBs), but that it would predict such 
experiences through its interaction with first-stage factors (social anxiety, anomalous 
experiences, thought suppression, and social rank). In support o f this hypothesis, no main 
effect o f the JTC bias was found on PDLB levels. The only significant interaction between 
the JTC bias and a first-stage factor was with social rank. Social rank had a greater effect 
on levels o f PDLBs when the JTC bias was present. It was concluded that, although these 
results offered some support for two-factor models o f PD formation, the JTC bias was not a 
necessary condition for PD formation. Avenues for future research and clinical implications 
are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Two-factor models o f the formation o f delusions (e.g., Davies, Coltheart, Langdon, & 
Breen, 2001; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; see Chapter 1) suggest a two-stage process of 
persecutory delusion (PD) formation with each stage in turn associated with specific 
cognitive deficits and biases. The first stage, in the case of PDs, is the triggering of an 
initial implausible thought which, once triggered, is uncritically adopted as a belief as a 
result of the operation of second-stage factors such as the jumping to conclusions (JTC) 
bias. This bias has been fi-equently documented in those with delusions (Garety & Freeman, 
1999) and, in the only study to look specifically at PDs in relation to the JTC bias, Startup, 
Freeman, and Garety (2008) found that 50% of patients with schizophrenia with PDs 
demonstrated a JTC bias, compared to only 10% of healthy, non-clinical controls. 
A number o f factors are likely to play a role in the first stage o f PD formation. One 
important candidate factor which may seed initial persecutory ideas is anxiety (Freeman, 
2007; Jones & Femyhough, 2008; see Chapter 1). Furthermore, as paranoid thoughts build 
upon common interpersonal anxieties and worries (Freeman et al., 2003), social anxiety in 
particular is likely to play a key role in the generation o f initial implausible thoughts. 
Secondly, Freeman (2007) suggests that social rank may be an important element in 
persecutory ideation formation. For example, greater levels o f paranoid ideation in healthy 
individuals have been found to be associated with lower social rank (Freeman et al., 2005). 
This study found that suspiciousness was also associated with low social rank. It hence 
seems plausible that low social rank may make it more likely for individuals to be 
suspicious and to generate initial implausible thoughts. 
A third factor that may be involved in the generation o f initial implausible ideas is 
the presence of anomalous experiences such as heightened perceptions of colour, increased 
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salience o f events, hypersensitivity to sound, and hallucinatory experiences. This proposal 
stems from the work of Maher (1974), who proposed that delusional experiences result 
from rational interpretations of unusual experiences. The evidence linking anomalous 
experiences and persecutory ideation is limited. However, in a series of studies using a 
methodology involving participants encountering avatars in a virtual reality environment, 
Freeman and colleagues (Freeman et al., 2003, 2005) found that a predisposition to 
anomalous experiences made persecutory ideation more likely. In these studies participants 
wore helmets, immersing them in a virtual reality environment. Participants were presented 
with a scenario in which other individuals ('avatars') were presented to them as other 
passengers on a underground train. Although the avatars were programmed to act in a 
neutral manner, around a third o f participants experienced the avatars' behaviour as 
persecutory. Individuals were more likely to experience persecutory ideation, as opposed to 
simply social anxiety, i f they had high levels o f hallucination-proneness (as assessed by 
self-report questionnaire). Finally, a fourth factor implicated in the creation o f initial 
implausible ideas is thought suppression, which may make thoughts hyperaccessible and 
amplify suppressed thoughts (Jones & Femyhough, 2008; see Chapter 1). 
The two-factor model of PD formation predicts that such initial implausible ideas 
are likely to be transformed into beliefs o f a delusional intensity when they are 
accompanied by biases in reasoning, such as the JTC bias. However, interactions between 
factors associated with the first and second stages of the two-factor model have not yet 
been experimentally investigated. The present study examined the hypothesis that biases in 
reasoning, specifically the JTC bias, would not in themselves predict levels of PDLBs, 
imless there were also high accompanying levels of the factors proposed to create the initial 
implausible thought. Specific hypotheses (see below) involved two-way interactions among 
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potential first-stage factors highlighted above and the second-stage factor of the JTC bias. 
Support for these hypotheses would constitute strong evidence in favour of a two-factor 
model. Conversely, evidence of the JTC bias independently predicting PDLBs would run 
coimter to two-factor models. 
The study set out to test the following hypotheses. Firstly, it was predicted that the 
JTC bias would not be an independent predictor o f levels o f PDLBs (Hypothesis 1). 
Secondly, it was predicted that there would be two-way interactions between the JTC bias 
and social anxiety (Hypothesis 2a), social rank (Hypothesis 2b), anomalous experiences 
(Hypothesis 2c), and thought suppression (Hypothesis 2d). It was predicted that all these 
first-stage factors would have a stronger effect on levels o f PDLBs when the JTC bias was 
present, as opposed to absent. The study also took the novel step of utilising two separate 
measures o f persecutory ideation in order to attempt to achieve convergent validity for any 
conclusions. 
Method 
Participants 
Undergraduate and postgraduate students (N = 165, 89 women) at a United 
Kingdom university, with a mean age of 20.2 years (SD = 1.3, range = 18-25) participated 
in the study. Participants were recruited through e-mail invitation. There was no financial 
incentive to participate. Answers were given anonymously, with only age and gender being 
requested. Response rates were approximately 20%, and comparable to previous studies 
employing on-line questionnaires o f similar length (e.g., Kaplowitz, Hadlock & Levine, 
2004). On-line questionnaires have been shown to be a reliable method of data collection 
(Jones, Femyhough, de-Wit, & Meins, 2008; see Appendix A) . 
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Measures 
Jumping to conclusions bias: This was assessed using an on-line version of the 
probabilistic reasoning task known as the 'beads task'; a methodology based on earlier 
studies of probabilistic reasoning (e.g., Phillips & Edwards, 1966). Participants are asked to 
obtain as many pieces of evidence (in the form of coloured beads) as they need in order to 
make a decision (about which o f two jars the beads came from) with certainty. The number 
of beads requested before making a decision is termed the number o f 'draws to decision'. 
Participants who take only a few draws to decision are seen to be making decisions based 
on only a small amount o f the available evidence, and are hence said to demonstrate a 
jumping to conclusions bias. Participants were first given instructions, on-line. They were 
next shown pictures of two jars, one with 85 black beads and 15 yellow beads, the other 
with 15 black beads and 85 yellow beads. The participant was then showri ajar (with a blue 
cloth around it) and told it was one of the two jars they had just seen. They next had to use 
the mouse to click on a button on screen which said "Show me a bead". This bead was then 
shown coming out o f the jar, and a picture of this bead was shown on the bottom of the 
screen. Participants were told in the initial instructions that the bead was actually placed 
back in the jar after it was drawn, and that the picture on screen was to help them recall 
what beads had been seen. The participant could then either click "Show me another bead" 
or " I am completely certain which jar it is". I f the participant chose to see another bead, this 
was shown on the screen, alongside the previous bead. This on-screen presentation of 
already-selected beads was intended to reduce working memory demand aspects o f the 
task. I f the participant clicked " I am completely certain which jar it is", then they were 
taken to a new screen where they were shown pictures of the 'mostly black' and 'mostly 
yellow' jars, and invited to click on the picture o f the jar they thought the beads had come 
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from. The order of the beiads drawn was fixed and was always 
B B B Y B B B B Y Y B B B B B B B B Y B (B refers to a black bead and Y to a yellow bead). This 
order was previously employed by McKay, Langdon, and Coltheart (2006a). 
Persecutory ideation: Persecutory ideation was assessed using the Persecutory 
Ideation Questionnaire (PIQ; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2006b). This is a 10-item 
questionnaire designed to measure persecutory ideation in both clinical and non-clinical 
samples. Items are rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "Very True" (4) to "Very 
Untrue" (0). This measure has been shown to have good reliability and validity (McKay et 
al., 2006b). A second measure of persecutory ideation was also employed to enable 
convergent validity to be obtained for any conclusions. This was the Persecution and 
Deservedness Scale (PADS: Melo, Corcoran, Shryane, & Bentall, in press). This is a 10-
item self-report measure o f persecutory ideation, which also assesses the perceived 
deservedness o f the experience (although the latter is not reported on here). Items are rated 
on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "Certainly false" (0) to "Certainly true" (4). This 
has been found to have satisfactory psychometric properties (ibid). 
Social Anxiety: This was assessed by the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; 
Liebowitz, 1987), a 24-item self-report measure in which participants first rate the amount 
of fear a social situation causes them. This is scored on a four-point Likert scale ranging 
from "none" (0) to "severe" (3). Participants then rate how much they avoid such situations, 
and respond on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from "never" (0) to "usually" (3). An overall 
total score is calculated by summing the total fear and total avoidance scores. The LSAS 
has been shown to be a valid and reliable tool (Baker, Heinrichs, Kim, & Hofinann, 2002). 
Anomalous experiences. This was assessed using the Unusual Experiences subscale 
of the short form version of the Oxford and Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and 
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Experiences (0-LIFE: Mason, Linney, & Claridge, 2005). This is a 15-item self-report 
measure, in which participants respond 'Yes' (1) or 'No ' (0) to items such as "Have you 
sometimes sensed an evil presence around you, even though you could not see it?". This 
has been shown to have satisfactory psychometric properties (ibid). 
Thought suppression: This was assessed using Muris et al.'s (1996) lO-item 
corrected version o f the White Bear Suppression Inventory ( W B S I ; Wegner & Zanakos, 
1994), the WBSIsup (Chapter 1). This measure has been shown to have satisfactory 
reliability and validity (Jones & Femyhough, 2006; Muris et al., 1996). The WBSIsup was 
used as a measure of the conscious desire to suppress thoughts. Items are rated on a five-
point Likert scale ranging from "Strongly Agree" (5) to "Strongly Disagree" (1). Total 
scores on the WBSIsup can hence range from 10 to 50. 
Social Rank: This was assessed using the Social Comparison Scale (Allan & 
Gilbert, 1995), an 11-item scale in which participants rate themselves on a 10-point Likert 
scale anchored in two bipolar constructs such as left out-accepted and unattractive-more 
attractive. For example, on the first item participants are asked to rate on a ten-point scale 
anchored in 'inferior' (1) and 'superior' (10) how they typically feel in relation to others. A 
higher score represents a higher perceived social rank. The Social Comparison Scale has 
been shown to have satisfactory psychometric properties (ibid). 
Results 
Initial analyses 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.1. Due to a coding error, data for iteni 
11 on the Social Comparison Scale was not recorded. However, the resulting 10-item scale 
still had satisfactory internal reliability (alpha = .90). Kolmogorov-Siiiimov tests indicated 
that PIQ and PADS scores were non-normally distributed, Z)(165) = .\5,p< .001, and 
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£>(165) = .07, p< .05 respectively. Non-parametric correlafional analyses were therefore 
utilised and relations between the continuous variables under investigation are presented in 
Table 2.2. Notably, a significant negative correlation was found between both PIQ and 
PADS scores and social rank. Additionally, the positive correlation between thought 
suppression and persecutory ideation found by previous research (Jones & Femyhough, 
2008; see Chapter 1) was replicated. Jones and Femyhough (2008) previously found a 
positive relation between anxiety and thought suppression; the results in Table 2.2 show 
that thought suppression is also related to specifically social anxiety (see also Chapter 4). 
Table 2.1 
Descriptive statistics 
Mean (SD) Range Cronbach's alpha 
PIQ 7.13 (5.08) 0-23 .82 
PADS 13.35 (7.81) 0-33 .83 
Beads 9.18(6.77) 2-20 n/a 
SocAnx 42.13 (20.45) 6-103 .80 
0-LIFEuE 3.80 (2.70) 0-12 .74 
Social Rank 57.67 (13.71) 25-91 .90 
WBSIsup 34.40 (7.86) 13-50 .80 
Note. PIQ = Persecutory Ideation Questionnaire, PADS = Persecution and Deservedness 
Questionnaire, Beads = Draws to Decision on Beads Task, SocArix = Liebowitz Social 
Anxiety Scale, 0 - L I F E U E = Unusual Experiences siibscale of the Oxford and Liverpool 
Inventory of Feelings and Experiences, Social Rank = Social Comparison Scale, and 
WBSIsup = White Bear Suppression Inventory - Corrected. 
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Table 2.2 
Non-parametric bivariate correlational analysis between continuous variables 
PIQ PADS SocAnx 0-LIFEuE Social rank WBSIsup 
PIQ 1 .65* .31* .24* -.32* .30* 
PADS - 1 .40* .24* -.35* .41* 
SocAnx - - 1 .13 -.54* .30* 
0-LIFEuE - - - 1 .04 .27* 
Social rank - - - - 1 -.26* 
WBSIsup - - - - - 1 
* p < .003 
Table 2.3 
Non-parametric bivariate correlational analysis between interval level measures for JTC-
(JTC+) group 
PIQ PADS SocAnx 0-LIFEuE Social rank WBSIsup 
PIQ 1 .66* (.52*) .24 (.47*) .23 (.27) -.25 (-.37) .24 (.36) 
PADS - 1 .34* (.45) .33* (-.09) -.22 (-.64*) .41* (.41) 
SocAnx - - 1 .13 (.15) -.46* (-.65*) .28* (.28) 
0-LIFEuE - - - 1 .04 (.18) .26 (.29) 
Social rank _ _ - - 1 -.30* (-.13) 
WBSIsup 
* p < . 0 0 3 
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Distribution o f draws to decision 
It has previously been suggested that the draws to decision (DTD) variable on the 
beads task should not be treated as an interval scale, as the beads differ in informational 
value (Freema:n, Pugh, & Garety, 2008). This has led such data typically being 
dichotomised (i.e., JTC bias present, JTC bias absent) in order to identify extreme 
responding styles. The distribution o f draws to decision in the present study is shown in 
Figure 2.1. The clustering of responses observed in Figure 2.1 suggested a trimodal 
distribufion of responses. Although no participants made their decision after seeing just one 
draw, a distinct group of early responders making a decision after 2 or 3 draws was 
diseernable (n = 39, 24% of sample) Although, Freeman et al. have suggested that the cut-
o f f for a JTC bias be set at 2 beads or less, others have used a criterion o f 3 beads (e.g., van 
Dael et al., 2005). For the purposes of the present study, the presence of a JTC bias was 
defined as those making a decision after 3 or fewer beads. This group (n = 39) is henceforth 
referred to as JTC+. 
A second cluster o f individuals chose after 5, 6, or 7 beads (« = 61, 37% of sample). 
At the other end o f the spectrum of responses, a clearly distinguishable group of individuals 
(n = 39, 24% of total sample) took the fu l l 20 possible draws to decide. Previous research 
using face-to-face administrations o f the beads task shows that taking 10 or more draws is 
only usually observed in 1% of participants (e.g., Dudley, John, Young, & Over, 1997). It 
may be that the absence of face-to-face interaction with a real experimenter, and 
presumably therefore a reduced social pressure to make a decision, enabled the participants 
to feel freer to select more beads in this on-line format. This point wi l l be returned to in the 
Discussion. For the purposes of the present study, and to avoid unnecessary reductions to 
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the power of the analyses, all those taking more than 3 beads to reach a decision were 
classed as not showing a JTC bias. This group (n = 126) is henceforth referred to as JTC-. 
The mean DTD for the total sample (N = 165) was 9.18 (6.77). This was 
significantly higher thian previous faee-to-face administrations o f the 85:15 ratio Beads 
Task in non-clinical samples. For example, Dudley et al. (1997) found a mean DTD of 4.9 
(SD = 1.9) beads. As noted above, the higher mean DTD score in the present sample was 
due to a significant number of participants requesting the fiiU mmiber of available beads. 
The mean (SD) DTD in the JTC+ group (n = 39) was 2.72 (.46), and the mean (SD) DTD 
in the JTC- group ( « = 126) was 11.17 (6.55). 
The relations between the continuous variables in the JTC+ and JTC- groups are 
presented in Table 2.3. Differing patterns o f correlations for the two JTC bias groups were 
followed up by the testing o f interactions between the JTC bias and the continuous 
variables. This was done through multiple linear regression analyses. 
Multiple linear regression analyses 
Multiple linear regression (MLR) analyses were used to analyse the data. Separate 
MLRs were conducted with PIQ and PADS as the respective dependent variables. Age and 
gender were entered in a first step to control for the potential influence o f these variables. 
The continuous variables o f social anxiety, social rank, anomalous experiences and thought 
suppression were entered in a second step, in addition to JTC group which was coded as a 
dummy variable (JTC+ = 1, JTC- = 0). In order to examine interaction effects between 
first- and second-stage factors, 2-way interactions between JTC group and social anxiety, 
social rank, anomalous experiences, and thought suppression were also entered in this step. 
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Beads group, social anxiety, social rank, anomalous experiences, and thought suppression 
scores were all mean-centered in order to remove multicollinearity from the data, as 
recommended by Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan (1990). This initial analysis showed that age 
and gender were not significant predictors o f PIQ or PADS scores, and hence the analyses 
were repeated with these variables excluded, a process recommended by Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2007) in order to maximize the power of analyses. 
For the M L R with PADS score as the DV, a Kolmogorov-Smimov test indicated 
the residuals were normally distributed, D(165)= .04, n.s. However, in order to meet the 
assumption of normally distributed residuals for the M L R with PIQ score as the DV, a 
square root transformation had to be applied. After this transformation a Kolmogorov-
Smimov test indicated that the residuals were normally distributed, D(165) = .05, n.s. 
Results o f the MLRs are presented in Table 2.4. 
For both MLRs, 0 - L I F E U E , social rank, and WBSIsup were all independent 
predictors of levels of PDLBs. However, JTC group and social anxiety were not. The 2-
way interaction between social rank and JTC group was significant in predicting PADS 
scores, although only a trend towards significance was found for the equivalent interaction 
when predicting PIQ scores. No other 2-way interactions were significant predictors o f 
either PADS or PIQ scores. Figure 2.2 illustrates the significant 2-way interaction between 
JTC group and social rank in predicting PADS scores. In preparing this figure, the model's 
regression equation was used for both JTC groups (JTC+, JTC-) over the observed range of 
centered social rank scores with all other predictors at rhean levels. Figure 2.2 demonstrates 
that social rank has a greater effect on PADS scores in the JTC+ group. 
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Table 2.4 
Results o f multiple linear regressions 
PIQ [Sqrt] PADS 
sig P. sig 
R^  = .23 R' = .36 
F(9,155) = 5.09,/»< .001 F(9,155) = 9.49, p<.001 
SocArix .12,p = .18 .16, p = .05 
0-LIFEuE .17,p<.05 .15,^ < .05 
Social rank -.20,p = <.05 -.20,p<.05 
WBSIsup .20,p<.01 .30,/X.OOl 
JTC Group -.02,/? = .84 -.08,p = .25 
JTC Group * SocAnx .06,p = .55 .13,/? = .14 
JTC Group * 0-LlFEuE -M,p=.57 .10, p = .\6 
JTC Group * Social rank .18, p = . 08 .^\,p<M\ 
JTC Group * WBSIsup -.04,p = .64 -.06,p = .44 
Note. Bold font indicates significant result, italics indicate a trend toward significance. 
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Figure 2.2 
Illustration of interaction effect between social rank and JTC group in predicting PADS 
scores 
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Discussion 
The present study aimed to test a range of predictions stemming frorn two-stage 
models o f PD formation. Bivariate correlational analyses found higher levels of social 
anxiety, anomalous experiences and thought suppression were all associated with greater 
levels o f PDLBs. Lower levels o f social rank were also associated with greater levels o f 
PDLBs. However, multiple linear regression analyses showed that although anomalous 
experiences, social rank, and thought suppression were significant predictors of levels of 
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PDLBs, social anxiety was not. The finding that thought suppression was a significant 
predictor of levels o f persecutory ideation was surprising as previous studies (Jones & 
Femyhough, 2008; see Chapter 1) found thought suppression not to be an independent 
predictor o f levels of PDLBs. 
In terms o f specific hypotheses, the first hypothesis, that there would be no main 
effect o f JTC bias on levels o f PDLBs, was supported. Hypotheses 2a, 2c, and 2d, that there 
would be 2-way interactions between the JTC bias and social anxiety, anomalous 
experiences and thought suppression respectively, were not supported. In contrast, support 
was found for Hypothesis 2b, that there would be a 2-way interaction between the JTC bias 
and social rank. In line with the direction o f this hypothesis, analysis o f this interaction 
showed that social rank had a greater effect in the group where the JTC was present. In 
those with a JTC bias, lower social rank was associated with greater levels of PDLBs. 
In summary, these findings are broadly in line with two-factor models of PD 
formation which propose that, in addition to cognitive biases such as the JTC bias, factors 
causing an initial implausible thought are required. That said, the only factor found to 
interact with the JTC bias was social rank. This could be taken to indicate that social rank is 
the only factor o f those investigated to create the type o f thoughts which, when combined 
with a JTC bias, can lead to persecutory ideation. There is now the need for more detailed 
studies o f the role o f social rank in persecutory ideation, what the experiences associated 
with low social rank are, and how they can seed initial implausible thoughts. It is plausible 
that lower social rank leads to initial implausible ideas due to the greater social threat 
anticipation associated with such a status. It has already been found that patients with 
schizophrenia with PDs show greater threat anticipation than controls (Corcoran et al., 
2006). It would hence be profitable to examine the relation between social rank and minute-
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to-minute social cognitions. Specifically it would be interesting to assess whether those low 
in social rank have greater numbers of thoughts about other's intentions towards them, and 
whether these tend to be more negative than controls. One methodology that is particularly 
suited to studying this is the experience sampling method (ESM). In ESM participants wear 
a watch that beeps a fixed number of times each day, at random intervals. At these beeps, 
participants are required to report their current affective states and cognitions when this 
beep occurs. This methodology has already been employed with patients with 
schizophrenia and PDs, finding that they had more unstable levels of self-esteem than 
controls (Thewissen, Bentall, Lecomte, van Os, & Myin-Germeys, 2008). 
The finding that anomalous experiences, social rank, and thought suppression were 
all independent predictors of levels of PDLBs could be taken to indicate that such factors 
are a sufficient cause of PDLBs, without the need for accompanying cognitive biases. A 
comparable line of reasoning would also suggest that the presence of the JTC bias is 
unlikely to be a sufficient cause of PDLBs. Thus, the present findings are consistent with a 
view that there are multiple routes to PDLBs, one operating directly through anomalous 
experiences, social rank, and thought suppression, without necessitating any cognitive 
biases, and another in which PDLBs arise through a two-factor process in which a JTC bias 
operates on initial implausible ideas created by social rank. 
A number of limitations of the present study need to be acknowledged. Firstly, as 
this was a correlational study, neither causation, nor direction of potential relations can be 
established. Secondly, no previous published studies have reported results of administering 
the beads task in an on-line format, rather than face-to-face. Although the on-line method 
has the advantage of being able to administer the task to large numbers of participants 
cheaply and efficiently, hence conferring greater statistical power, it also has potential 
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limitations. It is firstly prudent to consider the possibility that on-line administration may 
have affected patterns of responding. One way in which the on-line administration of the 
beads task may have affected the results is through the possibility (which we cannot 
completely eliminate) that participants may have failed to understand the written 
instructions, or have skipped over these, paying them only cursory attention. Such a 
possibility could be reduced in future on-line studies by displaying the instructions for a 
fixed minimum interval, and/or only letting participants proceed to the study proper after 
correctly answering on-line questions about how the study will work and what they are to 
do. A second way in which on-line administration may have affected the results is due to 
the anonymous nature of the task. The finding that a significant number of individuals took 
more than ten beads to reach a decision in this on-line version of the task raises an 
interesting question about the role of social pressures in choice-making on the beads task. 
One obvious difference between the online and face-to-face administration formats is that 
the former includes little social pressure to produce an answer. It could be argued that the 
on-line version actually assesses 'off-line' decision-making abilities, which are unlike those 
required in real-time, real-world situations. This may be addressed in fiiture studies, as 
Femyhough, Jones, Whittle, and Waterhouse (2008) have suggested, by introducing an 
element of a social interactional context to on-line tasks, such as a virtual 'experimenter' 
asking for responses. Such a procedure might potentially result in a greater load on online 
processing. However, ultimately, this again highlights the need to replicate these findings in 
a face-to-faee administration format. 
In conclusion, this study offers some evidence consistent with a two-factor model of 
PD formation. Evidence was found that social rank, a possible source of initial implausible 
ideas, had a stronger effect on levels of PDLBs when the JTC bias was also present. 
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However, the JTC bias appeared to be neither a sufficient nor a necessary cause of PDLBs, 
as anomalous experiences, social rank and thought suppression (but not the presence of the 
JTC bias) all independently predicted levels of PDLBs. These findings would be consistent 
with a one-factor model, in which single factors (anomalous experiences, social rank and 
thought suppression) are sufficient to lead to PDLBs, without the necessary presence of 
reasoning biases. 
The present findings therefore suggest the need for further research into the impact 
of the JTC bias on persecutory ideation. For example, PDs have been argued to be a 
multidimensional phenomenon (Freeman, 2007) with dimensions such as distress and 
conviction. Given that the JTC bias has been proposed to be associated with the uncritical 
acceptance of initial implausible ideas, it would be interesting to exarnine whether the JTC 
bias impacts specifically upon PD conviction. It is also important that the findings of the 
present study be replicated in a clinical population. Direct tests of the two-factor model 
would presumably be quite feasible in such clinical groups. For example, one could 
compare levels of anxiety and the presence of the JTC bias in patients with persecutory 
delusions, and patients with generalised anxiety disorder (but no persecutory ideation). The 
two-factor model would predict that although levels of anxiety may not differ between 
these two groups, greater levels of the JTC bias would be found in the patients with 
persecutory ideation. Such studies would offer greater insight into the processes behind 
PDs, which should be extremely valuable to allowing further development of cognitive 
behavioural therapies for individuals with these fi-equently distressing belief systems. 
63 
Chapter 2: Jumping to conclusions and persecutory ideation 
References 
Allan, S., & Gilbert, P. (1995). A social comparison scale: Psychometric properties and 
relationship to psychopathology. Personality & Individual Differences, 19, 293-299. 
Baker, S. L., Heinrichs, N. , Kim, H., & Hofinann, S. G. (2002). The Liebowitz Social 
Anxiety Scale as a self-report instrument: a preliminary psychometric analysis. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 701-715. 
Corcoran R,, Ciummins, S., Rowse, G., Moore, R., Blackwood, N., Howard, R., et al. 
(2006). Reasoning under uncertainty: heuristic judgments in patients with 
persecutory delusions or depression. Psychological Medicine, 36, 1109-1118. 
Davies, M., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., & Breen, N. (2001). Monothematic delusions: 
Towards a two-factor account. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 8, 133-158. 
Dudley, R. E. J., John, C. H., Young, A. W., & Over, D. E. (1997). Normal and abnormal 
reasoning in people with delusions. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 36, 
243-258. 
Femyhough, C, Jones, S. R., Whittle, C , Waterhouse, J., & Bentall, R. P. (2008). Theory 
of Mind, Schizotypy, and Persecutory Ideation in Young Adults. Cognitive 
Neuropsychiatry, 13, 233-249. 
Freeman, D. (2007). Suspicious minds: The psychology of persecutory delusions. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 27, 425-457. 
Freeman, D., Bebbington, P. E., Rollinson, R., Kuipers, E., Ray, K., & Dunn, G. (2006). 
Psychological investigation of the structure of paranoia in a non-clinical population. 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 186, 427-435. 
Freeman, D., Pugh, K., & Garety, P. (2008). Jumping to conclusions and paranoid ideation 
in the general population. Schizophrenia Research, 102, 254-260. 
64 
Chapter 2: Jumping to conclusions and persecutory ideation 
Freeman, D., Garety, P. A., Bebbington, P., Slater, M., Kuipers, E., Fowler, D., et al. 
(2005). The psychology of persecutory ideafion I I : A virtual reality experimental 
study. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 193, 309-315. 
Freeman, D., Slater, M., Bebbington, P. E., Garety, P. A., Kuipers, E., Fowler, D., et a]. 
(2003). Can virtual reality be used to investigate persecutory ideation? Journal of 
Nervous and Mental Disease, 191, 509-514. 
Garety, P. A., & Freeman, D. (1999). Cognitive approaches to delusions: A critical review 
of theories and evidence. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 38, 113-154. 
Jones, S. R., & Femyhough, C. (2006). The roles of thought suppression and metacognitive 
beliefs in proneness to auditory verbal hallucinafions in a non-clinical sample. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 41, 1421-1432. 
Jones, S. R., & Femyhough, C. (2008). Thought suppression and persecutory delusion-like 
beliefs in a non-clinical sample. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 13, 281-295. 
Jones, S. R., Femyhough, C, de-Wit, & Meins, E. (2008). A message in the medium? 
Assessing the reliability of psychopathology e-questiormaires. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 44, 349-359. 
Kaplowitz, M., Hadlock, T. D., & Levine, R. (2004). A comparison of web and mail survey 
response rates. Public Opinion Quarterly, 68, 94-101. 
Langdon, R., Comer, T., McLaren, J., Ward, P. B., & Coltheart, M. (2006). Extemalizing 
and personalizing biases in persecutory delusions: The relationship with poor 
insight and theory-of-mind. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 699-713. 
Liebowitz, M. R. (1987). Social phobia. Modern Problems of Pharmacopsychiatry, 22, 
141-173. 
65 
Chapter 2: Jumping to conclusions and persecutory ideation 
Mason, O., Linney, Y., & Claridge, O. (2005). Short scales for measuring schizotypy. 
Schizophrenia Research, 78, 293- 296 
McKay, R., Langdon, R,, & Coltheart, M . (2006a). Need for closure, jumping to 
conclusions, and decisiveness in delusion-prone individuals. Journal of Nervous 
and Mental Disease, 194, 422-426. 
McKay, R., Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2006b). The Persecutory Ideation 
Questionnaire. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 194, 628-631. 
Melo, S. S., Corcoran, R., Shryane, N., & Bentall, R. P. (in press). The persecution and 
deservedness scale (PADS). Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and 
Practice. 
Phillips, L. D. & Edwards, W. (1966). Conservatism in a simple probabilistic inference 
task. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 72, 346-354. 
Sass, L. (1992). Madness and modernism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Startup, H., Freeman, D., & Garety, P. A. (2008). Jumping to conclusions and persecutory 
delusions. European Psychiatry, 23, 457-459. 
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2007). Using multivariate statistics. Boston: Pearson. 
Thewissen, V., Bentall, R., Lecomte, T., van Os., J., & Myin-Germeys, I . (2008). 
Paranoia and fluctuations in self-esteem in the context of daily life. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 117, 143^153. 
Van Dael, F., Versmissen, D., Janssen, I . , Myin-Germeys, I . , van Os, J., & Krabbendam, L. 
(2006). Data gathering: Biased in psychosis? Schizophrenia Bulletin, 32, 341-351. 
Wegner, D. M., & Zanakos, S. (1994). Chronic Thought Suppression. Journal of 
Personality, 62, 615-640. 
66 
'HALLUCINATIONS ANB' INTRUSIONS-
61 
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FOREWORD TO CHAPTERS 3 AND 4 
The studies reported in Chapters 1 and 2 examined the potential of thought 
suppression to contribute to the formation of persecutory delusion-like beliefs. It was noted 
that this relation was thought to pertain, in part, due to the potential of thought suppression 
to lead to intrusive thoughts. Chapter 1 found evidence that thought suppression in those; 
with high levels of anxiety may contribute to the formation or maintenance of persecutory 
delusion-like beliefs. Chapter 2 went beyond this to examine the relation between factors 
thought to cause the initial implausible thought (first-stage factors), and factors which lead 
to the uncritical acceptance of such a thought as a belief, specifically the jumping to 
conclusions bias. 
The next two chapters examine how intrusive thoughts, which thought suppression 
may contribute to, may form part of the cognitive processes that lead to hallucinations. 
Chapter 3 describes the developnient and evaluation of a new tool for the assessment of 
hallucinations in the hypnagogic and hypnopompic states. The relation of such experiences 
to the general tendency to experience intrusive thoughts is examined. Chapter 4 describes 
the testing of a model of auditory verbal hallucinations involving intrusions, thought 
suppression and rumination. This chapter then proposes an extended model which 
highlights a role for trauma and disrupted agency mechanisms in the formation and 
maintenance of these experiences. 
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Chapter 3 
In a dark time: Development, validation, and correlates of the 
Durham Hypnagogic and Hypnopompic Hallucinations 
Questionnaire ^ 
ABSTRACT 
One factor limiting research involving hypnagogic and hypnopompic (H&H) 
hallueinations is the lack of a brief, valid and reliable self-report measure of such 
experiences. The present paper reports on the development of the Durham 
Hypnagogic and Hypnopompic Hallucinations Questionnaire (DHQ) which consists 
of three unidimensional subscales assessing the presence of auditory, visual, and felt-
presence experiences in the H&H state. In a sample of 18-29 year olds (iV= 365) this 
scale was found to have satisfactory psychometric properties. A subsample (n = 293) 
completed self-report measures of intrusive thoughts, thought suppression and 
transliminality. Intrusive thoughts and the conscious desire to undertake thought 
suppression both correlated with levels of auditory, but not visual or felt-presence 
H & H hallucinations. Transliminality correlated with all DHQ subseales, but 
significantly more strongly with felt-presence than visual H&H experiences. 
Implications of these findings are considered, and recommendations for future 
research made. 
^ Chapter published as: Jones, S. R., Femyhough, C , & Meads, D. (2009). In a dark time: 
Development, validation, and correlates of the Durham Hypnagogic and Hypnopompic Hallucinations 
Questionnaire. Personality and Individual Differences, 46, 30-34. 
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Introduction 
Hallucinatory experiences on the borders of sleep affect the majority of individuals 
(Ohayon, 2000). Hypnagogic (experienced in the wake-sleep transition) and 
hypnopompic (experienced in the sleep-wake transition) hallucinations may occur 
across the spectrum of sensory modalities, including the visual, tactile, and olfactory. 
They may also involve feelings of a presence that cannot be heard, felt, seen or smelt. 
Following Mavromatis' (1987) argument that no clear phenomenologieal or 
physiological differences exist between hypnagogic and hypnopompie (henceforth 
H&H) hallucinations, we treat them here as belonging to the same group of 
phenomena. In 1925 Leaning noted that H & H states were a "little cultivated area" (p. 
290), and today we still know relatively little about the correlates of H & H 
experiences (Watson, 2001). 
One factor limiting research into such experiences is the absence of a brief, 
psychometrically reliable and valid self-report measure. Cheyne and colleagues (e.g., 
Cheyne & Girard, 2007) have developed a valuable tool to assess H&H hallucinations 
(the Waterloo Unusual Sleep Experiences Survey), which incorporates both 
qualitative and quantitative responses. This instrument was not designed, however, to 
have internally reliable subscales assessing the presence of H & H experiences in each 
modality, and is also time-consuming for participants to complete. The first aim of the 
present study was hence to establish a brief, valid and reliable measure of auditory, 
visual, and felt-presence H&H experiences. The development of such a tool, suitable 
for inclusion with a battery of other psychometric assessments, should help enable 
specific hypotheses in this area to be tested, such as whether levels of H & H 
experiences prospectively predict psychosis or near-death experiences (Jones & 
Femyhough, in press). 
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Our second aim was to investigate factors potentially associated with H&H 
experiences. Many theories of H&H hallucinations model these as intmsions from 
REM sleep (Hori, Hayashi, & Morikawa, 1994). Such theories can be seen to share 
some commonalities with so-called 'seepage' models of hallucinations, in which 
hallucinations occur due to material crossing a boundary fi-om the unconscious to the 
conscious (e.g.. West, 1962). We proposed that general susceptibility to intrusions 
would relate to H&H experiences. A number of ways of assessing and 
conceptualizing individual differences in susceptibility to such incursions exist. One 
important such concept is that of transliminality (Thalboume & Delin, 1994). 
Translirhinality has been defined as the "extent to which the contents of some 
preconscious (or "unconscious" or "subliminal") region of the mind are able to cross 
the threshold into consciousness" (Thalboume & Delin, 1994, p.3). We hence firstly 
hypothesized that transliminality would relate posifively to individuals' susceptibility 
to H & H experiences. 
Another way to conceptualize intmsions into consciousness is through the 
paradigm of intmsive thoughts. The intmsive occurrence of thoughts has been linked 
to auditory hallucinations in the waJcing state in clinical and non-clinical populafions 
(Morrison & Baker, 2000; Jones & Femyhough, 2006). However, less research has 
considered how intrusive thoughts relate to hallucinations in other modalifies, or 
proposed a theoretical basis for such a relation. Our second hypothesis was hence that 
the tendency to experience intrusive thoughts in the waking state would be positively 
associated with higher levels of auditory, but not visual or felt-presence H&H 
experiences. 
If, as hypothesized, intmsive thoughts are associated with auditory H & H 
experiences, cognitive strategies that encourage the occurrence of intmsive thoughts 
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should also be linked to auditory H&H phenomena. One such strategy is likely to be 
thought suppression, defined as "the intentional conscious removal of a thought from 
subsequent conscious attention" (Wegner, 1992, p. 194). Due to its potential to create 
intrusive thoughts, thought suppression has been linked with auditory hallucinations 
in healthy populafions in clear consciousness (Jones & Femyhough, 2006). 
Suppression of a thought also makes it more likely to occur in an H&H hallucination 
(Schmidt & Gendolla, 2008). It therefore seems plausible that trait levels of thought 
suppression should be linked to the occiirrence of auditory H & H phenomena, through 
its encouragement of cognitive intrusions. Our third hypothesis was thus that levels of 
thought suppression would be associated with auditory, but not visual or felt-
presence, H&H experiences. 
In summary, the present study set out to develop a brief, valid, and reliable 
self-report questionnaire for assessing H&H experiences. We hypothesized firstly that 
levels of transliminality would be positively associated with all forms of H&H 
experiences. Our second and third hypotheses were that auditory, but not visual or 
felt-presence, H&H experiences would be associated with the self-reported tendencies 
both to experience intrusive thoughts and to undertake thought suppression. 
Method 
Participants 
A first sample of students {N=399, 215 women) at a United Kingdom 
university, with a mean age of 19.5 years {SD - 1.1, range = 18-24) completed a 25-
item, on-line H & H experiences questiormaire. Participants were recruited through e-
mail invitation. There was no financial incentive to participate. Answers were given 
anonymously, with only age and gender being requested. 
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A second, separate sample of students (A^= 365, 236 women) with a mean age 
of 21.1 years {SD = 2.8, range = 18-29) completed a revised 14-item version of the 
original H&H questionnaire. This 14-item questiormaire was named the Durham 
Hypnagogic and Hypnopompic Hallucinations Questionnaire (DHQ). Issues around 
recruitment, lack of financial incentive and anonymity of responses were the same as 
for the first sample. Of this sample, 293 (195 women) with a mean age of 21.1 years 
{SD = 2.8, range 18-29) consented to go on to complete the questionnaire measures 
detailed below. 
Response rates were approximately 20%, and comparable to previous studies 
employing on-line questionnaires of similar length (e.g., Kaplowitz, Hadlock & 
Levine, 2004). On-line questionnaires have been shown to be a reliable method of 
data collection (e.g., Jones, Femyhough, de-Wit, & Meins, 2008; Appendix A) 
Measures 
Measures employed included those described below. The development of the 
DHQ is detailed in Section 3.1.1. 
White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) is a 15-
item self-report measure of tendency to suppress thoughts. Each item is scored on a 
five-point Likert scale ranging fi-om "strongly agree" (5) to "strongly disagree" (1). 
Muris, Merckelbach, and Horselenberg (1996) argued that the WBSI taps intrusive 
thoughts as well as thought suppression, and devised a "corrected WBSl" (p. 505) 
which removed all items relating to intrusion (items 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9). The resultant 
scale (WBSlsup) was found to have satisfactory internal reliability and test-retest 
reliability, and was used in the present study as a measure of self-reported thought 
suppression (Chapter 1). Following Muris et al. (1996), numerous factor analyses 
have confirmed that the WBSI measures both thought suppression and intrusive 
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thoughts. A range of studies (see Jones & Femyhough, 2006) all identified subtly 
different "unwanted intrusive thoughts" factors of the WB SI, all finding the core 
items Muris et al. (1996) identified as the "intmsion items" on the WBSI (items 2, 3, 
4, 5 and 9) to load onto this factor. Thus, we used these five items as a separate 
measure of self-reported intrusiveness of unwanted thoughts (WBSIintru)-
Hallucination-proneness. This was assessed using the revised Launay-Slade 
Hallucination Scale (Bentall & Slade, 1985), a 12-item instrument designed to 
measure predisposifion to hallucinadon-like experiences. Each item is scored on a 
five-point Likert scale ranging fi-om "certainly applies to me" (0) to "certainly does 
not apply to me" (4). Higher scores indicate a greater predisposition to hallucination-
like experiences. This tool has been found to have satisfactory psychometric 
properties (ibid.). In the current administration it was stated at the start that 
participants should only endorse items i f they had experienced them in clear 
consciousness, and not in the H & H state. 
Transliminality. This was assessed using the 17-item scoring scheme (Lange 
et al., 2000) for the 29-item Transliminality Scale (Thalboume, 1998). Scores can 
range fi-om 13.7 to 37.3, with higher scores representing higher levels of 
transliminality. Response options are "tme" or "false". Examples of items are " I have 
felt that I have received special wisdom, to be communicated to the rest of humanity" 
and " I think I really know what some people mean when they talk about mystical 
experiences". The validity and reliability of this scale has previously been 
demonstrated (ibid). 
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Results 
Durham Hypnagogic Hallucinations Questionnaire 
Development of the DHQ. A preliminary 25-item questionnaire assessing the 
presence of auditory, visual, and felt-presence H&H hallucinations was developed 
through face-to-face discussions with students, an Intemet search for accounts of such 
experiences, and integration of features of the categories used by Cheyne & Girard 
(2007). Preliminary instmctions make it clear to participants that items should only be 
endorsed i f they have been experienced in the H&H state. These instmctions read: "In 
the drowsy state when you are about to fall asleep, or have just woken up, healthy 
people can experience hallucination-like experiences. We are interested in whether 
you have any experiences like this. There are a number of statements below about 
such experiences, please indicate i f you have had such experiences or not. To be clear, 
all the statements refer to experiences you may have had on the border of falling 
asleep or waking up, and which could not have had a source in the 'real world'. For 
example, the item ' I have seen a blurry figure in the room' refers to seeing a blurry 
figure when you were about to fall asleep or wake up, which you later realised was 
not really there, although at the fime it seemed real". Response options (and scoring) 
were on a 6-point Likert scale: "never" (0), "very rarely" (1), "rarely" (2), 
"occasionally" (3), "fi-equently" (4), and "very fi-equently" (5). 
This questionnaire was administered to a first set of participants (N = 399). 
Inifial exploratory factor analysis was then performed using principal components 
analysis (PCA) with oblique rotafion (Direct Oblimin) on the basis that factors were 
likely to correlate with each other. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy was .89, and Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant (p < .001). Items 
were discarded i f over 85% of participants indicated they had never had the 
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experience, the item communality was < .4, or i f feedback indicated problems with 
the wording. This led to eleven items being discarded, including "I've heard animal 
noises", and "I've seen someone I know to be dead". A further PCA was then 
performed on the rerhaining fourteen items. 
Scree-plot inspection. Kaiser's rule, and parallel analysis using a Monte Carlo 
analysis with 1000 repetitions all suggested the extraction of three factors, with 
eigenvalues of 5.67, 1.69, and 1.21, accounting for 61.23% of the observed variance. 
Each item loaded (> .5) onto a single factor. The three factors clearly related to 
auditory H&H hallucinations, visual H&H hallucinations, and the experience of a felt 
presence. 
The 14 items identified above, modified after feedback from participants, were 
administered to a new sample (N = 365), and constituted the final version of the DHQ 
(Table 3.1). Confiirnatory factor analysis was performed on the data using AMOS 
6.0, in order to examine i f a three-factor solution, consisting of auditory (DHQaud: 
items 2, 5, 6, 8, & 12), visual (DHQvis: items 3, 7, 9, 11, 13) and felt-presence 
(DHQpres: items 1,4, 10, 14) H & H factors, was a good fit to the data. Previous 
psychometric research has demonstrated that in order to generate a well-fitting model, 
it may be necessary to allow for correlated errors (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthon, 
1989). Byrne et al., (1989) have noted that "such parameter specifications are justified 
because, typically, they 
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Table 3.1 
Endorsement fates fo^^^ items (TV = 365) 
Percentage (%) of peGple endorsing 
Item Mean (Sp) Never Rarely or Occasionally Frequently or 
very rarely very frequently 
1. I've felt M evil pfeseMe in but eoiild not see, .88(1.24) 58 24 15 3 
hear, touch or smell anyone there 
2. I've heard someone callirig my name 1.11 (1.55) 51 26 18 5 
3. I've seen a blurry hiiman figure in the room .84(1.24) 60 24 12 4 
4. I've had the sense of an invisible presence watching me 1.16(138) 48 31 14 7 
5. I've heard the voice of a person I could not identify .65 (1.13) 69 20 9 3 
6. I've heard human speech which spoke in a garbled,. .56(1.11) 74 16 7 3 
unclear way 
7. I've; seen the image of a face .71 (1.19) 67 21 8 4 
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8. I've heard a voice of a person familiar to me .99(1.34) 56 
9. I've seen things or figures floating in my room .49 (1.05) 77 
10. I've felt the presence of an intruder in my bedroom, .94(1.30) 55 
though I didn't actually see, hear, touch, or smell anyone 
11. I've clearly seen people in my room .33 (.87) 84 
12. I've heard non-speech sounds, such as laughter, .78(1.18) 62 
music, or other noises 
13. I've seen things in my room other than people .56 (1.11) 73 
14.1 have had the feeling of a presence in the room .79(1.18) 60 
which I felt was aware of me too, but I couldn't actually 
see, hear, touch or smell them 
26 
15 
28 
9 
26 
18 
28 
12 
4 
12 
4 
8 
5 
9 
6 
4 
6 
2 
4 
4 
3 
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represent non-random measurement error due to method effects such as item format 
associated with subscales of the same measuring instrument" (p. 460). We hence 
hypothesised that it may be necessary to allow errors of some items on the same DHQ 
subscale to correlate in order to achieve a satisfactory fit. 
As the data was non-normal, initial analysis was performed using the 
asymptotically distribution free (ADF) method. However, this performs poorly for 
samples of the size employed here (Bentler & Yuan, 1999). We hence adjudged fit 
using Bentler and Yuan's (1999) F statistic ( 7 » , a modification of the ADF statistic 
which performs well with non-normal data in sample sizes as low as 90. Other 
goodness of fit indices (such as GFI, CFI, and RMSEA) depend on the choice of 
estimation method. As AMOS 6.0 is unable to recalculate such goodness of fit 
statistics for use of the TF estimation method, we were only able to report such 
statistics for the ADF method. As shown below, the more appropriate 7> statistic 
often suggested better model fit than the ADF statistic, and hence the GFI, CFI, and 
RMSEA fit statistics reported below, based on the ADF statistic, are likely to be 
underestimates. 
The standard minimum fit chi-squared was a poor fit to the data, X ^ A D F (91) = 
536.64, p < .001. Similarly, a one-factor solution was found to differ significantly 
from the data, TF (77, 288) = 2.28, p < .001 [ X ^ D F (77) = 222.80,/? < .001, GFI = .79, 
CFI = .67, RMSEA = .07 (90% CI = .06-.08)]. The proposed three-factor solution also 
differed significantly from the data, r/r(74, 291) = 1.51,/? < .01 [X^ADF (77) = 794.40, 
p < .001, GFI = .87, CFI = .82, RMSEA = .05 (90% CI = .04-.06). As hypothesized, 
modification indices indicated that the 3-factor solution would be irnproved by 
allowing errors for a number of similar items from within the same subscale 
(specifically DHQ items 3 & 13, 2 & 6, 5 & 6, and 2 & 8) to correlate. The resultant 
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model did not differ significantly from the data, 7> (70, 295) = 1.24, n.s. [X '^ADF (77) = 
107.53,/7 < .001, GFI = .90, GFI = .92, RMSEA = .04 (90% CI = .04-.06)]. In this 
model standardized regression weights ranged from .69 to .88, and correlations 
between the factors ranged from .65 to .71. 
Finally, Rasch analysis'* (one-parameter item response theory) was performed 
to determine whether each DHQ subscale was unidimensional. Rasch analysis places 
questionnaire response data for each individual and each question on the same 
spectrum of person severity and item severity. The Rasch model (Rasch, 1960) 
assumes that the probability that a particular individual will respond in a certain way 
to a particular item is a ftinction of the relative distance between the item and person 
severity and only a fiinction of this. Analyses were conducted using the Rasch 
Unidimensional Measurement Model (RUMM2020; Andrich, Lyne, Sheridan & Luo, 
2003) software. The adequacy of DHQ scale fit to the Rasch model was evaluated 
using the item-trait interaction fit statistic, and item fit was evaluated through 
individual item fit statistics. Significant statistics (p < .01 given the large number of 
tests completed) indicate misfit to the Rasch model. Item fit residuals were also 
examined and a final test conducted within the RUMM framework to confirm the 
absence of mulfidimensionality in each scale. Differential Item Functioning (DIF; 
Holland & Wainer, 1993) by gender was also examined to determine whether 
responses to DHQ items were significantly influenced by the gender of the 
respondent. 
Each of the final DHQ subscales exhibited fit to the Rasch model p >.01) 
with no individual items exhibiting misfit (x^p >.01) or excessive residuals (< +/-
2.5). In addition no item was subject to DIF by gender (ANOVA p < .01). The tests 
" The Rasch analysis reported here was performed by David Meads of the Galen Institute, Manchester, 
UK. 
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for multidimensionality indicated that the three DHQ scales are in fact 
unidimensional. Although the combined 14 items of the DHQ fit the Rasch model 
these additional tests indicated that they could not be considered to capture a 
unidimensional construct. 
Pattern of responses to the DHQ. Mean (SD, range) DHQ scores were DHQaud 
= .83 (.99, 0-4.6), DHQvis = .58 (.81, 0-4.2), and DHQpres = .95 (1.09, 0-4.5). Paired t-
tests (with a Bonferroni corrected alpha of a = .02) showed that both mean DHQpres 
and DHQaud subscale scores were higher than mean DHQvis subscale scores, t (364) = 
7.78,p < .001, and / (364) = 5.49,p < .001, respectively. Mean DHQaud and DHQpres 
scores did not differ. 
85% of participants reported experiencing at least one of the items on the 
DHQ. 67% of participants endorsed at least one item on the DHQpres, with the 
equivalent rates being 65% and 58% for the DHQaud and DHQvis respectively. 
Typically, around 5% of participants experienced frequent or very frequent H&H 
experiences. The most common items in each modality were hearing one's name 
called, seeing a blurry figure in the room, and the feeling of an invisible presence 
watching. There were no gender differences in scores on any of the DHQ subscales, 
or at item level when Bonferroni corrections were employed. 
Reliability and validity of the DHQ. Cronbach's alphas for all DHQ subscales 
were satisfactory (Table 3.2). Face validity of the DHQ was maximized by 
developing the original questionnaire items from accounts of such experiences. 
Convergent validity of the DHQ was evaluated by its correlation with the Revised 
Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale. Given that (regardless of frequency of occurrence) 
approximately 50% of people who report daytime hallucinations also experience 
H&H hallucinations (Ohayon, 2000), we expected that hallucinatory experiences in 
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the H&H state would be related to the more general tendency to experience 
hallucinatory experiences. In line with this, a positive correlation was found between 
the LSHS-R and all subscales of the DHQ (Table 3.3). 
Table 3.2 
Descriptive statistics (« = 293) 
Mean (SD, range) Cronbach's alpha 
DHQaud .82 (.99,0-4.6) .86 
DHQvis .59 (.83,0-4.2) .82 
DHQpres .93 (1.08,0-4.5) .87 
WBSIintru 18.32 (4.14,6-25) .80 
WBSIsup 34.26 (8.43, 10-50) .87 
Transliminality 22.21 (3.66, 13.7-35.0) .75 
LSHS-R 18.21 (9.24,0-42) .85 
Intrusion-proneness and H&H experiences 
Descriptive statistics for the participants (n = 293) who went on to complete 
further questiormaires are given in Table 3.2. LSHS-R, WBSIsup and WBSIintru scores 
were in line with previous studies assessing these variables in student populatioiis 
(e.g., Jones & Femyhough, 2006). Bivariate correlational analyses are presented in 
Table 3.3. Bonferroni-corrected significance levels were employed and alpha set atp 
= .001 (i.e., -.05/28). Transliminality correlated significantly with all DHQ subscales. 
DHQpres correlated more strongly with transliminality than DHQvis, = 4.94, p < .05, 
but not significantly differently to DHQaud- Intrusive thoughts and thought 
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suppression both correlated significantly with DHQaud, but hot with any other DHQ 
subscales. 
Table 3.3 
Bivariate correlational analysis 
DHQaud DHQvis DHQpres WBSIintru WBSIsup Transiiminality LSHS-R 
DHQaud 1 .56* .46* .27* .23* .35* .50* 
DHQvis 1 .58* .16 .11 .28* .43* 
DHQpres - - 1 .11 .14 .44* .38* 
WBSIintn. - - - I .65* .35* .54* 
WBSIsup - - - - 1 .28* .35* 
Transliminality - - - - 1 .50* 
L S H S - R - - - - - - 1 
* p < .001 
Discussion 
The research reported here represents the first attempt to produce a brief, 
psychometrically reliable and valid self-report measure of H&H phenomena. 
Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis indicated that the resulting instrument, 
the DHQ, had a three-factor structure, indexing auditory H&H hallucinations, visual 
H&H hallucinations, and the experience of a felt presence. Rasch analysis confirmed 
that each of these scales was unidimensional and therefore capable of generating 
summed total scores. The reliability and validity of this tool were satisfactory, with 
the DHQ subscales being found to be internally reliable and to have both face and 
convergent validity. 
83 
Chapter 3: Hypnagogia 
Each subscale of the DHQ had at least one item endorsed by approximately 
two-thirds of participants, with only \5% of participants reporting never having 
experienced any of the items on the DHQ. The resulting prevalence rate of H&H 
phenomena of 85%) is significantly higher than the 31% rate (in a 15-44 year age 
group) of hypnagogic hallucinations reported by Ohayon (2000) but consistent with 
the rates of hypnagogic (79%) and hypnopompic (72%) imagery (in a 20-29 year old 
student sample) reported by Richardson, Mavromatis, Mindel and Owens (1981). One 
possible reason for this disparity in prevalence is that Ohayon's methodology, which 
involved collecting data via telephone interviews whilst also asking about mental 
illnesses, may have led to reduced disclosure. Another possible reason is that the 
frequency of H&H experiences is positively related to levels of drug use (Ohayon, 
2000), and drug use is higher in student populations than in the general population 
(Hope, Dring, & Dring, 2005). Finally, Ohayon does not report the question(s) used to 
assess the presence of H&H experiences. If Ohayon only utilized a single question, 
the multiple-item DHQ could likely have generated higher endorsement rates due to 
its provision of specific examples of the; relevant experiences. 
Auditory and felt-presence H&H experiences were found to be more frequent 
than visual experiences. This is in contrast to the findings of Ohayon (2000) who 
found visual experiences to be more common than auditory or felt-presence 
experiences. No clear gender differences in DHQ responses were found, in contrast to 
previous findings that such experiences are rnore common in women than men 
(Ohayon, 2000; Richardson et al., 1981). We did however note that a number of items 
not included in our final version of the DHQ, such as "Have you ever felt a 
benevolent, protecting figure?" were significantly more often endorsed by women 
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than men. Future studies may wish to consider whether gender differences are orily 
found in relation to specific H&H content. 
Our study also aimed to exarnine the relation between cognitive intrusions and 
H&H experiences. In line with our first hypothesis, transliminahty wais positively 
related to all subscales of the DHQ. We found support for our second and third 
hypotheses that auditory (but not visual or felt-presence) H&H experiences would be 
associated with the self-reported susceptibility to intrusive thoughts and tendency to 
undertake thought suppression. Although a weak correlation, this could be taken to 
suggest that different explanatory models are needed for each modality of H&H 
phenomena. 
A number of limitations of the present study need to be acknowledged. Firstly, 
the forgetting or elaboration of hypnagogic experiences may affect responses on the 
DHQ. Secondly, in order to achieve satisfactory internal consistency, the visual H&H 
factor of the DHQ is weighted towards experiences involving people, with less 
emphasis on experiences such as seeing lights, landscapes, and animals. Thirdly, the 
DHQ does not distinguish between experiences in the hypnagogic and hypnopompic 
states. In order to address this, the DHQ could be administered to a sample of 
participants twice, with instructions relating to hypnagogic and hypnopompic 
experiences in each instance. Another potential limitation is that the DHQ does not 
make a distinction between H&H hallucinations associated with sleep paralysis and 
those not. Future studies may also wish to establish the discriminant validity of the 
DHQ, as well as its test-retest reliability. 
In addition to the broad categories assessed here (auditory, visual, and felt-
presence H&H experiences), future researchers may also wish to consider a multi-
dimensional conception of H&H phenomena. It would be of particular interest to 
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examine what factors affect the content of the experiences, the disfress caused by 
them, and the individual's conviction about their reality. Furthermore, it may be asked 
what factors differentiate individuals who experience a primarily benevolent felt 
presence from those whose experience is primarily of an evil presence. Trauma may 
be one candidate. Future research may also consider the phenomenological relation of 
H&H hallucinations to those that occur in clear consciousness. Additionally, the DHQ 
could be used in samples at high risk for schizophrenia to examine if it predicts onset 
of this disorder. It is hoped that the present study will be seen as a step towards 
allowing greater understanding of the causes, correlates and consequences of this 
intriguing phenomenon. 
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Chapter 4 
Rumination, reflection, intrusive thoughts, and hallucination-
proneness: towards a new model ^ 
ABSTRACT 
Although rumination has been proposed to play an important role in the creation of 
hallucinafions, direct empirical tests of this proposal have not yet been performed. 
Employing a distinction between ruminative and reflective self-consciousness, we set 
out to test a new model of the relations among rumination, reflection, intrusive 
thoughts, thought suppression, social anxiety, and hallucination-proneness. This 
model proposed that rumination would be related to hallucination-proneness through 
the mediating variable of intrusive thoughts, but that reflection would not be related to 
hallucination-proneness. The model was tested in a student population (N=296) 
using path analyses. A modified version of the model was found to be a good fit to the 
data, once a direct path from reflection to hallucination-proneness had been added. As 
hypothesized, rumination was related to hallucinatipn-proneness only indirectly, 
through the mediafing variable of intrusive thoughts. Implicafions for interventions 
and ftiture directions for research are considered. 
' Chapter published as: Jones, S. R. & Femyhough, C. (2009). Rumination, reflection, intrusive 
thoughts, and hallucination-proneness: towards a new model. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 47, 
54-59. 
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Infroduction 
The cognitive mechanisms underlying auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) are still 
not well understood. Many contemporary accounts of AVHs propose that such 
experiences have their roots in the voice-hearer's own inner speech (e.g., Leudar, 
Thomas, McNally, & Glinski, 1997). One problem for such theories arises from the 
observation that, in both clinical and non-clinical samples, AVHs are typically 
perceived as the voice of another person (Nayani & David, 1996). One approach to 
this problem is to ask why voice-hearers would be generating other people's voices in 
their inner speech (Jones & Femyhough, 2007b). We have previously argued, 
employing a Vygotskian approach, that inner speech should naturally take a dialogic 
form, i.e., be in the form of a dialogue rather than a first person monologue (Jones & 
Femyhough, 2007a, 2007b; Appendix B). If dialogic inner speech is the norm, then it 
raises the question of what factors may be relevant to the experiencing of such 
internalized voices as AVHs (Femyhough, 2004). 
Fowler et al. (2006) have proposed that inner speech may be experienced as 
alien if it involves the recreation of a voice associated with a stressftil event in one's 
past. Based on observations that early trauma, such as sexual and physical abuse, 
often precede onset of AVHs (e.g.. Read, van Os, Morrison, & Ross, 2005), they 
suggest that rumination or inner dialogues about interactions with the people in these 
situations could form the raw material of some AVHs. For example, "rumination or 
inner dialogue about self in relationship to what a shaming and insulting abuser might 
say about one's current actions" (Fowler et al., 2006, p. 113) may explain why AVHs 
commonly take the form of commentaries on present actions. This proposal is also in 
line with the finding that a significant number of AVHs have similar themes and 
content to earlier abuse experiences (Hardy et al., 2005). 
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Although the relation between rumination and hallucinations has not yet been 
studied, the relation between hallucinations and a construct related to rumination, the 
metacognitive trait of cognitive self-consciousness, defined by Cartwright-Hatton & 
Wells (1997) as "the tendency to focus attention on thought processes" (p. 387), has 
been examined. For example. Baker and Morrison (1998) found that levels of 
cognitive self-consciousness were higher in patients with schizophrenia with auditory 
hallucinations than in patients with schizophrenia with delusions but no auditory 
hallucinations. 
Rumination may also be related to hallucinations in other modalities, such as 
the visual. Allen, Coyne, and Console's (1997) argument that stressful or traumatic 
events may leave individuals "vulnerable to ... [their] inner world" (p. 332) allows for 
an inner experience consisting of reconstructed visual images as well as auditory 
experiences. Indeed, indirect evidence suggests that rumination will be associated 
with hallucinations in general, rather than specifically with hallucinations of the 
auditory-verbal type. For example, cognitive self-consciousness has been found to be 
positively related to a general measure of hallucination-proneness, the Launay-Slade 
Hallucination Scale (Launay & Slade, 1981), in student populations (Morrison, Wells, 
& Northard, 2000; Sterling, Barkus, & Lewis, 2007). This led Sterling et al. (2007) to 
conclude that hallucinations are related to a "relatively stable trait-like form of 
'ruminative thinking'" (p. 1407). 
Nevertheless, as the studies discussed above utilized a general measure of 
cognitive self-consciousness rather than dedicated measures of rumination, there is as 
yet no evidence for a specific relation between rumination and hallucinatory 
experiences. Trapnell and Campbell (1999) have argued that self-consciousness of 
one's thoughts should be divided into two distinct forms, based on the individual's 
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motivations. They note that one reason why individuals may pay attention to their 
thoughts is because they are "motivated by curiosity or epistemic interest in the self 
(p. 297). This form of self-consciousness is termed reflection, and is proposed to be 
associated with adaptive self-knowledge and generally positive effects. In contrast, 
individuals may also focus on their own thoughts for reasons of negative affect and 
anxiety. Trapnell and Campbell term this rumination, Or "self-attentiveness motivated 
by perceived threats, losses, or injustices to the self (p. 297). 
Given Fowler et al.'s (2006) contention that it is recreating imagined 
interactions with significant individuals associated with negative affect or anxiety that 
form the raw material of some hallucinations, rumination as conceptualized by 
Trapnell and Campbell (1999) would appear to be likely to relate strongly to 
hallucinations. The first aim of the present study was hence to investigate the relations 
among rumination, reflection and hallucination-proneness. We hypothesized that 
rumination, but not reflection, would be related to hallucination-proneness. 
We proposed that this relation would occur because of rumination's tendency 
to cause cognitive intrusions. Cognitive intrusions have been linked to hallucinations 
in both clinical and non-clinical populations. Morrison, Haddock, and Tarrier (1995) 
proposed that intrusive thoughts may form the raw material for auditory 
hallucinations, with intrusive imagery being the raw material of visual hallucinations. 
This has received support from studies showing that patients with schizophrenia with 
auditory hallucinations report more cognitive intrusions than psychiatric and healthy 
controls (Morrison & Baker, 2000). In a student population Jones and Femyhough 
(2006b) have also found a relation between intrusive thoughts and hallucination-
proneness. As rumination has been found to increase both the number and intensity of 
cognitive intrusions (e.g., Guastella & Moulds, 2007), we proposed that rumination 
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would relate to hallucination-proneness through its tendency to promote cognitive 
intrusions. As there is ho evidence that the other element of self-consciousness 
identified by Trapnell and Campbell (1999), reflection, is related to intrusions, we 
predicted no relation between and hallucination-proneness. 
We were also interested in examining other variables potentially related to 
rumination, cognitive intrusions and hallucinations. Thought suppression, "the 
intentional conscious removal of a thought from subsequent conscious attention" 
(Wegner, 1992, p. 194), is known to encourage both intrusive thoughts and 
rumination. Attempting thought suppression has been foimd to cause suppressed 
thoughts to intrude into consciousness in an unexpected manner (Wegner, 1992). 
Furthermore, like rumination, thought suppression has been found to increase the 
intensity of intrusive memories (Yoshizumi & Murase, 2007). Indeed, there is 
evidence that thought suppression may be related to hallucinations due to its tendency 
to encourage intrusive thoughts (Jones & Femyhough, 2006b). Rumination is also 
associated with greater levels of thought suppression (Erskine, Kvavilashvili, & 
Kombrot, 2007). Thus, we proposed that rumination may be linked to hallucination-
proneness through its direct and indirect (via thought suppression) encouragement of 
cognitive intrusions. 
The final factor of interest was social anxiety. Trapnell and Campbell (1999) 
proposed that rumination, but not reflection, should be related to anxiety. In support 
of this proposal, social anxiety has been found to be associated with higher levels of 
ruminative thought (Kocovski & Rector, 2007). Individuals with high levels of social 
anxiety have also been shovra to attempt more thought suppression (Magee & 
Zinbarg, 2007), and to do so less successfiilly, experiencing more intrusions and 
unwanted thoughts than controls (Fehm & Margraf, 2002; Magee & Zinbarg, 2007). 
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This led us to propose that social anxiety may relate to hallucinations through its 
tendency to promote cognitive intrusions via the mediating variables of rumination 
and thought suppression. 
In summary, the findings and arguments set out above led us to propose a 
model of relations between hallucination-proneness, rumination, reflection, intrusive 
thoughts, thought suppression, and social anxiety, as shown in Figure 4.1. The key 
points of this model are as follows. Rumination is understood as having an indirect 
effect on hallucination-proneness through acting as the generative force behind the 
thoughts that intrude into consciousness. Reflection does not relate to hallucination-
proneness in the model, either directly or indirectly. 
It is now well established both that hallucinations exist on a continuum with 
normal experiences, and stretch into the general population (Johns & van Os, 2001). It 
has also been argued that the mechanisms underlying sub-clinical (i.e., experienced by 
non-patients in the general populace) and clinical hallucinations may be the same. For 
example, based on the finding that risk factors for hallucinations are the same for 
those with sub-clinical and clinical hallucinations, Aleman and Lar0i (2008) have 
argued for "a developmental mechanism in nonclinical participants that is similar to 
the one reported in schizophrenia" (p. 82). We hence proposed to perform an initial 
test of this model, using path analyses, in an analogue study using data obtained from 
a sample drawn from a student population. 
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Method 
Participants 
Undergraduate and postgraduate students {N=296, 198 women) at a UK 
university, with a mean age of 21.3 years {SD = 2.83, range = 18-29), completed on-
line questionnaires. Participants were recruited through e-mail invitation and there 
was no financial incentive to participate; the likelihood of repeated participation was 
thus considered negligible. Response rates were approximately 20%, and comparable 
to previous studies employing on-line questionnaires of similar length (e.g., 
Kaplowitz, Hadlock & Levine, 2004). Answers were given anonymously, with only 
the age and gender of the participants being recorded. Thought suppression and 
hallucination-proneness data reported here overlaps with that reported in Jones, 
Femyhough, & Meads (2009). 
Measures 
White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) is a 15-
item self-report measure of tendency to suppress thoughts. Each item is scored on a 
five-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly agree" (5) to "strongly disagree" (1). 
Higher scores indicate a greater tendency to suppress thoughts. Muris, Merckelbach, 
and Horselenberg (1996) have argued that the W B S I taps intrusive thoughts as well as 
thought suppression, and devised a "corrected W B S I " (p. 505) which removed all 
items relating to intrusion (items 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9). The resultant scale, which we term 
WBSIsup, was found to have satisfactory internal reliability and test-retest reliability, 
and was used in the present study as a measure of self-reported thought suppression 
(Chapter 1; Chapter 2). Following Muris et al. (1996), numerous factor analyses have 
confirmed that the full version of the W B S I measures both thought suppression and 
intrusive thoughts (e.g., Rassin, 2003) and all such studies have found the core items 
97 
Chapter 4: Rumination and hallucination-proneness 
Muris et al. (1996) identified as the 'intrusion items' on the W B S I (items 2, 3, 4, 5 
and 9) to load onto this factor. Thus, we used items 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9 of the W B S I as a 
separate measure of self-reported intrusiveness of unwanted thoughts (WBSIintru)-
Hallucination-proneness. This was assessed using the revised Launay-Slade 
Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R; Bentall & Slade, 1985), a 12-item instrument designed 
to measure predisposition to hallucination-like experiences. Items are scored on a 
five-point Likert scale ranging from "certainly does not apply to me" (0) to 
"certainly applies to me" (4). Examples of items include "In the past, I have often had 
the experience of hearing a person's voice and then found that no-one was there", and 
" I have been froubled by hearing voices in my head". This scale also contains one 
item directly related to unwanted intrusive thoughts ("No matter how hard I try to 
concentrate, unrelated thoughts always creep into my mind"). We hence removed this 
item from the scale in order to avoid inflating the correlation between the LSHS-R 
and our measure of intrusive thoughts (WBSIintru)- The resulting 11-item scale had a 
total score that could range from 0 to 44. Higher scores indicate a greater 
predisposition to hallucination-like experiences (Chapter 3). 
Rumination and Reflection. This was assessed using the Rumination and 
Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ: Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), a 24-item self-report 
measure of individuals' dispositions to engage in ruminative and reflective private 
self-consciousness. The scale is scored as two separate 12-item ruminative and 
reflective subscales, derived by factor analysis. Examples of ruminative and reflective 
items include " I always seem to be 're-hashing' in my mind recent things I've said or 
done" and "I'm very self-inquisitive by nature" respectively. Items are scored on a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from "sfrongly agree" (5) to "strongly disagree" (1). Total 
scores on each subscale are divided by twelve to give a mean item score, hence 
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subscale scores may range from 1-5. This instrument has been shown to have good 
psychometric properties (ibid). 
Social Anxiety: This was assessed by the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale 
(LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987), a 24-item self-report measure in which participants first 
rate the amourit of fear a social situation causes them. This is scored on a four-point 
Likert scale ranging from "none" (0) to "severe" (3). Participants then rate how much 
they avoid such situations, and respond on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from "never" 
(0) to "usually" (3). An overall total score is calculated by summing the total fear and 
total avoidance scores. The LSAS has been shown to be a valid and reUable tool 
(Baker, Heinrichs, Kim, «& Hofmann, 2002). 
Results 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.1. Rumination and reflection 
scores on the RRQ were in line with those found by Trapnell and Campbell (1999) in 
the general population. WBSIsup and WBSIint™ scores were in line with previous 
studies assessing these variables in student populations (e.g., Jones & Femyhough, 
2006b). Scores on our 11 -item version of the LSHS-R were in line with pro-rated 
scores of students taken from previously published data on the 12-item version of this 
scale (e.g.. Waters, Badcock, & Maybery, 2003). Cronbaeh's alphas for all scales 
employed were satisfactory. Partial correlations (controlling for age and gender) 
between the variables are presented in Table 4.2. Due to the number of correlations 
performed (15), a Bonferroni correction was employed and alpha set at a = .05/15 = 
.003. 
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Table 4.1 
Descriptive statistics for variables under investigation (N = 296) 
Mean (SD, range) Cronbach's alpha 
LSHS-R 15.11 (8.77,0-38) .84 
Rumination 3.85 (.70, 1.17-5.00) .91 
Reflection 3.33 (.77, 1.25-5.00) .85 
WBSIinm. 18.34(4.12, 6-25) .80 
WBSIsup 34.29 (8.42, 10-50) .87 
SocAnx 45.64 (27.61,2-144) .94 
Note. LSHS-R = Revised Launay Slade Hallucination Scale, WBSIint™ = Intrusive 
thoughts subscale of the White Bear Suppression Inventory, WBSIsup = Thought 
suppression subscale of the White Bear Suppression Inventory, SocAnx = Liebowitz 
Social Anxiety Scale. 
Table 4.2 
Partial correlations between variables (controlling for age and gender) 
LSHS-R Rumination Reflection WBSIintru WBSIsup SocAnx 
LSHS-R 1 .39* .30* .46* .31* .19* 
Rurriination - 1 .24* .57* .42* .33* 
Reflection - - 1 .15 .04 .05 
WBSIintru - - - 1 .64* .27* 
WBSIsup - - - - 1 .32* 
SocAnx - - - - - 1 
* p < .003 
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The model shown in Figure 4.1 was subjected to path analysis using AMOS 6.0. The 
sample size was deemed appropriate for reliable performance of such analysis as it 
met the criterion of iV > 200 proposed by Barrett (2007). Due to data non-normality, 
analysis was performed using Bentler and Yuan's (1999) Tr statistic, which has been 
shown to be reliable with non-normal data (ibid). The model in Figure 4.1 was found 
to differ significantly to the data, Tp (8, 288) = 3.39, p < .01, GFI = .97, AGFl = .92, 
CFI = .96, RMSEA = .09. Modification indices indicated that the model fit could only 
be significantly improved by addition of a direct path from Reflection to LSHS-R. 
This model was found to be an excellent fit to the data, Tp (7, 289) = 1.48, n.s., GFI = 
.99, AGFI = .97, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .04. Standardized estimates of the strength of 
the relations between the variables for this revised model are shovvTi in Figure 4.2. 
Modification indices indicated that adding further additional paths between variables 
(such as a direct path between Rumination and LSHS-R) would not improve the fit of 
the model. 
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Standardized estimates of path strengths 
el Reflection 
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Rumination 
.32 
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LSHS-R 
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Discussion 
The present study aimed to provide a test of the model of hallucination-proneness set 
out in Figure 4.1. Path analyses indicated that the model was a poor fit to the data. 
After examination of modification indices, our original model was revised to include 
a direct path from reflection to hallucination-proneness. This amended model (Figure 
4.2) was found to be an excellent fit. 
A number of features of this model are worthy of discussion. Firstly, although 
correlation analyses indicated a sfrong relation between rumination and hallucination-
proneness, the path analysis, as predicted, demonstrated that this relation was not 
direct, but rather mediated by intrusive thoughts. Furthermore, as predicted, 
rumination was found to be associated with intrusive thoughts directly, as well as 
indirectly through the mediating variable of thought suppression. This is consistent 
with a model of hallucination-proneness that sees intrusive thoughts playing a key 
role, with levels of intrusive thoughts being influenced by ruminative and thought 
suppression processes. 
As noted above, reflection was found, contrary to our prediction, to be directly 
related to levels of hallucination-proneness. It is possible that this relation may have 
obtained due to the increased tendency of reflective individuals to notice their 
thoughts, and hence to notice dissonance between their meta-cognitive beliefs and the 
actual occurrence of thoughts. Morrison et al. (1995) have proposed that such 
dissonance may result in individuals making atfributions of such thoughts to another, 
resulting in hallucination formation. Finally, in line with previous research, social 
anxiety was found to relate to rumination and thought suppression, but these relations, 
although statistically significant, were weak. This suggests that, although social 
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anxiety may influence rumination and suppression, it may not be a key causal factor 
in the creation of hallucinafions. 
One possible objection to the argument that intrusive thoughts are the raw 
rriaterial of hallucinations is that those with hallucinations should report fewer, rather 
than more, intrusive thoughts, as any such intrusions would be experienced as 
hallucinations. It is not clear, however, that all intrusive thoughts will automatically 
be experienced in this way. For example, in the case of AVHs, the factors affecting 
whether a verbal intrusion is experienced as a hallucination include individual 
differences in source monitoring abilities (Bentall, 1990). It has been proposed that 
source monitoring deficits may be particularly associated with verbal imagery of non-
self speakers rather than one's ordinary inner speech (Hoffman, Varanko, Gilmore, & 
Mishara, 2008). Based on a review of neuroimaging studies in this area, we too have 
advocated the position that the raw material for AVHs is inner speech involving non-
self speakers (Jones & Femyhough, 2007). 
A number of limitations of our study must be acknowledged. Firstly, it is not 
able to establish the direction of causation among the variables under investigation. It 
is possible that a more complicated pattern of relations could exist. For example, 
rumination and thought suppression could be seen as maladaptive sfrategies to cope 
with intrusive thoughts (rather than agents acting in the genesis of them) that work in 
a feedback circuit to amplify the effects of cognitive intrusions (Ehlers & Steil, 1995). 
Secondly, given that the LSHS-R is heavily weighted towards AVHs, and that 
the theoretical and empirical arguments for a relation between the variables discussed 
here are strongest for AVHs, it may be that our model is more appropriate for AVHs 
than visual hallucinations. Future studies may wish to examine whether this model 
holds equally well for AVHs and visual hallucinations. Thirdly, the present study 
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lacked a sufficient sample size (Barrett, 2007) to examine whether the model held 
equally for males and females. It is hoped that future studies with larger samples may 
address this issue. Fourthly, metacognitive beliefs not examined here, such as beliefs 
about the uhcontroUability and danger of thoughts, are also related to hallucination-
proneness (Morrison et al., 1995; Jones & Femyhough, 2006b). Future work may 
wish to investigate the relations of such factors to the present variables. A fifth 
limitation was the self-report nature of the study, which ftiture research might 
overcome through the employment of behavioural measures. For example, cognitive 
intrusions or the tendency to ruminate could be assessed by experience sampling 
techniques such as have been used effectively in research into delusions (Thewissen, 
Bentall, Lecomte, van Os, & Myin-Germeys, 2008). Finally, another limitation of the 
present study was its failure to control for levels of depression in participants, which 
is associated with rumination (Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001). 
Looking forward, it is worth considering how our model may be extended to 
account for the causes of ruminative and reflective thinking, factors causing intrusions 
to be experienced as not authored by the self, and whether it is likely to be applicable 
to hallucinations in populations such as patients with schizophrenia. Firstly, in terms 
of accounting for the causes of ruminative thinking, traumatic stress may play a key 
role in generating such ruminative thinking (Gold & Wegner, 1995). Secondly, our 
model needs extending to include other factors such as individuals' appraisals of, and 
responses to, cognitive intrusions (Morrison, Frame, & Larkin, 2003), as well as other 
factors that may be involved in causing self-generated cognitions to feel non-self 
generated (Chapter 5; Chapter 6). These may include disrupted source monitoring 
abilities (Bentall, 1990), and corollary discharge mechanisms (Jones & Femyhough, 
2006; see Chapter 5). Such factors are termed 'Disrupted agency mechanisms' in our 
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extended hypothesized model, presented in Figure 4.3. As we have suggested our 
model may be most appropriate to AVHs, we have focused on these experiences in 
this model. 
In terms of the applicability of this model to clinically relevant AVHs, such as 
in patients with schizophrenia, a number of arguments are suggestive that this model 
may be valid, although this must ultimately be tested by future research. Firstly, as we 
noted in the Infroduction, common mechanisms may indeed underlie hallucination-
proneness and clinical hallucinations. For example, abuse and trauma have been 
found to be associated with hallucinations (especially AVHs) in both clinical (Read et 
al., 2005) and non-clinical (Morrison & Petersen, 2003) populations. Similarly, it has 
been argued that it is the content and distress associated with clinical AVHs, such as 
the disfressing abusive content found particularly in clinical populations (Nayani & 
David, 1996), and not their form or pragmatics, that separates AVHs in psychiatric 
and non-psychiatric populations. We would hence call for this model to be tested, in 
both clinical and non-clinical samples, by replicating the present study whilst also 
taking appropriate measures of exposure to trauma and stressful events. Such studies 
may also wish to use more detailed measures of the tendency to experience intrusive 
thoughts, such as the Intrusive Thoughts Questionnaire (Reynolds & Salkovskis, 
1992). Similarly, when assessing the tendency to ruminate, existing measures could 
be adapted to assess the extent to which imagined responses from other individuals 
are created in inner speech or produced in visual imagery. 
Finally, i f the model can be validated in future studies, it may inform 
interventions with those distressed by hallucinatory experiences, or those at high risk 
for such experiences. Firstly, strategies that can help reduce the frequency of 
cognitive intrusions may be beneficial. One such strategy may be for individuals to be 
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encouraged to openly express stressfiil or traumatic experiences. As Sparrow and 
Wegner (2006) have found that intrusive thoughts may be deactivated by merely 
expressing them, such a strategy may profitably impact upon the frequency of 
hallucinations. Furthermore, interventions that attempt to directly reduce rumination 
on and around traumatic events may also be likely to prove beneficial. For example, 
self-affirmation has been found to be successful at reducing rumination on negative 
events (Koole, Smeets, Van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999). That said, more 
work requires to be performed to validate the model presented here before clear 
recommendations on cognitive-behavioural interventions can be made. 
107 
Chapter 4: Rumination and hallucination-proneness 
Figure 4.3 
Extended proposed model of cognitive mechanisms behind hallucinations 
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FOREWORD TO CHAPTERS 5 AND 6 
Chapter 4 highlighted that, in addition to the presence of factors such as 
rumination, thought suppression, intrusive thoughts and anxiety, there is the need to 
understand how self-generated thoughts come to be experienced as non-self 
produced. Mechanisms involved in this process were termed disrupted agency 
mechanisms. Chapter 5 offers a detailed consideration o f how agency mechanisms 
may typically work and how these niiay come to be disrupted in those who experience 
AVHs. This draws on the key concepts o f the forward model and the illusion o f 
conscious w i l l . Chapter 5 also offers insights into how a Vygotskian conception of 
inner speech may prove valuable in enhancing our understanding of AVHs. Chapter 6 
then turns to an empirical experimental test o f whether agency mechanisms are 
disrupted in those prone to hallucinations 
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Chapter 5 
Thought as Action: Inner Speech, Self-monitoring, and Auditory Verbal 
Hallucinations ^ 
ABSTRACT 
Passivity experiences in schizophrenia are thought to be due to a failure in a neurocognitive 
action self-monitoring system (NASS). Drawing on the assumption that inner speech is a 
form of action, a recent model o f auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) has proposed that 
AVHs can be explained by a failure in the NASS. In this article, we offer an alternative 
application of the NASS to AVHs, with separate mechanisms creating the emotion of self-
as-agent and other-as-agent. We defend the assumption that inner speech can be considered 
as a form of action, and show how a number o f previous criticisms of applying the NASS 
to AVHs can be refuted. This is achieved in part through taking a Vygotskian 
developmental perspective on inner speech. It is suggested that more reseiarch into the 
nature and development o f inner speech is needed to further our understanding o f AVHs. 
* Chapter published as: Jones, S. R. & Femyhough, C. (2007). Thought as Action: Inner Speech, Self-
monitoring, and Auditory Verbal Hallucinations. Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 391-399. 
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Introduction 
The phenomenon of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs), where individuals report 
hearing speech in the absence of any external stimulation, continues to puzzle psychiatrists 
and psychologists. Schneider (1959) classified AVHs as a first-rank symptom of 
schizophrenia, reflecting the approximately 60 to 74% o f those with schizophrenia who 
report experiencing them (Wing, Cooper, & Sartorius, 1974; Slade & Bentall, 1988). 
However a movement has developed away from understanding AVHs as necessarily 
signifying pathology, and towards an acceptance that voice-hearing can be a part o f normal 
experience (Johns & van Os, 2001; General Introduction). Furthermore, there do not seem 
to be radical differences in the structure and functions o f AVHs between voice-hearers with 
a diagnosis o f schizophrenia and those without (Leudar, Thomas, McNally, & Glinski, 
1997). Whether in a clinical or non-clinical sample, one of the fundamental characteristics 
of AVHs is their alien quality. In this article, we take a new look at the question o f how it is 
possible that a self-generated cognition may come to be experienced as produced and 
performed by an agent other than the self. 
Explaining Agency: Is It Me? 
Frith and colleagues (e.g.. Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000) have developed an 
elegant model o f the passivity experiences, such as delusions o f control, found in 
schizophrenia. This model attributes such experiences to deficits in a postulated 
neurocognitive action self-monitoring system (NASS), and has had its predictions 
supported by empirical research (e.g., Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998). The NASS 
model is based on Miall and Wolpert's (1995) forward model which was developed to 
model systems in which, due to temporal constraints, it makes sense to base decisions on 
the predicted consequences of actions. Frith and colleagues' utilization o f these ideas may 
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be summarized as follows (adapted from Frith et al., 2000, and Blakemore, 2003; see 
Figure 5.1). 
Firstly a representation is created o f what motor command is needed to achieve a 
particular goal, based on the estimated current state o f the system and the desired end-state. 
The motor command needed to achieve this goal is then issued. In parallel to this an 
efference copy of the motor command is also issued. The efference copy is used by the 
brain, in conjunction with knowledge of the current state o f the system, to create a 
prediction of what wi l l happen i f this motor plaji is executed. It is proposed that i f the actual 
sensory feedback matches the predicted state then awareness o f initiation of movement w i l l 
remain based on the predicted state. In this scenario awareness of performing a motor 
action is hence based on the predicted state, which is available before the movement is 
actually performed. This resuhs in individuals being aware o f the occurrence o f their motor 
action arovmd 50 to 100ms before they have actually moved (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & 
Pearl, 1983; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999). Thus in Figure 5.1, awareness o f motor 
actions (although not self-authorship) occurs at the time of predicted state generation, 
which temporally precedes actual performance of the action. I f the action is self-produced 
then predicted sensory feedback should be cancelled out by reafference from the actual 
sensory feedback. I f this occurs then there is perceptual sensory attenuation of the motor 
act, meaning that one does not feel or pay as much attention to the movement. I f the actual 
movement does not match the predicted movement, due for example to a defective 
predicted state mechanism, then the predicted sensory feedback and actual sensory 
feedback signals w i l l not cancel each other out. 
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Figvire 5.1, 
Forward model o f motor cpntrol (adapted from Frith et al., 2O00)-
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Frith et al. (2000) use this postulated mechanism to explain why an action may be 
actively experienced as performed by the self or passively experienced as performed by an 
alien 'other'. Blakemore (2003) has detailed the mechanism through which we come to 
experience an action as authored by another. She claims that it is the predicted sensory 
feedback not matching and consequently not cancelling out the actual feedback, leading to 
greater activity in the parietal cortex, which makes the movement feel "externally 
controlled" (p. 651). Support for this assertion comes from the work of Spence, Brooks, 
Hirsch, Liddle, Meehan, and Grasby (1997), who suggest that over-activity of the parietal 
cortex may contribute to the feeling that willed actions are externally controlled in patients 
suffering from delusions of control. 
The mechanism through which we come to experience an action as authored by 
ourselves has been detailed by Frith (2002). Frith claims that we get our awareness of 
authoring movements before the comparison has been made between the predicted and 
actual feedback. To argue for this. Frith draws on Wegner and Wheatley's (1999) work 
showing that the temporal contiguity o f a thought o f what is about to happen (e.g., hearing 
the word 'swan') followed by it actually happening (e.g., finding that your hand has just 
moved a pointer to a swan) causes the emotion of self-authorship. Wegner (2002) calls this 
"apparent mental causation" (p. 64). Frith applies this to the forward model by suggesting 
that the "emotion" (Wegner, 2002, p. 325) of self-authorship is created when awareness o f 
an action about to occur, based on the predicted state (available 50-100ms before we move 
as discussed above), is promptly followed by the actual action. 
The forward model can be applied to deviations fi-om the normal processes of action 
authorship in the following way. I f the predicted state mechanism is malftxnctioning, either 
through efference copy information not reaching it or through some other impairment, then 
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firstly Wegner's mechanism of apparent mental causation cannot work, meaning that the 
actor does not feel the authorship emotion, even though the action is self-initiated. 
Secondly, the high level o f parietal cortex activation (due to non-cancellation of predicted 
and actual feedback) is the same as i f the movement were passive (i.e., caused by someone 
else). This gives the event the same 'feel ' as a passive or externally-caused action, and the 
actor hence feels as though someone else caused the action. 
The Application of the Forward Model to AVHs 
Somewhat surprisingly Frith and colleagues have only applied their forward model 
to abnormalities involving overt actions such as delusions of control and the alien hand sign 
(e.g., Blakemore & Frith, 2003; Frith, 2002; Frith et al., 2000). Frith and colleagues have 
not attempted to use the forward model to explain phenomena not involving overt 
movements, such as AVHs. One reason for this may be criticisms (e.g., Gallagher, 2004; 
Stephens & Graham, 2000) of Frith's previous attempt to apply his prior model to 
cognitions (Frith, 1992). We address these criticisms, and offer some possible responses to 
them, in the second part o f this article. 
Frith et al.'s (2000) model has, however, recently been applied to AVHs by Seal, 
Aleman, and MeGuire (2004). Seal et al. begin by noting that any neurocognitive model of 
AVHs needs to account for how self-generated thought, mispereeived as speech, is 
experienced as unintended. The highlighting o f unintendedness as a defining feature of 
AVHs leads Seal et al. to apply the forward model to AVHs in a particular manner. Their 
application o f the forward model to AVHs is founded on the assumption that inner speech 
is the primary material o f AVHs. The involvement of inner speech in AVHs is accepted by 
many psychologists (e.g., Bentall, 2003; Femyhough, 2004), and supported by empirical 
research such as Gould's (1950) study showing that when patients hallucinated, 
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subvocalisations occurred which could be picked up with a throat microphone. That these 
subvocalisations were causally responsible for the inner speech perceived in AVHs, and not 
just echoing it, was suggested by the work o f Bick and Kinsboume (1987), who 
demonstrated that i f people experiencing hallucinations opened their mouths wide, stopping 
vocalizations, then the majority o f AVHs stopped. 
Having made the assumption that inner speech is the primary material o f AVHs, 
Seal et al. next propose that, "once some trigger event brings about the generation of the 
AVHs motor commands are issued and inner speech is produced" (p. 65). This makes the 
(unexamined) assumption that inner speech may be conceptualized as an action, and that it 
is therefore valid to apply the forward model to inner speech. Once this assumption has 
been made, Seal et al. are then able to apply Frith et al.'s (2000) forward model to the 
phenomenon of inner speech, postulating that the experience of imintendedness, 
characteristic o f AVHs, is due to the predicted sensory consequences o f inner speech 
initiation being distorted or absent. This distortion or absence of the predicted state means 
that, when the actual sensory consequences o f the inner speech command occur, there is no 
predicted state to accurately attenuate it. As Seal et al. (2004) phrase it, "The experience o f 
unintendedness can be accounted for by failure o f feed forward information" (p. 64). This 
concept o f the unintendedness o f iimer speech is part o f Seal et al.'s proposal that the 
failure o f the predicted state leads to inner speech whose origins (self or other) is 
experienced, " in various states o f ambiguity rather than two separate states o f awareness 
(self/other)" (p. 65). The proposal is then made that top-down factors, such as attributional 
biases, lead to the unintended inner speech being experienced as other-generated. This 
mechanism is illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2 
;Seal et al. 's (2004) application of the forward ifiodel to AVHs. 
desired state 
specification 
of motor 
command 
speech system 
action 
sensory 
system 
actual sensory 
experience 
efference copy not sent 
no predicted 
comparator 
ffiisfnatch 
unihtendedness 
' 
A V H 
top-down factors 
124 
Chapter 5: Thought as action 
We suggest, however, that this application o f the forward model to inner speech is 
problematic. Contrary to Seal et al.'s assertions, the forward model outlined by Frith et al. 
does not state that the absence (or distortion) of the predicted state causes the experience of 
unintendedness, which is then resolved into a feeling of self or other authorship by 
preconscious attributions. Instead, as discussed above, the forward model has a two-part 
mechanism, in which the emotions of self-authorship or other-authorship of an action are 
determined by the Frith/Wegner and Blakemore mechanisms respectively. 
Our alternative interpretation of how to apply the forward model to inner speech is 
shown in Figure 5.3. Firstly, as in Seal et al.'s model, the brain either produces a degraded 
predicted state or fails to produce a predicted state at all. The reasons for this are still poorly 
understood, but it seems likely that it wi l l involve a particular neurological deficit, 
potentially modulated by stress. The consequences o f failing to generate a coherent 
predicted state from the initial inner speech motor command are likely to be that awareness 
of performing inner speech cannot occur, as Libet et al.'s (1983) work suggests it would, 
50-100ms before inner speech actually occurs. Consequently, Wegner's (2002) mechanism 
of apparent mental causation (responsible for generating the emotion o f self-authorship) is 
unable to operate. Instead, Blakemore's (2003) mechanism of non-cancellation o f predicted 
and actual feedback, leading to increased parietal cortex activation and hence the feeling o f 
external control, would be operative, leading the event to be attributed to an external cause. 
To summarise. Seal et al.'s application of the forward model (shown in Figure 5.2) 
proposes that a mismatch between predicted and actual state leads to an experience of 
unintended inner speech which is then resolved into selfother authorship by preconscious 
attributions. Instead we argue (see Figure 5.3) that the failure o f the predicted state means 
that the emotion o f self-authorship is not felt, and that instead the mismatch of predicted 
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Figure 5.3 
Revised application o f the forward model to AVHs. 
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and actual state leads to the experience o f other-authorship o f inner speech. This model, 
contra Seal et al., does not require that there be a feeling o f unintendedness, the ambiguity 
of which must then be resolved into selCother authorship by preconscious attributions. 
Inner Speech as a Kind o f Action 
One potentially problematic aspect of Seal et al.'s (2004) account is the unexamined 
assumption that it is possible to transpose Frith et al.'s (2000) model from overt actions to 
the process o f thinking in inner speech. Gallagher (2004) has made a sfrong case that it is 
incorrect simply to transpose Frith's forward model from its successful explanation of 
passivity experiences, involving overt actions, to cognitive phenomena such as AVHs 
where there is no overt behaviour. Gallagher suggests that any such arguments are based on 
the erroneous assumption that "thinking is a kind of action" (p. 6). 
Gallagher's suggestion is that Frith and colleagues' use o f the forward model makes 
sense for overt actions, as there are at least two clear reasons why a predicted state is 
needed for overt actions. Firstly, we iieed to know whether our actions are internally caused 
(i.e., i f I l i f t my arm) or externally caused (i.e., i f someone else lifts my arm). Secondly, i f 
our action is not going to achieve our goal we need to know this in advance so we can make 
the necessary adjustments. Gallagher goes on to point out that i f the forward model is 
applied to purely internal events such as thoughts, then these two reasons for having the 
predicted state no longer come into play. Firstly, why would we need to know whether a 
thought has been caused by us or by an external agent? As Frith and Done (1988) point out, 
i f all our thoughts are internally generated, there is no possibility of our having thoughts 
other than our own. Stephens and Graham (2000) expand on this by pointing out that 
whereas we have to distinguish our actions from the actions o f others, "we are never 
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confronted with the... problem of having to sort out our thoughts out from other people's 
thoughts" (p. 138). 
However, the issue of how we judge the ownership of our thoughts makes more 
sense when inner speech and verbal thought are considered within their developmental 
context. A key figure in this respect is the developmental psychologist, L . S. Vygotsky 
(e.g., 1934/1987). He suggested that inner speech constitutes a form of verbal self-
regulation that is derived from semiotically mediated exchanges with interlocutors in the 
social world. Dialogue that originally exists on the interpsychological plane, as an exchange 
between individuals, is reconstructed on the intrapsychological plane as inner speech or 
verbal thought. Generally speaking, Vygotsky's hypotheses about the development of inner 
speech (and its semi-covert precursor, private speech), have been supported by empirical 
research (Berk, 1992; Winsler, 2004). 
The implications o f these ideas about inner speech for the present discussion are, 
firstly, that thought has a social origin and, secondly, that the challenges of determining the 
ovraership of one's utterances continue when those utterances are transferred to the 
intrapsychological plane. Indeed, a major cognitive challenge for children is to distinguish 
self-as-speaker from other-as-speaker (Femyhough & Russell, 1997). Femyhough (2004) 
has noted that a Vygotskian approach to inner speech, whereby the experience o f alien 
voices is explained in terms of atypical patterns o f internalization o f external dialogue, can 
help to resolve the paradox that AVHs are both experienced as alien and at the same time 
acknowledged to be of the self (Leudar & Thomas, 2000). 
Taking seriously the idea o f ownership of thoughts would thus militate against 
Stephens and Graham's (2000) conclusion that a system that assigns ownership of thoughts 
is just an "ad hoc" (p. 138) creation devised solely to help scientists explain delusions of 
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control. Rather, a Vygotskian perspective on inner speech entails an assumption, similar to 
that made in other recent discussions o f the 'extended mind' (Clark, 1997; 1998 ; Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998), that mental activity is not necessarily co-extensive with the boundaries of 
the biological organism. For present purposes, the implication o f Vygotsky's ideas about 
the social origins o f thought is that inner speech retains the dialogic quality of the external 
exchanges from which it derives (Femyhough, 1996), and that thinking is therefore 
naturally permeated by other voices (Femyhough, 2004). 
A related question posed by Gallagher (2004) is whether the process o f planning 
and executing an utterance in inner speech can be mistaken in the same way that it can for 
the generation of overt utterances. In other words, is there an internal, purely cognitive 
equivalent to the process o f making subtle adjustments to an action plan? Although the 
relevant data for inner speech are necessarily lacking, due to the unobservability of such 
utterances, some interesting findings from the study o f children's private speech (seen by 
Vygotsky to represent a way-station between external dialogue and verbal thought) are 
relevant to this question. Manfra, Tyler, Shiflett, and Winsler (2003) reported evidence that 
preschool children apply the same correction for speech errors and dysfluencies to their 
private speech as they do to their social utterances. I f private speech is seen as continuous 
with verbal thought, as the Vygotskian approach entails, it suggests that similar corrections 
to inner speech might be plausible. In other words, it seems plausible that individuals can 
indeed act as though an utterance in irmer speech is wrong, and needs adjusting. 
A fiirther objection raised by Gallagher's (2004) critique concerns the problem of 
unbidden thoughts. He notes that thoughts can strike us 'out of the blue' without us having 
a sense o f agency, and yet we do not attribute these thoughts to someone else (as a person 
with psychosis may do). However, there is no evidence that it is these out-of-the-blue 
129 
Chapter 5: Thought as action 
thoughts that those diagnosed with psychosis experience as AVHs. Indeed, as Femyhough 
(2004) noted, we know very little about the normal processes o f inner speech and verbal 
thought in disorders such as schizophrenia. It may be, conversely, that these out-of-the-blue 
thoughts are responsible for the AVH-l ike experiences found in non-clinical populations, 
but not full-blown AVHs. In the model outlined above, thoughts that occur to us in this way 
should not be attributed to someone else, as a predicted state is still generated. Asking 
voice-hearers (both from the non-clinical and patient populations) whether, and under what 
conditions, they experience such unbidden thoughts wi l l presumably shed fiirther light on 
the role o f predicted state formation in determining the ownership of utterances in inner 
speech. 
One o f the benefits o f applying Frith's forward model to inner speech, which Seal et 
al. do not note, is that this approach has the benefit o f being immune to Akins and 
Deimett's (1986) criticism of Hoffinan's (1986) influential account o f AVHs. Hoffman 
(1986) proposed that AVHs were due to inner speech that was experienced as unintended, 
and tried to explain this unintendedness as due to problems with discourse plarming. This 
led to Akins and Dennett's objection that, i f iiuier speech is intelligently planned by means 
of discourse plans, then there must be another intelligent entity planning the discourse 
plans, and so on, leading to an infinite regress. Frith's forward model sidesteps this problem 
by not assigning any crucial role in the model to judgments about the unintendedness (or 
otherwise) of actions. Rather, the model (when applied to AVHs, as outlined here) proposes 
a direct causal mechanism leading from the malfimction of the predicted state to the 
experience o f irmer speech as being of alien origin, in the absence of any competing self-
authorship emotion (see Figure 5.3). Failure o f the predicted state leads to neurological 
activity associated with passivity experiences, which may indeed lead to inner speech being 
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experienced as unintended. However the unintendedness of the inner speech is a result o f 
the failure o f the predicted state and follows from the passivity experience itself Thus 
unintendedness is a consequence, not a cause, o f the A V H and hence does not play the 
problematic theoretical role that it does in Hoffman's (1986) model. 
A number of ftirther challenges for the present model need to be addressed by future 
research. One important issue is to pinpoint precise brain areas or networks involved in the 
generation of (and, in cases o f damage, the failure to generate) the predicted state. Leube, 
Knoblich, Erb, Grodd, Bartels, and Kircher (2003) have suggested that the neurological 
instantiation o f a deficit in the efference copy mechanism may be located not in specific 
brain areas, but rather may arise fi-orri defective interactions between perceptual and motor 
areas. These areas are likely to involve the cortical network that de Vignemont and 
Foumeret (2004) note as being involved in action attribution, which include the prefrontal 
and the parietal cortex, the supplementary motor area, and the cerebellum. However, 
current research in this vein has tended to focus on the role of the cerebellum in signalling 
the sensory discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences o f 
movements (e.g., Blakemore, Frith & Wolpert, 2001) and not on the neural correlates o f the 
predicted state itself Another route o f entry into understanding the neural underpinnings o f 
the predicted state mechanism is via neuropsychological syndromes, such as the alien hand 
syndrome, which are associated with lesions in known brain regions. In the case o f the alien 
hand syndrome, patients make involuntary yet seemingly purposeful limb movements 
(Giovannetti, Buxbaum, Biran & Chatteijee, 2005), suggesting a breakdown in the forward 
model, but without the feeling that their actions are caused by another. As this syndrome is 
associated with medial frontal and callosal lesions (Delia Sala, Marchetti, & Spinnler, 
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1991), this identifies these as regions to be potentially incorporated into any neural 
instanfiation of the forward model. 
A further challenge, noted by Gallagher (2004), is the selectivity problem, which 
recognises the episodic nature o f positive symptoms. That is, i f the predicted state is 
malfunctioning, why do all thoughts not seem alien? The first point to note is that die 
predicted state may only intermittently be malfunctioning. This raises the further question 
of what is it that causes the predicted state to fail . A possible answer is that it could be the 
same factors that Bentall (1990) has described as affecting our judgements about whether 
an event is public or private: namely, factors such as stress-induced arousal, our abiHty to 
use cues, perceptual attenuation, or effects o f suggestion. These remain areas for future 
empirical research. The second point relates to the fact, noted above, that we do not have 
sufficient understanding of normal inner speech in individuals who experience AVHs. Only 
a greater understanding of the phenomenology o f iimer speech in affected individuals w i l l 
allow us to specify how voice-hearing may be determined by the breakdown of the 
predicted state mechanism. 
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Chapter 6 
A new spin on the Wheel of Fortune: 
Gender effects in priming of action-authorship judgments ' 
ABSTRACT 
The proposal that there is an illusion o f conscious wi l l has been supported by findings that 
priming o f stimulus location in a task requiring judgments o f action-authorship can enhance 
participants' experience of agency. We attempted to replicate findings from the 'Wheel o f 
Fortune' task [Aarts, H. , Ousters, R., & Wegner, D. M . (2005). On the inference of personal 
authorship: enhancing experienced agency by priming effect information. Consciousness 
and Cognition, 14, 439-458.] and to investigate whether the effect of priming on judgments 
of action-authorship was of equivalent strength in men and women. We also examined 
participants' performance on this task in relation to self-reported passivity experiences and 
hallucination-proneness. There was a significant effect o f priming, with primes being found 
to increase the experience of agency. An interaction between gender and priming was also 
found, with further analysis indicating that priming enhanced feelings o f agency in women 
but not in men. There were no significant correlations between levels of self-reported 
passivity experiences or hallucination-proneness and participants' susceptibility to the 
priming effect on ratings of agency. Implications o f these findings are discussed with 
regard to a prominent model of passivity experiences. Possible explanations o f the observed 
gender effect are also considered. 
^ Chapter published as: Jones, S. R., de-Wit, L . , Femyhough, C , & Meins, E . (2008). A new spin on the 
Wheel of Fortune: Priming of action-authorship judgements and relation to psychosis-like experiences. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 576-586. 
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Introduction 
The feeling o f having consciously willed something to happen is a fundamental 
human experience. Wegner (2002, 2004) has proposed that this experience o f action-
authorship could be a result of the same mental processes we use in the perception of 
causality more generally. As Hume (1739) noted, the constant conjunction of x followed by 
y leads us to infer that x caused y. Wegner (2004) translates this argument, typically used to 
explain causality for mechanistic events (the paradigmatic example being the collision o f 
billiard balls), into the realm of mental phenomena. In essence Wegner proposes that, just 
as we experience a moving billiard ball as causing the movement of a stationary ball with 
which it collides, we experience ourselves as causal when an action is preceded by a 
relevant forethought about the action. This leads us to experience ourselves as causal agents 
when "we have experienced relevant thoughts about the act at an appropriate interval in 
advance, and so can infer that our own mental processes have set the act in motion" (p. 
654). Wegner terms this the theory o f apparent mental causation: "people experience 
conscious wi l l when they interpret their own thought as the cause o f their action" (Wegner 
& Wheatley, 1999, p. 480). Wegner describes three aspects of thought-action contiguity 
that determine the extent to which mental causation is felt. These are the priority, 
consistency, and exclusivity of the thought about the action (Wegner & Wheatley 1999). 
For the perception of apparent mental causation, the thought should occur before the action, 
be consistent with the action, and not be accompanied by other potential causes. 
An important implication o f this theory is that people may experience the feeling o f 
doing something when there is actually no causal connection between their thoughts and 
their actions. Indeed, as Wegner notes, there may be a third factor causing both the thought 
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and the action, with no causal linkage from the thought to the action. It is this that has led 
Wegner (2002, 2004) to talk of the "illusion" o f conscious w i l l . 
Priming and the artificial enhancement o f conscious w i l l 
The potential for our feeling o f conscious wi l l to be illusory, and show no relation 
to the actual mechanisms by which our actions have been generated, has been empirically 
demonsfrated by Wegner and colleagues (e.g., Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Aarts, Ousters, 
& Wegner, 2005). At the heart o f such experiments is the idea that briefly priming an effect 
of an action (by priming a thought/representation of an action's consequences just before it 
occurs) increases the probability that one wi l l experience that effect as due to one's own 
volition. 
One methodology created by Wegner and colleagues to investigate this 
phenomenon has been dubbed the 'Wheel o f Fortune' task (Aarts et al., 2005). In this task, 
participants are told that they control the motion of a grey square rapidly fraversing a 
rectangular grid whilst a computer independently moves another square in the opposite 
direction at the same speed. At a certain point participants are instructed to press a key to 
stop the motion o f their square. They are then shown a new grid with one square 
highlighted and they must judge whether their key-press caused their square to land there, 
or whether that was where the computer had caused its square to stop. The high velocity at 
which the squares traverse the grid result in this decision being ambiguous. This ambiguity 
regarding who caused the square to land on the final highlighted position (i.e., whether it 
was the participant's button press that stopped their square there, or whether it was where 
the computer's square finished) allows the participant's experience of authorship over the 
observed stops to be experimentally manipulated. In primed trials, the position o f the final 
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square is briefly presented to participants (for 34ms) before they see the final square's 
position, which is in fact predetermined. This is termed an 'effect-prime', as it primes the 
judgment about the apparent effect o f the participant's button press (Aarts et al., 2005). 
Wegner's theory of apparent mental causation leads to the prediction that, in effect-primed 
trials, the occurrence o f the thought^representation o f the square's position, followed by the 
perception of it being there, wi l l increase participants' feeling o f conscious volition of 
stopping the square, compared to a control condition where no prime is present. 
Aarts and colleagues have published three papers demonstrating that the provision 
of an effect-prime does increase the experience of conscious w i l l (Aarts, 2007; Aarts et al., 
2005; Aarts, Wegner, & Dijksterhuis, 2006). However, this methodology has yet to be 
replicated by other research groups. The first aim of the current study was therefore to 
provide an independent replication of Aarts et al.'s findings. We were also interested in 
examining whether the magnitude o f this effect was similar in both genders as, unusually, 
Aarts and colleagues have neither reported the gender compositions o f their samples, nor 
analyzed the effect of effect-primes by gender. Given that Wegner (2004) implies that the 
mechanism that generates the "illusion of conscious w i l l " (p. 649) is likely to be a 
universal, non-gender-specific, human phenomenon, foregoing an analysis by gender is 
understandable. 
There are nonetheless reasons to believe that a gender effect on the susceptibility to 
effect-primes may emerge through appropriate analyses. Firstly, as Wegner and Wheatley 
(1999) themselves note, the experience of conscious w i l l is an expression of our tendency 
to take what Dennett (1987) terms the 'intentional stance'. This, as Wegner and Wheatley 
state, involves viewing "psychological causation not in terms o f causal mechanism but 
rather in terms o f agents who have beliefs and desires that cause their acts. Conscious wi l l 
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is part o f taking an intentional stance towards oneself (p. 490). However, Baron-Cohen 
(2002, 2003, 2005) has argued that the "drive to identify another's mental states" (2005, p. 
820), which he terms o f the skill o f empathizing, is greater in women than men. This 
argument has received substantial empirical support (e.g., Davis, 1994; Hall, 1978; Happe, 
1995; Taimen, 1990). It hence seems plausible that the greater propensity in women to take 
the intentional stance towards others may lead to an equivalent propensity to overrate the 
role of thoughts in causing their own actions.^ In terms of the Wheel of Fortune task, this 
led us to predict that, whereas both men and women were likely to have greater self-
authorship ratings on effect-primed (as compared to non-primed) trials, the magnitude o f 
this effect would be greater in women due to their propensity to overrate the role o f 
thoughts induced by effect-primes in causing the observed event. 
Applying the Wheel of Fortune task to questions o f psychopathology 
In addition to explaining typical judgments o f action-authorship, Wegner and 
colleagues' theory o f apparent mental causation has been used to account for disturbances 
in action-authorship judgments associated with various forms o f psychppathology (e.g. 
Frith, 2002; Jones & Femyhough, 2007a). For example, patients with schizophrenia often 
suffer from what are termed passivity experiences. In such experiences patients feel as i f 
their actions have been caused, or are under the control of, another agency. For example, a 
patient reported by Mellor (1970) describes how his "fingers pick up the pen, but I don't 
control them. What they do is nothing to do with me" (p. 18). Frith and colleagues 
(Blakemore, 2003; Frith, 2002; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000) have attempted to 
explain such experiences as resulting from a breakdown in the mechanism responsible for 
' This idea was suggested to me by Lee de-Wit. 
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generating the emotion o f authorship (see Chapter 5). In their model, the issuing of a motor 
command is accompanied by the production o f a parallel efference copy of the motor 
command which is then used by a predictor mechanism to create a prediction (the 
'predicted state') o f what the movement wi l l result in. Awareness of starting a movement 
appears to be based on this predicted state and not on sensory feedback from movements 
themselves. In experiments investigating the time at which a self-generated movement is 
perceived as starting, it is found that individuals experience their movement as starting -50-
-80ms before their actual movement begins (Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999). 
Frith (2002) draws on Wegner's (2002) concept o f apparent mental causation to 
explain how the emotion o f self-authorship is created when awareness that an action is 
about to occur (based on the predicted state, which is available 5O-80ms before we move), 
is promptly followed by the actual action (see Jones & Femyhough, 2007a). I f the predicted 
state mechanism malfunctions, then Wegner's mechanism of apparent mental causation 
cannot work, meaning that the actor does not feel the authorship emotion. It is this 
malfiinction o f the predicted state that has been proposed to be the source o f passivity 
experiences (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000). In addition to its involvement in the 
generation of passivity experiences, a malfunction o f the predicted state has been proposed 
to play a causal role in the genesis o f auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs). In such 
models, a failure in the predicted state has been proposed to cause self-produced speech to 
be experienced as not produced by the self, resulting in an A V H (e.g., Jones & Femyhough, 
2007a; Seal, Aleman, & McGuire, 2004). 
Although Frith and colleagues are not clear on this point, there are at least two 
potential ways in which the predicted state mechanism could lead to a breakdown in the 
feeling o f authorship. Firstly, there may be a problem upstream of the predicted state, 
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resulting in a complete or partial failure to generate a predicted state. Secondly, there may 
be a problem downstream of the predicted state. In this latter case, the creation o f the 
predicted state may be normal, but the individual may be unable to use this information to 
generate the feeling of agency. The Wheel of Fortune procedure offers a potential method 
of distinguishing which o f the above possibilities is the best explanation o f passivity 
experiences and AVHs. We propose that effect-primes may be seen as proxy predicted 
states, in that they give a preview of what is about to occur. I f there were indeed a problem 
downstream of the predicted state, meaning that individuals could generate it but not use it, 
then individuals with passivity experiences or AVHs should be impaired in their ability to 
use the effect-primes on the Wheel of Fortune task to increase their feeling of authorship. 
This would result in a negative correlation between susceptibility to both passivity 
experiences and AVHs and the increase in the feeling o f authorship on effect-primed trials. 
A failure to find a correlation would be in line with the prediction of the upstream 
explanation, namely that such experiences result fi"om a lack/breakdown of the predicted 
state, and the ability to use the predicted state (prime) should hence not be related to levels 
o f such experiences. 
One obvious way o f testing these potential explanations would be to employ the 
Wheel o f Fortune procedure in examining action-authorship judgments in patients with 
schizophrenia who have passivity experiences, or in patients who experience AVHs. 
Another strategy, which we adopt here, is to use measures of susceptibility to passivity 
experiences and AVHs in a non-clinical sample. Measures of general delusionality in the 
healthy population often include items relating to passivity experiences. For example, the 
Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI-21; Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004) includes 
items relating to passivity experiences such as "Do you ever feel as i f you are a robot or 
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zombie with no w i l l o f your own?" (item #21). This item was found to be endorsed by 
6.3% of a student sample by Jones and Femyhough (2007b). This provides evidence that, 
just as hallucinations and persecutory delusions have been found to exist on a continuum 
stretching into the healthy population (Johns & van Os, 2001; General Introduction), 
passivity experiences may also exist on a continuum. In order to test the specificity o f any 
observed relation, we also set out to examine associations between Wheel of Fortune 
performance and susceptibility to another form of delusional ideation, not linked to 
problems with the predicted state and feelings o f authorship, namely persecutory delusions. 
In summary, this study set out to investigate the following hypotheses. Firstly, we 
hypothesized that authorship ratings on the Wheel o f Fortune task would be higher on 
effect-primed trials than non-effect-primed trials. We also made the second hypothesis that 
although the effect of priming would be significant in both men and women, the magnitude 
of this effect would be greater in women, resulting in an interaction between gender and 
priming. Thirdly, we hypothesized that self-reported susceptibility to both passivity 
experiences and AVHs would correlate negatively with increases in the feeling o f action-
authorship resulting from exposure to effect-primes. Our final hypothesis was that self-
reported persecutory delusion-like beliefs would not correlate with increases in the feeling 
of action-authorship resulting from exposure to effect-primes. 
Method 
Participants and design 
A convenience sample of 144 students (62 men, 82 women) with mean age o f 
21.5yrs (SD = 3.91) participated in the experiment. Participants were tested in two groups 
in order to assess whether there was a.n effect o f order o f testing. In Group 1, 92 
participants (40 men, 52 women) first completed the three quesfionnaires described above, 
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recorded their basic demographic data, including their gender, and then undertook the 
Wheel o f Fortune task, using laptop computers in a quiet room. Participants were not paid 
for their participation. In a within-participants desigii, participants experienced trials on 
which they were primed with effect information (the final location o f the square) and trials 
in which they were not primed. In Group 2, the remaining 52 participants (22 men, 30 
women) firstly undertook the Wheel o f Fortune task, using desktop computers in isolated 
cubicles, and then completed the questionnaire portion o f the study and recorded their 
demographic details including gender. Again, in a within-participants design, participants 
experienced trials on which they were primed with effect information (the final location of 
the square) and trials in which they were not primed. 
Measures 
Passivity experiences. A new 5-iteiTi questionnaire was developed for the purpose of 
assessing levels o f passivity experiences in a healthy population sample (see Appendix C), 
as there is no existing tool that attempts to measure these specific experiences in non-
clinical samples. This was termed the Scale for Assessrnent of Passivity Experiences in the 
General Population (SAPE-GP). The items constituting this were taken in part from the 
Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (Peters et al., 2004) and in part adapted from the Scale for 
the Assessment o f Positive Symptoms (Andreasen, 1984). Items were scored on a 5-point 
Likert scale with potential responses being: Always (4), Very Often (3), Fairly many times 
(2), Occasionally (1) and Never (0). Total scores could hence range from 0 to 20, with 
higher scores indicating more passivity experiences. 
LSHS-R: The revised Lauriay-Slade Hallucination Scale (Launay & Slade, 1981, as 
modified by Bentall & Slade, 1985) is a 12-item instrument designed to measure 
predisposition to hallucination-like experiences. Each item is scored on a five-point Likert 
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scale consisting of: "certainly applies to me" (4), "possibly applies to me" (3), "unsure (2), 
"possibly does not apply to me" (1), "certain does not apply to me" (0). Total scores can 
range from 0 to 48. Higher scores indicate a greater predisposition to hallucination-like 
experiences (Chapter 3; Chapter 4). 
Persecutory delusion-like beliefs. These were assessed using the Persecutory 
Ideation Questionnaire (PIQ; McKay et al., 2006), a 10-item questionnaire designed to 
measure persecutory ideation in both clinical and non-clinical samples. Items are rated on a 
5-point Likert scale ranging from Very True (4) to Very Untrue (0), with higher scores 
meaning that individuals experienced greater levels o f persecutory ideation. This measure 
has been shown to have good reliability and validity (McKay et al., 2006; see Chapter 1). 
Experimental task and procedure 
The Wheel o f Fortune task was programmed in C+ using the Borland builder 
environment. Precise control o f timing was ensured with the use o f Direct X. 
Administration and scoring o f the task was exactly as reported in Aarts et al. (2005). 
Participants were informed that the study was designed to examine feelings of control. The 
participants had to press and hold the S-key on the keyboard to cause a grey square rapidly 
to traverse a rectangular path, consisting of eight white squares, in a counter-clockwise 
direction. At the same time, another grey square (under the computer's control) moved 
along the same path but in a clockwise direction. At a random point in time (between 8 and 
10 laps o f the screen) the grid went blank and participants had to stop the motion of the 
squares, which they were told continued to rotate invisibly, by pressing the Enter-key. This 
resulted in one of the white squares o f the grid turning black, which was said to represent 
the position o f either their own square, or the computer's, at the time they pressed stop. 
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After each stop, participants were asked to indicate whether they had caused the square to 
stop on that position or whether the computer had. The authorship judgment was measured 
on a 10-point Likert scale, running fi-om 'not me at a l l ' (1) to 'absolutely me' (10). The stop 
location was presented twice on each of the eight tiles o f the path. The experimental task 
thus consisted o f 16 trials. The order o f primed and unprimed trails was randomly specified 
for each participant. Before the experimental phase proper, participants were given two 
practice trials to familiarise themselves with the procedure. These data were not used in the 
analyses reported here. 
Events in a trial. Each trial began with a warning signal (the word 'Warning' 
appeared on the screen). Next the message ' Start' appeared in the centre of the grid until 
the participant pressed (and held) the S-key. The participant's and the computer's squares 
then began to move along the path in alternate steps (the squares were presented one after 
the other). Squares were displayed for 67ms on each position. It hence took 1072ms for one 
complete lap to occur (67ms x 8 positions x 2 [participant's and computer's] squares; Aarts 
et al., 2005). The number o f laps that occurred in a trial was programmed to vary randomly 
between 8 and 10 laps. When the message 'Stop' appeared in the centre o f the grid, only 
the eight white empty tiles were shovm, until the participant pressed the Enter-key. At the 
press o f this button a black square was presented after 101ms. The placement of this square 
was always four positions farther than that o f the last position of the participant's square 
before the stop message had appeared. Thus, participants did not have actual control of 
where the black square landed. 
Effect-priming. In 8 of the 16 trials the black square that was to be displayed was 
flashed on the screen before the message 'Stop' appeared. The primed location was always 
the same as the subsequently presented position o f the black square. The prime occurred 
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33ms after the last presentation o f the participant's square. Primes were presented for 33ms 
and were followed 51ms later by the message 'Stop' (the total priming period hence being 
117ms). In the no-priming condition, the position o f the black square was not flashed (the 
position was presented in white for 33ms). The priming event was employed for every 
possible location on the 8 square grid, resulfing in eight trials o f the prirning condifion, and 
8 o f the no-priming condition. 
Measurement of potential control. Participants' potential control over producing the 
effects was also measured. The computer measured participants' reaction times (in ms) 
between the word 'Stop' appearing on screen, and their press of the Ehter-key. As Aarts 
(2007) notes, i f the participants press the Enter-key 330ms (equivalent to 369ms using our 
timings) after the presentation o f the stop message, then they w i l l have pressed it at the 
same time that their square was actually in the position indicated by the black square. A 
measure o f potential confrol was hence calculated as the absolute difference between the 
participant's reaction tirne (time of Enter-key press less time of presentation of the word 
'Stop') and 369ms. Most participants on most trials stopped the motion o f the squares 
before one lap o f the squares could be completed. For slower responses the response times 
first had the time of the completed laps (1072ms for each lap) subtracted from it, then the 
absolute difference between this figure and 369ms was calculated (Aarts et al., 2005). The 
smaller the absolute difference in these numbers, the more likely it was that participants 
could actually have caused the square to land on that position. I f there are no differences in 
this figure between primed and non-primed trials, it rules out the possibility that 
participants may have rated their authorship higher on primed trials due to them actually 
landing their square closer to the final position of the black square on such trials. 
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A number of individual trials resulted in participants showing high reaction times. 
This was interpreted as the participant losing concentration on the task or hitting the wrong 
button to stop the motion o f the squares. As such, any trials on which participants' reaction 
times were greater than 2144ms (two laps of the invisible squares) were removed from the 
data. This eventually led to the removal o f a total o f 104 individual trials (Group 1: 90 
removed. Group 2:14 removed) representing 5% (Group 1: 6%, Group 2: 2%) of the total 
trials performed by participants. 
Debriefing. At the end of the session participants were debriefed. The debriefing 
indicated that none o f participants realised the true nature of the study. Previous studies 
utilising this task (e.g., Aari:s, 2007) with a 34ms prime duration have noted that none of 
their participants reported having seen the primes. In our replication, one participant 
confidently reported having seen a black square flash on around half of the trials and 
ftirther noted that the position of this square was identical to the location of the final square. 
This participant's data were excluded frorh the analysis, as their experience o f the task was 
clearly not comparable to the other participants. A minority o f participants (<10%) reported 
having seen a flash on the screen on a few trials, but they were unaware that the position of 
this square matched the position of the final black square. 
Results 
Authorship ratings and effect-priming 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.1. The average ratings o f experienced 
authorship across the 16 trials were analysed using a 2 (Prime: present, absent) x 2 (Order 
of testing: Group 1, Group 2) x 2 (Gender: male, female) mixed-design A N O V A . A 
Kolmogorov-Smimov test indicated that the ratings of experienced authorship on both 
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Table 6.1 
Descriptive statistics for variables under investigation 
Overall Men Women 
( N = 143) (n = 61) (n = 82) 
Authorship rating (effect-prime) 5.35 (1.52) 4.92(1.41)** 5.67(1.52)** 
Authorship rating (no effect-prime) 4.74(1.53) 5.17(1.67)** 4.42(1.33)** 
Passivity experiences 2.00 (2.74) 2.60 (3.78)* 1.61 (1.68)* 
Hallucination-proneness 18.09 (7.39) 16.90 (7.04) 18.86 (7.56) 
Persecutory Ideation Questionnaire 7.85 (5.70) 7.54 (4.57) 8.05 (6.36) 
* p < . 0 5 , **;?<.01 
Note. Passivity experience and persecutory ideation questionnaire data was unavailable for 
eleven participants. 
effect-primed and non effect-primed trials did not deviate significantly fi-om a normal 
distribution, D (143) = .05, p > .05 for both. The main effect o f priming was significant, F 
( 1 , 139) = 7.44,p < .01, ri^ = .05. This effect size is small to medium by Cohen's (1988) 
criteria, and is comparable to the effect size for effect-priming of = .09 found by Aarts 
(2006). The interaction between priming and gender was also found to be significant, F ( l , 
139) = 16.96,/? < .001, Ti^ = .11. By Cohen's (1988) criteria, this is a medium to large effect 
size. There was no interaction between priming and group, F (1 , 139) = .49, p = .49, nor 
between priming, group, and gender, F ( l , 139) = 1.01, p = .32. Finally, there was no main 
effect o f gender, F ( l , 139) = .03,p = .87, or group, F ( l , 139) = .01,p = .94. 
To investigate the interaction between priming and gender, paired t-tests were 
performed separately for each gender on the authorship ratings for primed and non-primed 
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frials. For men, authorship ratings for the primed and non-primed trials did not differ 
significantly, / (61) = -.85, p = .40. For women, authorship ratings were significantly higher 
for the primed than the non-primed trials, t (82) = 5.37,p < .001, Cohen's d = .59. This is a 
large effect size as defined by Cohen's (1988) criteria for paired t-test effect sizes. 
Finally, as shown in Table 6.1, there was a significant difference in authorship 
ratings on both primed trials and non-primed trials between men and women, with men 
scoring significantly higher than women on non-primed trials, and significantly lower on 
primed trials. 
Potendal confrol 
The mean absolute differences between the response fime after the Stop message 
and the time required to land exactly halfway through the presentation of the black square 
(see Secfion 2.5) were compared for the 8 primed trials and the 8 non- primed trials using a 
2 (Prime: present, absent) x 2 (Order of testing: Group 1, Group 2) x 2 (Gender: male, 
female) mixed-design A N O V A . It was found that there was no effect o f prirning, F{\, 139) 
= .08, p = .77, indicafing that priming did not affect participants' potential control over 
causing the effects. Furthermore, there was also no interaction between either gender, F(l, 
139) = .13,p = .72, or group, F ( l , 139) = .26,p = .61, with priming, and no three-way 
interaction between priming, group, and gender, F ( l , 139) = .17,/? = .68. There was no 
main effect o f gender, F ( l , 139) = 1.73,/? = . 19, although there was a main effect o f group, 
F{1, 139) = 7.49, p < .01, T]'^  = .05, with reaction times significantly quicker in Group 2. 
Overall the mean absolute difference score was 94ms (SD = 83). 
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Passivity experiences, persecutory ideation, and effect-priming 
Cronbach's alpha for the SAPE-GP was 0.73, indicating satisfactory internal 
reliability; Levels o f passivity experiences reported were exceedingly low. Only thirteen 
participants scored five or over on the SAPE-GP. As shown in Table 6.1, men had 
significantly higher levels of passivity experiences than women. Correlations among 
passivity experiences, hallucination-proneness, persecutory delusion-like beliefs, and the 
difference in authorship between primed and non-primed trials (average primed authorship 
rating less average non-primed authorship ratings for each participant) are reported in Table 
6.2. There were no significant correlations among the variables on either the entire data set 
or when analysed by gender. There was a trend towards females (but not males) showing a 
significant correlation between hallucination-proneness and effect-priming (p = .09). 
Greater hallucination-proneness was associated with lesser susceptibility to effect-primes in 
women. However, due to the number o f correlations performed, it appears likely that to 
conclude there is a relation between hallucination-proneness and effect-priming in women 
would be to make a Type I error. 
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Table 6.2 
Correlations between delusions and effects on authorship of priming 
Passivity Hallucinatioh- Persecutory 
experiences proneness ideation 
Overall effect o f priming (N = 132) -.02 -.09 .10 
Effect o f priming in men (n = 52) .09 -.08 .01 
Effect o f priming in women (n = 80) -.04 -.19* .13 
Note. Passivity experience and persecutory ideation questionnaire data were 
unavailable for eleven participants. * p = .09 
Discussion 
This study aimed to replicate the Wheel of Fortune methodology as devised by 
Aarts et al. (2005). In concordance with our first hypothesis we found a significant main 
effect o f effect-priming on this task. Participants reported greater feelings o f authorship on 
primed compared to non-primed trials. Our second hypothesis, that there would be a 
significant interaction between gender and priming, was also supported. Further analysis 
showed that the direction of our second hypothesis, namely that women would show greater 
effects o f priming on authorship ratings than men, was also supported. However, our 
second hypothesis also predicted that although the magnitude o f the effect in women would 
be greater than in men, both would sfill show a significant effect of priming. This was not 
supported, as it was found that only women showed an effect o f priming on authorship 
ratings, with authorship ratings higher on primed than non-primed triails. 
It was also found that men reported significantly higher authorship ratings than 
women on non-primed trials, yet lower authorship ratings than women on primed trials. 
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The higher authorship ratings by men on non-primed trials may potentially be explained by 
the greater perceived self-efficacy on computer-based tasks experienced by men (Busch, 
1995; Dumdell, Haag, & Laithwaite, 2000). On primed trials this greater male perceived 
self-efficacy may have been offset by women's (but not men's) greater susceptibility to 
priming, resulting in lower authorship ratings for men than women. 
We had also hypothesised that levels o f passivity experiences and AVH-proneness 
would correlate with participants' susceptibility to effect-primes. There was no significant 
correlation between participants' (of either gender) susceptibility to effect-primes and either 
levels o f self-reported passivity experiences or AVH-proneness. As predicted, no 
correlation was found between participants' suscepfibility to effect-primes and their levels 
of persecutory delusion-like beliefs. 
Effect-priming and gender effects 
Our finding of an effect of priming in women but not in men is thus an intriguing 
finding which requires some discussion. One possibility is that we found an effect o f 
priming in women but not in men due to the smaller number o f men than women used in 
the present study, and the subsequent lower power o f the study when examining men. 
However, i f the effect size o f priming in men had been equivalent to that found in women 
in the present study (d = .59), then the sample size of men would have resulted in a power 
in excess o f p = .80, ample to detect an effect. 
I f this finding is not due to a lack of power, it raises the question as to whether our 
data can be reconciled with the previous Wheel of Fortune experiments by Aarts and 
colleagues. A l l o f these previous studies which reported a main effect of effect-primes on 
the Wheel of Fortune task (Aarts, 2007; Aarts et al., 2005, 2006) failed to report splits of 
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their data by gender or include gender in their ANOVAs as a between-subjects variable. It 
is possible that these studies would have found a gender effect had they analysed their data 
in this way. Furthermore, we may speculate that, as the series of studies by Aarts and 
colleagues have all used student populations, these potentially consisted of a large number 
of psychology students. Psychology students are predominantly women: for example, 81% 
of students accepted onto a Psychology degree in the United Kingdom in 2006 were women 
(UCAS, 2007), and similar gender compositions are seen in studies that report gender splits 
on samples drawn from psychology departments in other European countries (e.g., Bohne 
et al., 2002). Since Aarts (2007) drew his Wheel o f Fortune sample from Dutch 
undergraduates, it is probable that there was a preiponderance of women in this sample. 
Thus it may be the case that the overall effect of effect-priming Aarts et al. reported is due 
to the effect o f priming in women offsetting the lack of a priming effect in men. This would 
be consistent with our findings. 
Although we have argued that our findings can be explained in terms o f the greater 
propensity to take the intentional stance in women compared to men, and that it is not an 
artifice resulting from a lack of power, other alternative explanations are also possible. It 
could be argued that gender differences in perceptual abilities could be the cause of the 
present findings. For example, in an experiment examining the impact o f odour priming on 
the ability to recognize a target word, only women (and not men) were found to show an 
effect of priming (Hermans, Baeyans, & Eelen, 2004). The authors of the study ascribed 
this gender effect to the superior olfactory perceptual abilities o f women (Doty, 1991). 
Given that the Wheel of Fortune task involves a significant spatial component, and a prime 
which varies in its spatial location, it could be argued that a difference between men and 
women in susceptibility to spatial primes could have caused the present pattern o f results. 
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However, the findings of a study by Koshino, Boese, and Ferraro (2000) on the efficacy of 
spatial primes suggests that such a differential susceptibility is not likely to exist. In this 
study the letter O was presented on a screen in one of four possible locations. Once it 
appeared on screen participants had to identify its location as quickly as possible. Brief 
priming of the target's location decreased participants' reaction times for identifying its 
position, but with no gender difference in the magnitude of the priining effects. 
Notwithstanding the above arguments, at the present time we are unable to 
speculate in any detail as to the precise causal mechanism that may lead to gender 
differences in the propensity to take the intentional stance to result in the effect found in 
this study. We would hence call for Our findings to be replicated by other studies using the 
Wheel of Fortune methodology, perhaps including independent measures of propensity to 
take the intentional stance (de-Wit, Femyhough, & Jones, 2006). Although we have argued 
that differential sensitivity to spatial primes is unlikely to be a cause of the current findings, 
it would also prove interesting to investigate the artificial enhancement of conscious will 
using experimental methods that do not use spatial primes. One potential method for this is 
the I-Spy methodology of Wegner and Wheatley (1999), which involves auditory rather 
than spatial priming. I f the gender differences reported here were also obtained on the I-Spy 
paradigm, it would be a clue that our findings are due to gender differences in general 
susceptibility to primes in action-authorship paradigms, rather than to any specific 
susceptibility to spatial primes. However, the only existing study utilising the I-Spy 
paradigm (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999) has not reported on gender effects within the data. It 
would hence be desirable for any replication of the I-Spy experiment to analyse the data by 
gender to investigate possible interactions between gender and priming. 
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We also note here that, whereas Aarts and colleagues (e.g. Aarts, 2007; Aarts et al., 
2005) reported none of their participants consciously saw their 34ms prime, approximately 
10% of our participants reported being aware at some level of seeing our comparable 33ms 
prime. However, we do not anticipate this will affect the nature of our conclusions because 
Aarts et al. (2005: Experiment 2) have previously demonstrated that priming is effective 
whether it is induced by brief (34ms) primes which participants do not report being aware 
of, or longer (68ms) primes (visible to 44% of participants). 
Passivity experiences, AVH-proneness, and effect-priming 
The finding that susceptibility to priming on this task was unrelated to self-reported 
passivity experiences provides preliminary evidence that it is not an inability to use the 
predicted state that leads to passivity experiences, but rather its absence altogether. One 
alternative explanation might be that the passivity experiences scale devised for this study 
was not sensitive or rehable enough to detect relevant differences in a non-clinical sample, 
and we would call for further work in developing such scales. Another alternative might be 
that passivity experiences are not sufficiently common and/or intense in such a sample for 
any such relations to obtain. Given the low endorsement rates of items on the SAPE-GP, 
this appears a likely explanation. Only the replication of the present findings with a clinical 
sample, and clinically proven assessments of passivity experiences, would allow any firm 
conclusions on this issue to be drawn. 
Similar arguments apply to the finding that susceptibility to priming was unrelated 
to AVH-proneness. As items measuring hallucination-proneness were endorsed to a wider 
extent than those assessing passivity experiences, this offers firmer evidence for an 
upstream impairment in the predicted state than the passivity data. However, again we 
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would call for the replication of these findings with both clinical and non-clinical samples 
in order to allow any firm conclusions to be drawn. 
Conclusions and future directions 
In summary the present study firstly points to the need for fiirther examination of 
potential gender effects in the artificial enhancement of the experience of actionrauthorship. 
The initial findings reported here suggest that previously documented gender differences in 
the tendency to take the intentional stance may extend to the generation of our feeling of 
volition. This also supports the more general idea that the generation of our own feeling of 
conscious will involves taking the intentional stance towards our own minds (de-Wit et al., 
2006; Frith, 2002). We have also suggested that it is possible to use brief effect-primes to 
mimic the predicted state proposed as part of Frith et al.'s (2000) forward model. Such a 
methodology should potentially allow a range of future experiments to explore further the 
mechanisms behind passivity experiences and hallucination in clinical populations. 
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FOREWORD TO CHAPTERS 7 AND 8 
Chapter 5 highlighted the potential for inner speech to be the raw material of 
auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs), and noted how a Vygotskian approach to irmer 
speech can help inform our understanding of the role inner speech may play in AVH 
formation. The next two chapters involve a detailed consideration of the role that inner 
speech may play in AVHs. 
Firstly, as noted in detail in Appendix B, it has been proposed that 
electrophysiological methods can be used to assess whether a disconnection between inner 
speech production and reception areas in the brain (termed a corollary discharge 
mechanism) is faulty in those who hear voices. Chapter 7 reports an electrophysiological 
study of event-related potentials in response to sounds in healthy participants to assess 
whether such arguments are likely to be valid. 
Chapter 8 then considers in detail the plausibility of a role for inner speech in 
AVHs. Although numerous neurological and electrophysiological studies of those with 
AVHs have been performed (see Appendix B for a review), what I term an argument-from-
phenomenology has been sidelined. Specifically, the chapter addresses whether the 
phenomenology of inner speech is consistent with the phenomenology of all, some, or no 
AVHs. Based on this idea. Chapter 8 considers whether inner speech- and memory-based 
models are a good fit to the phenomenology of the experience, and explores implications 
for the future study of AVHs. 
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Chapter 7 
The Nl event-related potential in response to sound during inner speech: 
Disentangling attentional demands from evidence of corollary discharge 
mechanisms 
ABSTRACT 
Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHS) have been proposed to be caused by a failure of the 
corollary discharge system involved in inner speech production. Evidence that patients with 
schizophrenia with AVHs show reduced dampening of the N l event-related potential 
component in response to external sounds when performing inner speech has been taken to 
be indicative of malfunctioning of this corollary discharge system. This article reports an 
investigation into the N l component in response to sounds during a range of inner speech 
tasks, as well as a non-verbal control task (mental rotation), in healthy individuals (N =10). 
It was found that the N l response to sound was dampened during subvocal rehearsal, 
dialogic inner speech, auditory verbal irhageiy, and mental rotation, as compared to a silent 
baseline. The dampening of the N l found during the mental rotation control task is taken as 
evidence that dampening during inner speech tasks is likely due to the attentional demands 
of the task. The dampening of the N l during irmer speech tasks may therefore hot be an 
indication of the activation of a corollary discharge system. Implications for inner-speech 
models of AVHs are explored. 
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Introduction 
Many prominent models of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) propose that the raw 
material for such experiences is the voice-hearer's own inner speech. It has been proposed 
that self-produced irmer speech may be experienced as alien due to a breakdown in a 
postulated neurocognitive action self-monitoring system (NASS; Blakemore, Wolpert, & 
Frith, 1998; Jones & Femyhough, 2007; see Chapter 5). In brief, this model proposes that a 
failure to predict the consequences of inner speech production leads to a discrepancy 
between the predicted and actual neural antecedents of inner speech, resulting in inner 
speech being experienced as alien (Jones & Femyhough, 2007; see Chapter 5). In a related 
formulation. Ford and colleagues (Ford et al., 2001a, 2001b; Ford & Mathalon, 2005) have 
proposed that the reason that such inner speech may come to be experienced as alien is due 
to a breakdown in a postulated corollary discharge system. This system is proposed to work 
through neural speech production areas sending efference signals to speech reception areas 
to dampen their activity, resulting in such speech being experienced as self-produced. Ford 
et al. (2001a) propose that a disconnection between these areas, and a resultant breakdown 
in the corollary discharge system, may result in self-produced inner speech being 
experienced as alien, resulting in an AVH. 
Ford and colleagues (2001a, 2001b) have attempted to test the hypothesis that a 
deficit in the corollary discharge mechanism is a cause of AVHs through a specific 
electrophysiological technique involving event-related potentials. Electrophysiological 
methods take advantage of the fact that neighbouring neurons in the brain fi-equently fire 
together, creating potentials which can be detected by electrodes placed on the scalp. 
Event-related potentials (ERPs) are changes in voltage resulting fi-om neural activity which 
occurs at a particular time after a specific event, such as an external stimulus (Luck, 2005). 
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As ERPs are relatively small ( l -30nV) compared to background cortical activity, 
participants must be repeatedly exposed to a procedure, so that an average ERP can be 
calculated. The resultant ERP waveform consists of a number of well-documented 
components including posifive and negative voltage fluctuafions at specific latencies post-
stimulus (Luck, 2005). 
Ford and colleagues have attempted to experimentally test the proposal that a 
corollary discharge breakdown occurs in those with AVHs by examining auditory cortical 
responsiveness to auditory stimuli during inner speech, as cornpared to a silent control 
condition. Ford et al. (2001a) suggested that the N l component of the ERP "elicited by 
unattended, irrelevant acoustic events" (p. 1914) would be an appropriate measure of 
auditory cortical responsiveness. The N l component is the first long-latency negative 
component on the ERP waveform, seen approximately 100ms post-stimulus onset, and is of 
greatest amplitude in response to auditory stimuli at the Cz electrode site, located at the 
vertex of the scalp (Katz, 2001). In healthy controls. Ford et al. found that the N l response 
to acoustic stimuli (taken as the average of Cz, and two adjoining sites, namely Pz and Cza) 
was reduced when participants were reciting sentences in inner speech, compared to when 
they were silent. This was taken as evidence of a corollary discharge mechanism in action. 
Ford and Mathalon (2005) refer to this as "our N l measure of corollary discharge 
dysfijncfion" (p. 187). When Ford et al. (2001a) studied padents diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, they found that their N l response to auditory stimuli was significantly less 
dampened during inner speech, as compared to a silent condition. This was interpreted to 
mean that such patients had a less effective corollary discharge system. However, Ford arid 
Mathalon (2005) later failed to find that this effect was linked to the severity of AVHs in 
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such patients. Specifically, there was no relation between the extent of dampening of the 
N l response and the severity of auditory hallucinations. 
There were, however, a number of limitations to Ford et al.'s (2001a) methodology. 
Firstly, as Adkin, Campbell, Chua, and Carpenter (2008) have noted, "[ijncreased 
attentional demand has... been shown to affect corticail response amplitude through 
attention-related facilitation of cognitive activity" (p. 123). The modulation of the N l wave 
by attention is a well-documented effect, with increased attention to auditory probes 
resulting in greater N l wave amplitude (Naatanen & Picton, 1987). Thus, the differences 
found by Ford et al. (2001a) between the amplitude of the N l response to auditory stimuli 
in the silent and inner speech conditions may be solely due to less attention being paid to 
the auditory stimuli in the latter condition. The first aim of the present study was to 
examine whether the dampening of the N l response during inner speech (compared to 
silent baseline) could be accounted for solely by attentional factors. This was done by 
adding a control condition to Ford et al.'s methodology, specifically one which placed 
demands on the attention of the participants, but which did not involve inner speech. The 
control task chosen was mental rotation of objects (Shepard & Metzler, 1971), which can 
be seen as unlikely to involve a significant inner speech component. I f participants showed 
a dampening of the N l response in this task (compared to silent baseline) it would suggest 
that dampening in inner speech conditions is due to attentional demands, and not the 
operation of a corollary discharge system. Conversely, i f no dampening of the N l response 
to auditory stimuli was shown during the mental rotation task, this would suggest that the 
dampening may be specific to inner speech tasks. This would provide support for the claim 
that the dampening of the N l response is a valid proxy measure of a corollary discharge 
system that results in self-produced speech being experienced as self-produced. 
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A second limitation of Ford et al.'s (2001a) methodology is its reliance on 
unexamined assumptions about the nature and elicitation of inner speech. Ford et al. asked 
patients and controls to generate inner speech in the form of simple statements said to 
themselves in their own voice (e.g., "That was stupid"). It has previously been argued that 
such simple, subvocal rehearsal is not an ecologically valid method of eliciting inner speech 
(Jones & Femyhough, 2007a, 2007b; see Chapter 5 and Appendix B). Although a subvocal 
rehearsal conception of inner speech has a clear historical foundation in Baddeley and 
Hitch's (1974) model of working memory, other conceptions of inner speech have been 
proposed. One valuable, alternative account has been developed by Vygotsky (1934/1987). 
In this model, supported by a body of empirical work (e.g., Wihsler, 2004), inner speech 
represents the endpoint of a developmental process in which external discourse gradually 
becomes internalized to form verbal thought. One result of this internalization is that verbal 
thought takes a dialogic form (Femyhough, 1996, 2004; see Appendix B for further 
discussion). For this reason, the study reported here set out to investigate whether Ford et 
al.'s (2001a) original finding of dampening of the N l response in healthy participants 
during subvocal rehearsal also obtained when participants were asked to generate dialogic 
inner speech, argued to be a more ecologically valid form of the phenomenon (Jones & 
Femyhough, 2007; see Appendix B). In the dialogic inner speech condition, participants 
were given an outline of a scenario within which they were free to create their own 
spontaneous dialogue. 
Alongside these concems about the ecological validity of inner speech conditions, 
the present study set out to build on previous research in this area by considering a specific 
type of inner speech that has been proposed to be key in the creation of AVHs (Jones & 
Femyhough, 2007; see Chapter 4 and Appendix B). Neuroimaging studies (e.g., Shergill, 
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Bullmore, Simmons, Murray, & McGuire, 2000) have found that when patients diagnosed 
with schizophrenia with AVHs produce statements in inner speech such as "That was 
stupid" (i.e., similar to the Ford et al., 2001, paradigm), no differences in neural activation 
exist in relation to controls. However, differences to controls have been found when 
patients imagine the voices of other people talking to them in their inner speech, termed 
'auditory verbal imagery' (AVI; Shergill et al., 2000). It has been proposed that this is due 
to patients with AVHs having specific difficulties with tasks requiring high levels of verbal 
self-monitoring, the cognitive capacity responsible for monitoring inneir speech (Shergill et 
al., 2003). Greater levels of verbal self-monitoring are thought to be involved in AVI due to 
the necessity to assess whether the voice has the prosody, tone, pitch, and rhythms of the 
voice it is intended to be (McGuire et al., 1996). The present study accordingly investigated 
dampening of the N l response, compared to silent baseline, when participants performed 
AVI. 
In summary, the present study set out to examine the following four hypotheses. 
Firstly, it was hypothesised that a dampened N l response during subvocal rehearsal, as 
compared to silent baseline, would be found. Secondly, it was hypothesised that this 
dampening would be found in a comparison between baseline and dialogic inner speech. 
Thirdly, it was predicted that this dampening would also be foimd during AVI. Finally, it 
was hypothesised that no dampening of the N l response would be found during a control 
task (mental rotation) designed to involve minimal levels of concurrent inner speech. 
Method 
Participa:nts 
An e-mail was circulated to students and staff in the Psychology Department at a 
United Kingdom University with an invitation to participate in the study. Those who 
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indicated that they would potentiially be interested were sent a Participant Information Sheet 
(Appendix D) with details of the study. All participants gave written informed consent after 
the procedures had again been fully described. Although a total of 16 individuals took part 
in the study, clean data sets were only obtained for 10 participants (4 men, 6 women) with a 
mean age of 32.4 years (SD = 12.0). Participants were paid £7 to participate in the study, 
which lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. 
Procedure 
Experimental stimuli. Stimuli were programmed and presented using the STIM 
software package. Stimuli were presented to subjects continuously during each 
experimental condition, and consisted of a series of three equiprobable items as employed 
by Ford et al. (2001a). These were i) a speech sound (a voice saying 'no') presented via 
headphones, ii) a pure lOOOHz tone presented via headphones, and iii) a square 
chequerboard presented visually on the screen. Each had a duration of 250ms. These were 
all presented with three equiprobable, random stimulus onset asynchronies of 0.8, 1.0, and 
1.2s (i.e., time of onset of the next sdmulus was randomly selected as being .8, 1.0, or 1.2s 
after the previous stimulus). The volume of the tones was 90dB. These aspects of the 
methodology were thus identical to the procedures used by Ford et al. (2001a). 
Experimental conditions 
Baseline. In the baseline condition participants sat upright, wearing foam 
ear-cuff headphones and facing a 15-inch computer monitor. They were asked to keep their 
eyes focused on a fixation point on the screen throughout the experiment, when the 
chequerboard was not present. There was no other task associated with this condition. 
Subvocal rehearsal. A sentence printed on an A4 sheet was presented to the 
participant. They were asked to memorise this sentence before the experimental portion of 
172 
Chapter 7: Electrophysiological study of inner speech 
the study began. When the participant was happy that they knew the sentence, the A4 sheet 
was renioved and the experimental portion of the study began. Participants repeated the 
given sentence continuously to themselves silently in their head for 30s. After the 
completion of one sentence, the procedure was stopped, the participant was given an A4 
sheet with the second sentence on, and the procedure was repeated. A total of seven 
sentences were utilized: "Go to the kitchen", "That was stupid", "Put it down", "Tie your 
laces", "Put on your jumper", "That was very smart" and "You're an idiot". These were 
designed to be similar to the sentences used by Ford et al. (2001a) which in turn had been 
designed to be similar to typical AVHs. 
Auditory verbal imagery (A VI). This condition was the same as the subvocal 
rehearsal condition except that participants were asked to imagine hearing a significant 
person in their life saying the sentences to them. Participants were asked to imagine hearing 
the same person for each sentence. 
Dialogic inner speech. In this condition participants were first given a 
scenario. Five scenarios were employed in total. These were "imagine you are back at your 
old school and that you have just met one of your teachers", "imagine you are back at home 
talking to your mother or father", "imagine you are helping a small child do a jigsaw 
puzzle", "imagine you have just met an old school friend whom you have not seen for 
years", and "imagine someone has come to this country from a relatively deprived country. 
Try to imagine explaining to them one of your hobbies or pastimes which they are likely to 
be unfamiliar with. For example, this could be a sport you play". Once the participant was 
familiar with the scenario, they were given the following instructions: "Imagine, silently in 
your head, how this conversation might go. For example, imagine them asking you 
questions, and you answering them". Each scenario was used as the basis for generating 
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dialogic inner speech for a period of 45 s, at which point the trial was terminated and the 
next trial began. 
Mental rotation. In this condition participants were presented with a picture 
of a 3D object, on an A4 sheet of paper, taken from the object set designed by Shepard and 
Metzler (1971). These objects are presented in Appendix E. Participants were asked to keep 
this object in mind during the task that followed. The picture of the object was then 
removed and for the next 30s participants were asked to rotate this object in their mind's 
eye in a defined direction. This was done for each of the objects shown in Appendix E. 
ERP Procedure 
Electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 10 specific sites (Fpl, Fp2, AFz, 
Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz, 0 1 , 02, and Iz) using a 32 channel EasyCap EC40, amplified by a 
SynAmps amplifier and recorded using SCAN 4.3.1 software. Only 10 sites were enabled 
in order to ensure the experimental procedure lasted an acceptable length of time for the 
participants, and to hence reduce the impact of fatigue on participa:nts' EEG. Due to poor 
signal quality from many of the frontal sites, only ERPs collected from the Cz electrode 
(located at the vertex of the scalp) are reported here. ERPs in response to auditory probes 
have previously been found to be largest at the Cz site (Katz, 2001). Vertical 
electrooculogram (VEOG) was recorded from electrodes placed above and below the right 
eye, and horizontal electrooculogram (HEOG) from electrodes placed at the outer rim of 
each eye. EEG and EOG were sampled every 4ms. The continuous EEG was first filtered 
using a low pass (30Hz) filter. It was then epoched into trials which began 200 ms before 
the stimulus and ended 500ms after it. These trials were manually examined for indications 
of eye blinks and eye movements. Any significant fluctuafions of the VEOG and HEOG on 
a trial led to the trial being excluded from the data set. Approximately 10% of trials were 
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rejected due to indications of such eye blinks and movements. An average ERP amplitude 
for auditory trials was then calculated. To increase the power of the study the speech 
stimuli and pure tone stimuli were summed into one overall auditory ERP. Following 
standard practice, N l was identified as the most negative peak between 75 and 200 ms. Iz 
was used as the reference electrode due to the low level of N l activity seen at this site 
compared to Cz (Katz, 2001). 
Results 
Descriptive statistics for peak N l amplitudes in each condition are presented in 
Table 7.1. The latencies of the peak N l amplitudes are presented in Table 7.2. Figures 7.1 
to 7.5 illustrate the averaged electrophysiological responses of the individuals over the 
epoched period frorn 200ms pre-stimulus to 500ms post-stimulus for the different 
conditions. The N l component is clearly identifiable in all these figures. 
Peak N l amplitudes were compared for the target comparisons using paired sample 
t-tests. As all hypotheses were directional, one-tailed p values are reported. As Table 7.3 
shows, peak N l responses to auditory stimuli were significantly lower than baseline in all 
experimental conditions. The significant differences between baseline and subvocal 
rehearsal, AVI , and mental rotation were all classed as being large effect sizes (Cohen, 
1988). The difference between baseline and dialogic inner speech was classed as a medium 
effect size (Table 7.3). The latencies of the N l peaks (i.e., the time, post-stimulus, at which 
N l peaks occurred) were also compared for each of these across-condition comparisons 
(Table 7.4). I f the latencies were to be significantly different for participants across the 
experimental conditions this could be indicative that values of peak N l amplitudes across 
conditions may be unreliable (Luck, 2005). As indicated in Table 7.4, latencies of the N l 
peaks did not differ significantly across the experimental conditions. 
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Table 7.1 
N l ERPs for stimuli conditions 
Participant # 
Experimerital condition (Nl f leak amplitude/ )iV) 
Baseline 
(silent) 
Subvocal 
rehearsal 
Dialogic 
inner speech 
Auditory 
verbal imagery 
Mental 
rotation 
11 -4.94 -5.63 -4,98 -4.18 -6.02 
2 -5.97 -6.44 -8.51 -4.12 -3.29 
3 -13:71 -12.08 .-* .* .* 
4' -6.47 -3.32 .-* -2.00 -2.58 
5 -9.34 -6.42 -4.69 -3.99 -6.10 
6 -10.49 :-6.87 -6.30 -6^63 -6.72 
7 :d2.49 -9.68 -8.62 -6.88 
8 -5.11 -6.09 -5.94 -3.68 -4.28 
9 -9v08 -3.76 -5.96 -6.61 -4.87 
10 s5.38 ^3.95 ^3.07 -3.97 -3.87 
Mean -8,30 -6,42 -6.00 ^;67 s4v71 
(SP) (3.20) (2.71) (1.87) (1.66) (1.47): 
Note, = Data was too noisy to cleMly identify the peak 
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Table 7.2 
Latency of N l ERPs for stimuli, conditions 
Expefiiifiehtal coihditioh (Nl peaks/ ms) 
Participant # Baseline Subvocal Dialogic Auditory Mental 
(silent) rehearsal inner speech verba;! imagery rbtatidn 
1 167 i;54 166 155 158 
2 117 H I 144 126 M4 
3 151 145 .* - * 
4 156 149 .* 145 135 
5 132 140 141 123 137 
6 146 151 144 149 147 
7 128 130 139 133 -*'' 
8 142 143 150 139 151 
9 163 181 157 176 180 
10 160 165 157 174 157 
Mean (SD) 146(16) 150(14) 150(9) 147(19) 149 (17) 
Note. * = Data was tog npisy to clearly identify tibe N 1 peak 
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Figure 7.1 
Averaged elecfrophysioipgical response in baseline condition (silent listening, N =10) 
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Figure 7.2 
Averaged electrophysiological response in'subvocal; rehearsal condition (jN - i l O ) 
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FigiJffe 7.3 
Averaged electTophysiGlGgical fesponse in dialogic iririer speech coiidition (N =8) 
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Figure 7.4, 
Averaged e[ecfrpphysjplpgica[ response in auditGry verbal imageiy-eonditio.n '(N —9) 
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Figure 7.5 
Averaged elecfrophysiplogical fes^ ^^ ^^  iri mental fPtatiPh condition (N =8) 
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Table 7.3 
Comparisons between peak N l amplitudes between experimental conditions 
Conditions compared t,p Cohen's d 
Baseline—Subvocal rehearsal t(9) = 2.85, p < .01 9^0 
Baseline—Dialogic inner speech t(7) = 1.96, p < .05 .55 
Baseline—AVI t(8) = 4.95, p < .001 1.48 
Baseline—Mental rotation t(7) = 3.84, p < .01 1.03 
Table 7.4 
Comparisons between peak N l latencies between experimental conditions 
Conditions compared t, p 
Baseline—Subvocal rehearsal t(9) = 1.04, n.s. 
Baseline—Dialogic inner speech t(7) - 1.40, n.s. 
Baseline—AVI t(8) = .30, n.s. 
Baseline—Mental rotation t(7) = .18, n.s. 
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Discussion 
This study firstly aimed to replicate the findings of Ford et al. (2001a) showing 
dampening of the N l response to auditory stimuli during subvocal rehearsal, as compared 
to a silent baseline task. As hypothesised, this finding was replicated. Secondly, as 
predicted, this dampening effect was also found during dialogic inner speech. Thirdly, 
agaiin as hypothesised, a dampened N l response was found during auditory verbal imagery 
as compared to silent baseline. Fourthly, the hypothesis that a dampened N l response 
would not be found in the mental rotation task was not supported. There were no 
differences between the peak latencies of the N l response between the baseline and 
experimental conditions, supporting the conclusion that the N l peak amplitude data was 
reliable. 
The finding of a dampened N l response during mental rotation suggests that the 
dampening seen in response to inner speech tasks is not specific to the concurrent 
performance of inner speech, but is rather due to a reduction in attention to the auditory 
stimuli. The implications of this are that we should be cautious about interpreting Ford et 
al.'s (2001a) findings as evidence of a corollary discharge mechanism being defective in 
voice-hearing patients with schizophrenia. Furthermore, the lack of dampening of the N l 
response during inner speech by such patients may indicate attentional differences in this 
group. It may be that the patients were unable to focus enfirely on the inner speech task, 
and found their attention returning to the acoustic probes instead, resulting in their N l 
responses during inner speech being more similar to that during baseline. 
This interpretation of Ford et al.'s (2001a) findings as resulting from an attentional 
artefact is supported by a substantial literature on deficits in attention in schizophrenia (e.g., 
Harris, Minassian, & Perry, 2007). Indeed, previous ERP studies have found that "the 
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ability to selectively attend to a target in one modality while ignoring the other is 
compromised in patients with schizophrenia" (Wood, Potts, Hall, Ulanday, & Netsiri, 2006, 
p. 67) and that "executive control of auditory attention cannot be sustained in 
schizophrenia" (Mathalon, Heinks, & Ford, 2004, p. 872). Were the present experimental 
procedure to be performed with patients with schizophrenia with AVHs, it would be 
expected that they would show less of a difference in their N l response between baseline 
and subvocal rehearsal, dialogic irmer speech, and AVI conditions, than healthy controls 
would, due to attentional impairments in the patients. However, it would also be predicted 
that they would also show a dampening of the N l response to auditoiy stimuli during the 
mental rotation task (although probably less dampening than healthy controls). I f these 
predictions were supported, it would offer further evidence that the dampening of the N l is 
an attention-related phenomenon, and not related to corollary discharge mechanisms. Such 
a view would also entail the prediction that no differences in N l response in the various 
conditions examined here would be found between patients with AVHs and those without 
AVHs. Indeed, such a prediction is consistent with Ford and Mathalon's (2005) finding that 
patients with schizophrenia with AVHs, and patients with schizophrenia with no AVHs, do 
not differ in the magnitude of their N l dampening during subvocal rehearsal (as compared 
to silent baseline). 
A number of limitations of the present study need to be acknowledged. Firstly, this 
was a relatively small sample and it would be beneficial to replicate these findings using a 
larger number of participants. However, it is worth noting that the sample sizes employed 
were comparable to those employed by Ford et al (2001a, N = 15, 2001b, N = 7). Secondly, 
the present study used the Iz electrode as the reference electrode, as opposed to the 
traditional mastoid reference electrode. It could be claimed that, by referencing to the Iz 
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electrode rather than the mastoid, smaller Cz ERPs would result (due to greater N l ERPs 
being recorded at Iz than at the mastoid), leading to a loss in power of the study. However, 
firstly, it has previously been shown that the N l ERP at the Iz site is low, and comparable 
to that recorded at the mastoids (Katz, 2001). Secondly, the present study was able to detect 
significant differences in all its N l peak amplitude comparisons, and hence it is unlikely 
that use of the Iz site as the reference electrode impacted significantly on the present 
findings due to power reductions. 
A third possible objection is that participants were not correctly performing the 
tasks they were required to. For example, participants' thoughts may have drifted away 
from the set task onto other, non-task-related topics. Although this is possible, it was noted 
that, even though participants indicated that some of the tasks were harder than the others 
(performing AVI was noted to be difficult by some participants), they all reported being 
able coritinuously to attempt the tasks. Finally, it should be noted that the silent baseline 
condition was assumed to have no inner speech in it. This is likely to be a false assumption 
(Jones & Femyhough, 2007; see Appendix B) as some spontaneous inner speech was 
reported by most participants in this condifion upon questioning. That said, volumes of 
inner speech were still likely to be greater in the inner speech experimental conditions 
(subvocal rehearsal, dialogic inner speech, and AVI), where inner speech was directly 
elicited, as compared to the silent baseline. For these reasons, it is arguable that the 
presence of spontaneous inner speech in the silent baseline condifion is unlikely 
significantly to have contaminated the results of this study. 
In terms of future avenues for research, it has been argued here that the N l ERP 
response to acoustic stimuli during inner speech is unlikely to be a good proxy measure of 
corollary discharge. Therefore altemafive techniques for examining any such postulated 
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corollary discharge mechanisms are likely to be required. One such alternative is diffusion 
tensor imaging (DTI), as used by Hubl et al. (2004). In their DTI study Hubl et al., found 
greater dysfunction in white matter signalling tracts in patients with schizophrenia with 
AVHs, as compared to patients without AVHs. This lead them to propose that dysfunctions 
in such white matter tracts could lead to inner speech activating regions involved in the 
processing of external stimuli, resulting in AVHs. Taking a structural anatomical approach 
to identifying abnormalities in white matter signalling between frontal and temporal regions 
may hence prove more valuable in charting the mechanisms of inner speech production 
than electrophysiological methods. 
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Chapter 8 
Do we need multiple models of auditory verbal hallucinations? 
Examining the phenomenological fit of cognitive and neurological models^  
ABSTRACT 
The causes of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) are still unclear. The evidence for two 
prominent cognitive models o f AVHs, one based on inner speech, the other on intrusions 
from memory, is briefly reviewed. The fit of these models, as well as neurological models, 
to the phenomenology of AVHs is then critically examined. It is argued that only a 
minority o f AVHs, such as those with content clearly relating to verbalizations experienced 
surrounding previous trauma, are consistent with cognitive AVHs-as-memories models. 
Similarly, it is argued that current neurological models are only phenomenologically 
consistent with a limited subset of AVHs. In contrast, the phenomenology o f the majority 
o f AVHs, which involve voices attempting to regulate the ongoing actions o f the voice-
hearer, is argued to be more consistent with inner speech-based models. It is concluded that 
subcategorisations of AVHs may be necessary, with each underpinned by different 
neurocognitive mechanisms. The need to study what is termed the dynamic developmental 
progression of AVHs is also highlighted. Future empirical research is suggested in this 
area. 
' Chapter published as: Jones, S. R. (in press). Do we need multiple models of auditory verbal hallucinations? 
Examining the phenomenological fit of cognitive and neurological models. Schizophrenia Bulletin. 
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Introduction 
The cognitive and neurological mechanisms involved in auditory verbal hallucinations 
(AVHs) remain poorly understood. With approximately two-thirds o f patients with 
schizophrenia, and 4% of the general population (Johns & van Os, 2001), reporting such 
experiences (Slade & Bentall, 1988; Wing, Cooper, & Sartorius, 1974), there is a clear need 
to understand this frequently distressing experience (see General Introduction). The term 
A V H encapsulates a diverse phenomenological experience, which may involve single 
and/or multiple voices, who may be known and/or unknown, speaking sequentially and/or 
simultaneously, in the first-, second-, and/or - thi rd person, which may give commands, 
comments, insults, or encouragement. Given the prima facie heterogeneity of AVHs it is 
surprising that only recently has the suggestion been made (David, 2004) that "perhaps we 
now have to consider further subcategorisations o f [auditory] hallucinations" (p. 118) and 
that this is likely to have important clinical, theoretical and empirical implications (Laroi, 
2006; Larei & Woodward, 2007). This paper aims to consider how well different cognitive 
and neurological models of AVHs accord with the phenomenology of the experience, and 
what implications this has for potential subcategorisation o f the experience. 
A VHs and inner speech 
One prominent type o f model proposes AVHs to result fi^om self-monitoring deficits 
leading to inner speech not being recognised as self-produced, and instead being perceived 
as an autonomous, non-self voice (Allen, Aleman, & McGuire, 2007; Frith & Done, 1989; 
Jones & Femyhough, 2007; Seal, Aleman, & McGuire, 2004) Inner speech has been 
defined in a variety of ways, ranging from the "subjective phenomenon of talking to 
oneself, o f developing an auditory-articulatory image o f speech without uttering a sound" 
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(Levine, Calvanio, & Popovics, 1982, p. 391) to "the overlapping region of thought and 
speech" (Jones & Femyhough, 2007, p. 148), or simply "thinking in words" (McGuire et 
al., 1995, p. 596). Allen and colleagues (Allen et al., 2007) have recently reviewed the 
behavioural and neuroimaging evidence for an involvement o f inner speech in AVHs. They 
concluded the behavioral evidence for impaired monitoring o f inner speech relating to 
AVHs is "limited" (p. 416), and that the specificity of such a deficit to AVHs is 
"questionable" (p. 412) as impaired self-monitoring is also foimd in patients with delusions. 
However, studies o f neural activation associated with AVHs, inner speech, and source 
monitoring were found to offer "more convincing evidence for the defective monitoring o f 
inner speech in patients with hallucination" (p. 415). Such studies were argued to favor a 
disconnections model, in which speech production areas are unable to modulate the activity 
o f the auditory cortex (i.e., is disconnected from it) to signal that inner speech is self-
generated, resulting in it being experienced as alien. Overall, Allen and colleagues 
concluded the existing neuroimaging evidence for an involvement of inner speech is 
stronger than the behavioral evidence, which is equivocal. 
One limitation of Allen et al.'s (2007) review is that it did not attempt to evaluate 
inner speech-based models of AVHs on the basis of what can be termed an argument-from-
phenomenology. Specifically, are AVHs phenomenologically consistent with inner speech? 
Recently, it has been claimed that an alternative cognitive model of AVHs, which 
conceives o f such experiences as reactivated memories, concords well with the 
phenomenology of the experience (Waters, Badcock, Michie, & Maybery, 2006). This 
model wi l l be briefly reviewed before evaluating it, as well as inner speech-based models 
of AVHs, by the argument-from-phenomenology. 
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A VHs as a sin of memory 
West's (1962) perceptual release theory proposed AVHs to be "previously recorded 
information: percepts, engrams, templates, neural traces, etc" (p. 281). In a cognitive 
reprise o f elements of this model, Waters and colleagues (Waters et al., 2006) have argued 
that auditory hallucinations (AHs), including AVHs, are a result o f the "unintentional 
activation of memories" (p. 65) or "the failure to inhibit memories of prior events" 
(Badcock, Waters, Maybery, & Michie, 2005, p. 132). 
Waters and colleagues (Waters et al., 2006) propose that AHs result from two 
specific deficits. The first is a failure in intentional inhibition: the ability to deliberately 
suppress thoughts o f an item after deciding it is irrelevant, a process which is effortful and 
available to conscious reflection (Nigg, 2000). This has been shown to result in intrusive 
thoughts, which occur more often in patients with schizophrenia with AVHs than healthy 
and psychiatric confrols ( Morrison & Baker, 2000). AVHs in the healthy population have 
also been linked to the presence of intrusive thoughts, potentially caused by failing thought 
suppression (Jones & Femyhough, 2006). A number o f studies have found failures o f 
intentional inhibition in patients with schizophrenia with AVHs (Badeock et al., 2005; 
Waters, Badcock, Maybery, & Michie, 2003). However, as some patients without AHs 
have also been found to have such deficits. Waters and colleagues (Waters et al., 2006) 
suggest that a second deficit is necessary for the occurrence of AHs, namely a context 
memory deficit. 
Waters and colleagues (Waters et al., 2006) note that episodic memory research 
differentiates between an event's content and its context (the source or temporal 
characteristics surrounding the encoding o f the event), and propose that in AHs the content 
of a memory is unintentionally acfivated, yet the context is not. This leads to these 
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representations being confused with ongoing reality. Consistent widi this, impaired 
processing o f contextual information has been found in patients with schizophrenia with 
AHs (Bazin, Perruchet, Hardy-Bayle, & Feline, 2000). More specifically. Waters and 
colleagues (Waters, Maybery, Badcock, & Michie, 2004) found that nearly all such patients 
tested had a context memory deficit. Patients were asked to watch or perform pairings of 
two different sets of 24 common objects over two sessions 30 min apart. In a recognition 
test performed five minutes later patients were tested on their episodic memory ( 'did you 
see this pair?') and two forms of context memory: source context ( 'did you put the pair 
together or did the experimenter?') and temporal context ('was the pair in the first or 
second set?'). A deficit in source context memory was found to be specific to patients with 
AHs, whereas temporal context memory was found to be impaired in both hallucinating and 
non-hallucinating patients, compared to healthy controls. However, later studies have found 
temporal context memory deficits specific to those with AVHs (Brebion, David, Jones, 
Ohlsen, & Pilowsky, 2007). 
Waters and colleagues (Waters et al., 2006) also provide evidence that the 
combination o f context memory deficits and intentional inhibition is associated with AHs. 
When deficit was defined as performance one standard deviation worse than controls, 90% 
of patients with current AHs were found to have deficits in context memory and intentional 
inhibition. Contrastingly, only 33% of patients (significantly less) with remitted AHs 
showed deficits in both context memory and intentional inhibition. In mapping these 
deficits to specific aspects of AHs, it has been argued that the failure o f intentional 
inhibition leads to the intrusive cognition, with the failure of context memory resulting in it 
being not experienced as a product o f one's own mind (Badcock, Waters, & Maybery, 
2007). Overall, although weakened by the fact that some hallucinating patients did not 
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show both deficits, and some non-hallucinating patients did show both deficits, intentional 
inhibition and context memory appear to be associated with AVHs (Aleman & Larei, 
2008). However, whether these deficits play a causal role, or derive from some other factor 
which causes AVHs, is as yet unknown. 
AVHs as memories: a phenomenological fit to the experience? 
In evaluating their model. Waters and colleagues (Waters et al., 2006) claim "the 
proposal o f auditory hallucinations as memories" is consistent with the phenomenology of 
the experience and can explain why "entire dialogues from a conversation may be recalled" 
and "why voices often refer to the patient's personal details" (p.76). However, this 
argument-from-phenomenology is based on only a limited number o f forms o f AVHs, 
without any comment by the authors on whether these forms are typical o f the experience. 
A more detailed evaluation o f this model based on the argument-from-phenomenology is 
hence required. 
A VHs consistent with memory-based models 
The phenomenology of some AVHs do indeed appear to be consistent with the 
AVHs-as-memories account, particularly where the content of the A V H can be linked to 
memories o f previous traumatic/abuse experiences. It seems likely such AVHs are related 
to decontextualised intrusions of this material from merriory. In accord with the perceptual 
quality o f many AVHs, intrusive trauma memories tend to be sensory fragments of the 
traumatic experience (Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004). There is substantial evidence 
demonstrating that hallucinations in general (Read, Agar, Argyle, & Aderhold, 2003) 
AVHs specifically (Morrison & Peterson, 2003; Offen, Waller, &. Thomas, 2003) and 
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particularly AVHs which take the form of commands to hurt the self or others 
(Hammersley et al., 2003), are associated with earlier experiences of physical and sexual 
abuse. However, there has been significantly less research into the concordance between 
the actual content o f the A V H and the auditory experiences undergone during and 
surrounding such abuse. I f actual memories associated with the trauma (e.g., what an 
abuser said) are the basis o f some AVHs, then concordance between the content o f AVHs 
and trauma memories would be expected. 
Direct evidence for this comes fi-om findings showing that the content of AVHs can 
be linked to traumatic experiences. Read and Argyle (1999) found, in three of seven 
instances in which content of the AVHs of patients with schizophrenia was recorded, that 
the content could be Hnked to physical or sexual abuse. For example, command 
hallucinations to self-harm were found to be in the voice of the abuser. Similarly, Fowler 
(1997) reported a history o f trauma in 14 of 24 patients with psychosis who experienced 
hallucinations, and in 4 of these 14 patients the voice heard was appraised as being that o f 
the abuser. In addition, some content of the voices matched utterances heard at the time of 
the abuse. Clinical experience also suggests that the content o f AVHs in those who have 
experienced abuse/trauma can be related to what was said during, and surrounding, these 
events (e.g., i f you tell anyone I ' l l k i l l you). This has led Read and colleagues (Read, Van 
Os, Morrison, & Ross, 2005) to claim that "some psychotic hallucinations appear to be 
nothing more or less than memories o f traumatic events" (p. 341). 
A VHs not consistent with memory-based models 
Despite the suggestive evidence above, further consideration shows the AVHs-as-
memories account to be in phenomenological accordance with only a (relatively small) 
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subset o f AVHs. Firstly, in the study o f Fowler (1997) cited above, only in 4 of the total 24 
voice-hearers studied could the content of voices be seen as "sometimes" being suggestive 
that these were memories. In the remainder of the sample who had a history o f trauma, 
meaningful connections could be made between the trauma and the voices. However, such 
cormecfions were thematic (e.g., both the voices and trauma involved humiliation) rather 
than involving a direct relation between the content of the voices and what was said during 
and surrounding the trauma. Similarly, another study (Hardy et al., 2005) found only 7% of 
individuals with AVHs were rated as demonstrating clear concordance between the theme 
and content o f the trauma and the themes and content o f the voices. This study also found 
that 42% of people with hallucinations, who reported having current problerias with past 
trauma, had no association between the content of their hallucinations and the past trauma. 
Instead, Fowler and colleagues (Fowler et al., 2006) have noted that, in those who 
have experienced trauma, AVHs typically involve critical comments or comments about the 
person's day-to-day experiences. This observation is consistent with the conclusion of a 
study o f A V H phenomenology in patients with schizophrenia, and in those without any 
psychiatric diagnoses, by Leudar and colleagues (Leudar, Thomas, McNally, & Glinski, 
1997). This study concluded that A VHs are "focused on the regulation o f everyday 
activities" (p. 896). Similarly, Nayani and David (1996) note that 46% of their sample o f 
patients with schizophrenia said their AVHs had come to replace their "voice of 
conscience" (p. 185) and that a proportion relied on their A V H for making decisions. 
Furthermore, AVHs were typically "minutely engaged in the apprehension o f objective 
reality" (p. 185). It is hard to understand how intrusions from memory of past 
verbalisations could fiinction in such a role. It is also worth noting that Nayani and David 
observe that AVHs tend to evolve over time with the voices "fashioning increasingly 
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detailed dialogues with or about the patient" (p. 187). Again, it is hard to see how verbal 
intrusions from memory could create such an interactive dialogue. 
That some AVHs are not simply an intrusive memory o f verbalisations experienced 
in and surrounding trauma/abuse, or more generally, but more o f a dynamic creation, is 
suggested by the technique of voice-dialogue (Romme & Escher, 1993). In this process a 
practitioner speaks to the voice-hearer's A V H through the voice hearer. For example, the 
questioner may ask "what do you want" (addressing the voice-hearer's A V H ) and the 
voice-hearer is asked to listen to their AVH' s response to the therapist and report it 
verbatim (e.g., " I want her to die"). The ability o f some individuals with AVHs to engage in 
such dialogues (and no empirical work yet exists clarifying what percentage o f those with 
AVHs can engage in such a process) suggests that they are not simply experiencing static 
intrusions from memory during this process, but that the process is more dynamic and 
creative. Furthermore, when voice-hearers themselves engage in a dialogue with their 
voices the number o f voices may multiply (Davies, Thomas, & Leudar, 1999), again 
pointing towards a more dynamic relation than simply static intrusions from memory. 
Furthermore, other types o f AVHs are hard to explain by this cognitive memory-
based account. For example, AVHs may take the form o f crowds of mumbling voices 
(Nayani & David, 1996). This seems an unusual form for an intrusive memory to take. 
Whilst it is well documented that trauma leads to intrusive recollections o f the experience 
and surrounding events (Ehlers et al., 2004), it is unclear why anyone should experience an 
intrusive memory o f mumbling voices. The sanie argument applies to non-verbal AHs. As 
Bleuer (1952) noted, in addition to verbal AHs, "blowing, rustling, humming, rattling, 
shooting, thundering, music, crying and laughing" (p. 96) may also be heard. Although 
Waters and colleagues' (Waters et al., 2006) argue that their model can explain such types 
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of AHs, it would appear that these experiences, with seemingly random content, are instead 
more parsimoniously accounted for by an bottom-up ictal-based neurological model (see 
below) (Nayani & David, 1996). 
In conclusion, what is to be made of the claim (Badcock et al., 2005) that a model 
which views AVHs as "the failure to inhibit memories of prior events" (p. 132), and sees 
"auditory hallucinations as memories" (Waters et al., 2006, p. 76), is consistent with the 
phenomenology of the experience? It appears from the above that such AVHs-as-memories 
models can only account for the phenomenology of a minority of types of A V H . For 
example, this may be applicable to the -10-20% (Fowler, 1997; Hardy et al., 2005) of 
individuals whose voices include content which can be linked directly back to memories o f 
trauma. However, the majority of AVHs, which phenomenological surveys have shown to 
be related to the ongoing patterns of activity in the voice-hearers life, seem to be 
inconsistent with this account. Such observations, and the conclusion that AVHs cannot be 
satisfactorily understood as simply a "direct intrusive [auditory] image o f the trauma event" 
(p. l 13) have led Fowler and colleagues (Fowler et al., 2006) to argue instead for an inner 
speech-based model. 
AVHs as inner-speech based: a phenomenological fit to the experience? 
Based on their findings (Leudar et al., 1997) that AVHs are typically "focused on 
the regulation o f everyday activities... and are characterized by the same dialogical 
structures one finds in ordinary speech" (p. 896) Leudar and colleagues have argued AVHs 
are phenomenologically consistent with inner speech. It has also been argued elsewhere, 
building on a consideration of the form, function, and development o f private and inner 
speech, that the phenomenology of many types o f AVHs is consistent with a basis in inner 
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speech (Jones & Femyhough, 2007). For example, the high fi-equency o f command AVHs, 
such as 'get the rhilk' or 'go to the hospital' (reported by 84% of voice-hearers in Nayani 
and David's phehomenological survey; Nayani & David, 1996) is consistent with inner 
speech's developmental linkage with the control o f action (Vygotsky, 1987). I f some AVHs 
do indeed have a basis in inner speech, it should not be surprising that they fi-equently have 
a similar regulatory quality. 
However, inner speech conceived of as simply speaking silently in one's own voice 
is hard to reconcile with the phenomenology of AVHs which are typically experienced as 
hearing the voice o f another person. For example, Nayani and David foimd 7 1 % of pafients 
with schizophrenia reported that their AVH's accent differed to their own (Nayani & 
David, 1996). Indeed, to argue that inner speech, conceived in this way, is the raw material 
o f AVHs leads to a number o f predictions that have been experimentally falsified. For 
example, i f A V H s occur because such inner speech is misidentified, individuals with AVHs 
should presumably report less frequent inner speech. However, a recent study found little 
difference between patients with schizophrenia with AVHs and healthy controls in terms o f 
the frequency and form of their inner speech (Langdon, Jones, Cormaughton, & 
Femyhough, in press). Furthermore, when the form and content of inner speech (again 
conceived of as speaking silently in one's own voice) of patients with schizophrenia with 
AVHs are compared to controls, no differences are found, and the pragmatics o f such 
patients' inner speech are not related to the pragmatics of their AVHs (Langdon et al., in 
press). Additionally, neuroimaging research has found that when patients with 
schizophrenia with AVHs simply speak silently in their own voice in inner speech, saying 
sentences such as " I like x", pattems of neural activation do not differ to controls (Shergill 
et al.,2001). 
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In response to this, a number of recent inner speech-based models have attempted to 
explain why inner speech/verbal thought may sometimes involve not speaking in our own 
voice, but instead taking another individual's perspective on our experiences (Jones & . 
Femyhough, 2007). A Vygotskian approach to iimer speech has proposed, in brief, that our 
thinking takes the form of a dialogue which is literally shot through with other voices 
(Femyhough, 2004). Similarly, Dialogical Self Theory proposes inner speech can involve 
multiple sets o f characters, with autonomous thought centres, that interact in verbal and 
non-verbal dialogical forms in an imaginal space (Hermans, 2001; Hermans & Dimaggio, 
2004). Another approach comes from Fowler and colleagues (Fowler et al., 2006), who 
have proposed a basis for AVHs in inner speech, but inner speech conceived o f as 
rumination and inner dialogue. Specifically, due to the association between abuse and 
AVHs, Fowler and colleagues propose that rumination or inner dialogue about interactions 
with an abuser may be the raw material for many AVHs (Fowler et al., 2006). This would 
predict the content of AVHs to be likely to "reflect patterns o f rumination or internal 
dialogue about self in relationship to what a shaming and insulting abuser might say about 
one's current actions" (p. 113). Such an account is hence consistent with the 
phenomenology of many AVHs which, as noted above, are not the same as what was said 
during/surrounding earlier trauma, yet related to it. 
Other similar inner speech-based accounts have also been developed. Such accounts 
have proposed that individual differences in the tendency to ruminate and perform 
imaginative verbal dialogues involving others may act as a risk factor for AVHs (Jones & 
Femyhough, 2008; see Chapter 4), or that "vivid and perceptual imagination", in 
combination with source monitoring deficits and particular metacognitive beliefs, may be 
the main constituent o f AVHs (Moritz & Laroi, 2008). Although the ability to produce 
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imagined speiech o f others does itself not appear to be impaired in patients with AVHs 
(Evans, McGuire, & David, 2000), I have argued elsewhere (Jones & Femyhough, 2007) 
that neuroimaging studies o f patients with schizophrenia with AVHs showing atypical 
neural activation associated with the ability to silently imagine another's voice speaking to 
oneself (Shergill et al., 2001) are consistent with involvement for this type o f inner speech 
in AVHs. Hoffman and colleagues (Hoffman, Varanko, Gilmore, & Mishara, 2008) have 
also recently noted this latter point, namely that "source monitoring mislabeling may 
selectively attach to verbal imageiy of non-self speakers rather than ordinary inner speech" 
(p. 1172). 
Irmer speech-based theories are still left with the problem that AVHs are typically 
reported as having the phenomenological quality o f being heard. For example, in a study by 
Leudar and colleagues (Leudar et al., 1997) all patients with schizophrenia who heard 
voices reported that it was "very much like hearing other people speak" (p. 889). One 
approach to reconciling this to the phenomenology of inner speech has been to that suggest 
inner speech has more acoustical properties in voice-hearers. For example, a recent study 
found that approximately 40% o f patients with schizophrenia with AVHs rated their own 
thotights as having some acoustical properties (as opposed to being absolutely silent) 
(Moritz & Lanai, 2008). This led the authors to argue that AVHs may be associated with 
abnormalities with sensory inner perception "which apparently arise already at the stage o f 
thoughts" (p. 105). An alternative approach is to question the degree to which an 
experience being labelled as a voice is to do with its acoustical properties. Stephens and 
Graham (Stephens & Graham, 2000) have argued that "something can count as a voice 
without being experienced as audition-like or mistaken for sensory perception of another's 
speech" (p. 114). In line with this, not all AVHs have the phenomenal qualities o f a heard 
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voice. Bleuler (1952) noted that some "patients are not always sure that they are actually 
hearing the voices or whether they are only compelled to think them. There are such 'vivid 
thoughts' which are called voices by the patients" (p. 110). More recent studies have found 
that 38% of patients with schizophrenia with AVHs said their voices were not very real 
(Moritz & Larei, 2008), 44% said their AVHs were more like ideas than external sensations 
(Nayani & David, 1996), and only 20% of patients said their voices were indistinguishable 
from auditory perceptions (Miller, 1996). 
Interestingly, inner speech models can predict the phenomenology of one o f the 
more unusual forms o f AVHs. Vygotsky (1987), Femyhough (2004) has noted, proposed 
that inner speech typically becomes syntactically and semantically condensed and 
abbreviated, losing most o f its structural and acoustic qualities, becoming a process of 
"thinking in pure meanings". I f itmer speech forms the raw material for AVHs then, in 
addition to fially formed words or sentences being experienced as AVHs, it can be predicted 
that some would also have this quality of "pure meaning". Frith (1992) has described this 
as the experience o f receiving information without any sensory component. Such types o f 
AVHs have indeed been documented. Bleuler (1952) termed these "soundless voices" (p. 
110). In such AVHs a message or meaning is communicated although it is not actually 
heard. For example, a patient of Bleuler's who threw himself into the Rhine reported 
afterwards that " I t was as i f someone pointed his finger at me and said "Go and drown 
yourself (p. I l l , itaHcs added). Janet also noted this phenomenon, giving the example of a 
patient who reported that " i t is not a voice, I do not hear anything, I sense that I am spoken 
to" (Leudar & Thomas, 2000). 
In conclusion, the phenomenology of inner speech, including its regulatory nature, 
its linkage to ongoing events, its ability to involve the voices and perspectives of others, its 
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ability to take the form of "thinking in pure meanings"(Femyhough, 2004, p.56), and its 
creative nature, are consistent with the phenomenological properties of a large number of 
AVHs. However, inner speech-based models have a number of limitations when compared 
to the phenomenology of AVHs. Firstly, they do not seem appropriate for the -10-20% of 
individuals, as noted above, whose voices have content which can be linked directly back to 
memories of trauma. These instead appear better modelled as verbatim intrusions from 
memory. Secondly, as Waters et al. (2006) have argued, such models cannot explain other 
types of A VH, such as the voices of crowds, or other AHs, such as environmental noise and 
music. Indeed, Nayani and David (1996) found the latter to be quite frequent, with 36% of 
patients with schizophrenia with AVHs also reporting musical hallucinations, and 16% 
reporting elemental sounds such as clicks and bangs. Thirdly, it may be worth considering 
Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel's differentiation between inner speech and inner hearing 
(Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007). These authors note that whilst inner speech is 
experienced as "going away", "produced by", and "under the control o f the individual, and 
is "just like speaking aloud except no sound", in contrast inner hearing is the experience of 
a sound which is "coming toward", "experienced by", and "listened to" by the individual 
(p. 257). In these terms many AVHs are more phenomenologically consistent with inner 
hearing than inner speech. Despite these limitations, and in need of fiiture empirical testing, 
inner speech-based models have the starting advantage of being in accordance with the 
phenomenology of a significant number of AVHs. 
Overall, the arguments presented above suggest that the AVHs-as-mernories model, 
and inner-speech based models, are both in accordance with the phenomenology of separate 
subsets of AVHs. However, neither model is consistent with the phenomenology of all 
AVHs. One possible conclusion is that both these models are correct, albeit each for a 
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separate subset of AVHs. However, it is also worth considering an alternative view, namely 
that neither of these models is correct, with the appropriate explanation of AVHs lying at 
the neurological level rather than in cognition. 
Neurological models and the phenomenology of AVHs 
It is possible that the mechanisms underlying AVHs do not fit neatly into any 
cognitive model. For example, complex visual hallucinations in epilepsy and Charles 
Bonnett syndrome have been explained by bottoni-up neurological models involving 
deafferentation and neural circuitry disinhibition (Hoffman, 2007), and are not readily 
accounted for by any cognitive mechanistic model. It has been proposed that an analogical 
model may be the appropriate level of explanation for AVHs (Hoffman, 2007). The 
following section attempts to evaluate this, and other bottom-up neurological models, in 
terms of their ability to predict the observed phenomenology of AVHs. 
Bottom-up neurological models of AVHs tend to reason from analogy from 
Penfield and Perot's (1963) studies involving direct external electrical stimulation of the 
temporal cortex (David, 2004). In these studies of Penfield and Perot (1963), participants 
reported a range of AHs. Firstly, reports of musical hallucinations were common, such as " I 
hear music" (p. 620) and " I hear singing... it is White Christmas" (p. 618). Other forms of 
environmental sounds were also reported, such as "a toilet flushing or a dog barking" (p. 
628). Secondly, voices were heard. These were typically overheard conversations, not 
directed at the individual, including " I heard someone speaking, my mother telling one of 
my aunts to come up tonight" (p. 617) and voices that "sounded like a bunch of women 
talking together, just a lot of women chattering" (p. 622). Participants heard multiple 
simultaneous voices, including "something like a crowd" (p. 640) and "a lot of people 
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shouting at me" (p. 630). Reports of speech directed at the person were rarer, although still 
present. For example, one participant reported that "Someone is telling me to stay still" (p. 
628). 
Such AHs have commonality with the musical hallucinations, elemental sounds, 
and crowds of simultaneous voices found to co-occur with more complex AVHs in 
schizophrenia (Nayani & David, 1996). The phenomenology of these AHs can be seen to 
be consistent with what has been termed (Nayani & David, 1996) a "random and quasi-ictal 
explanation" (p. 187). 
However, the ability of most bottom-up neurological models to account for the 
rnore typical phenomenological aspects of AVHs, such as voices directed at the hearer and 
focused on everyday activities, is less successfiil. For example, David and colleagues have 
proposed that AVHs result from language input processes in the temporal lobe functioning 
hyperactively, leading to a strong perceptual representation of auditory images (Brebion et 
al., 2007). Such a model can account well for some phenomenological properties of AVHs, 
such as their involuntariness, which many patients with AVHs highlight as irnportant in 
differentiating their AVHs from their everyday thoughts (Hoffman et al., 2008), their 
intermittent occurrence, and their perceptual qualities. This model can also be seen to 
account for AVHs involving verbatim traimiatic memories. Furthermore, such a model also 
predicts patterns of activation during AVHs found in many neuroimaging studies (Copolov 
et al., 2003). However, it gives no clear reason why many AVHs tend to be focused on 
everyday activities, and directed at the voice-hearer. Furthermore, such a model would also 
appear to predict that content of AVHs should be highly repetitive. This is the case in some, 
but by no means all AVHs (Nayani & David, 1996). However, a bottom-up neurological 
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model that makes more specific predictions about the phenomenology of AVHs has 
recently been developed. 
Hoffman (2007) proposes that a lack of social contact may result in deafferentation-
like reorganisation in regions of association cortex leading to AVHs, in a way analogous to 
the complex visual hallucinations in Charles Bonnett Syndrome which result from 
deafferentation due to vision loss. Specifically, Hoffman argues that as a result of social 
isolation, language detection systems' ability to detect complex verbal meaning is increased 
in response to the deprivation of normal conversational interaction, resulting in the 
production of spurious auditory experierices. This functions "in the service of filling in the 
'blank slate' due to withdrawal from the world" (Hoffman et al., 2008, p. 1172). Such a 
model is claimed to predict the personal relations many individual have with their voices. 
Hoffman (2008) also claims such a model would predict AVHs to involve spurious social 
meaning in the form of complex, emotionally compelling voices of other persons or agents. 
This account also appears to predict that the emotional valence of the voice, and its 
pragmatics, would be in accordance with the way the individual relates to people within 
their social environment. This proposal appears to be empirically supported (Hayward, 
2003). However, such a model sfill appears to fail to explain the tendency for AVHs to be 
associated with action regulation, and is hard pressed to explain the phenomenological 
findings of Moritz and Lar0i (2008), discussed above, that highlight the similarity between 
thoughts and some AVHs. 
Separate phenomenologies, separate causes? 
From the above argument-from-phenomenology it appears that each of the cognitive 
models reviewed is only able at present to account for a subset of AVHs. One possible 
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conclusion is that neither of these models is correct, and that the true mechanism 
underlying AVHs is not readily captured by any cognitive model because at a neurological 
level the mechanism cuts across many cognitive, metacognitive, linguisfic and/or 
perceptual capacities. An alternative conclusion is that both are correct, and that different 
types of AVHs have different underlying neurocognitive mechanisms. Such a proposal 
would entail subcategorisations of AVHs. The first type of AVH would be that with content 
directly linked to intrusive memories of early abuse/trauma, which could be understood via 
a neurocognitive model that sees AVHs as a failure to inhibit memories. A second type 
would involve seemingly random auditions, such as those involving crowds, noises, and 
music, and could be seen as best explained at the neurological level, using an ictal, bottom-
up neurological model. Finally, a class of AVHs typified by novel statements that attempt 
to regulate the actions of the voice-hearer, linked to their ongoing activities, and which 
cannot be linked directly to a verbatim memory, can be delineated. Such AVHs appear to 
be phenomenologically best accounted for by a neurocognitive inner speech-based model. 
The proposal that subcategorisations of AVHs are necessary, each involving 
different underlying neurocognitive mechanisms, leads to a number of falsifiable 
hypotheses. Firstly, different patterns of neural activation would be likely to underlie these 
different forms of A VHs. For example, a patient with an AVH identifiable as a verbatim 
memory of abuse would be hypothesised to show a different pattern of neural activation to 
a patient with a more novel AVH commenting on on-going actions. The first type of AVH 
may show activation more similar to that seen during traumatic autobiographical memory 
recall. As Broca's area activation decreases during recall of traumatic (as compared to 
neutral) memories in patients with PTSD (Rauch et al., 1996), and increases during inner 
speech production ( Shergill et al., 2001), less activafion should be seen in this area during 
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AVHs involving intrusive memories of abuse, than during AVHs involving novel 
comments on ongoing actions. This proposal may explain the inconsistent findings of 
studies of activation in Broca's area during AVHs (Jones & Femyhough, 2007). Such 
inconsistency may be due to such studies involving differing ratios of patients with AVHs 
associated with intrusive memories of trauma/abuse to patients with more novel AVHs. It 
is, however, also highly possible that the inconsistent finding of Broca's area activation 
may be due to the different tasks or paradigms that have been used. To allow comparability 
of findings it may be valuable for neuroimaging studies in fiiture to report more details on 
the specific phenomenology of their patient's AVHs, and to analyse their data by sub-
groups of hallucinators based on phenomenology. 
The distinction between inner speech-based AVHs and memory-based AVHs 
should also lead to detectable electrophysiological differences between such AVHs. 
Electrophysiological studies have found some evidence that when inner speech is produced 
in those with AVHs, dampening of the activity of the auditory cortex is impaired (Ford & 
Mathalon, 2005; see Chapter 7). It can be hypothesised that such a relation should be found 
only in AVHs which are phenomenologically consistent with inner speech. Conversely, in 
those which are more phenomehologically consistent with verbatim intrusions from 
memory such a disconnection would not be predicted. Again, the failure to employ such a 
distinction, and to hence freat AVHs as a homogenous phenomenon, may explain the mixed 
findings that electrophysiological studies have reported to date in investigating dampening 
of auditory responses in those with AVHs (Ford & Mathalon, 2005). 
One factor that is likely to complicate testing such hypotheses is the fact that 
phenomenologically different types of AVHs often co-occur. For example, AVHs with 
parallels to inner speech often occur in the presence of seemingly more ictal-based AHs, 
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such as environmental noises. This is suggestive that there may indeed be an underlying 
neurological mechanism which cuts through across many cognitive, metacognitive, 
linguistic and/or perceptual capacities. Another factor to consider is that, although this 
paper has contrasted a AVHs-as-memories model with inner speech-based models, these 
two models may, to some degree overlap. The concept of a dynamic developmental 
progression, which I turn to next, helps illustrate this point. 
Dynamic developmental progression 
AVHs tend to evolve over time with voices "fashioning increasingly detailed 
dialogues with or about the patient" (p. 187). The evolution of AVHs and AHs over time, 
which is currently a neglected and poorly understood area, I term their dynamic 
developmental progression (DDP). This can be applied to the change in the nature of the 
AVHs/AHs themselves, as well as the charige in the distress associated with them, and the 
beliefs held about them. As detailed published accounts of the DDP of AVHs are rare, an 
example from personal experience will be given. Adam (not their real name), who had been 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, initially developed an AVH the content of which was a voice 
saying (verbatim) phrases which had actually been said to them during a traumatic event. 
However, over time Adam's AVH changed to become the voice of the same individual 
(from the traumatic event) but now saying novel things. It is hence worth considering the 
possibility that the mechanisms that may form the original basis for an AVH (e.g., a verbal 
intrusion of a specific memory of trauma) may come, over time, to be developed into a 
form unpredictable from its original content and potentially underpinned by different 
mechanisms (such as inner speech). Such fransformations may be the result of cognitive, 
emotional, and neurological mechanisms. In die example above, it may be that memory-
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based and inner speech-based processes interacted. Extensive activation of temporal lobe 
structures during spontaneous verbal thought has been taken to suggest that long-term 
memory processes may form the core of spontaneous thought (Christoff, Ream, & Gabrieli, 
2004). Hence, i f hyperaccessible memories exist (e.g. traumatic memories), it is plausible 
that these will be employed in inner speech processes. This could lead to cognitions with 
the properties of inner speech (e.g., action focused, relevant to ongoing events, etc.) but 
with content drawn from such memories. Such an interaction may result in an AVH 
involving a novel, action-related cognition involving the voice of an abuser. Although 
speculative, this highlights the possibility of synthesising AVH-as-memories models with 
inner speech-based models, to develop a synergistic account in line with a wider range of 
aspects of the phenomenology of AVHs than either of the models alone. 
The concept of a DDP may prove valuable in a number of other ways. Given that 
the experience of AVHs stretches into the healthy population, it may be finiitflil to consider 
how (and to what degree) AVHs may evolve from brief, benign experiences that can be 
considered more or less normal, to a disfressing clinically relevant experience (Leudar et 
al., 1997). One possible DDP is that patients who come to develop schizophrenia initially 
experience benign, non-cHnically relevant AVHs the content of which then becomes 
negative and distressing as a result of a traumatic/abusive experience. Personal experience 
indicates that a number of patients with schizophrenia report a DDP involving a positive, 
helpful voice in childhood which, after the individuals were exposed to a range of highly 
abusive experiences, became negative, abusive and entrenched in adulthood. Another 
(related) possibility is AVHs with benign content come to be negative, due to broader 
psychosocial factors affecting the individual. For example, how the individual relates to 
others in their social world, their social rank and levels of powerlessness, are associated 
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with their relation to their AVHs (Hayward, 2003). It has also been noted (Bleuler, 1952) 
that some AVHs follow a DDP in which they "first appear as the ordinary dream; then they 
appear in the hypnagogic state; then finally in the fiil l waking state", a famous example 
being Emanuel Swedenborg (Jones & Femyhough, 2008). A range of other DDPs are 
possible and encountered in patients, and it is likely that a large range of factors may 
interact dynamically to result in AVHs that are all-consuming and fiercely destructive. 
Phenomenological surveys which tend to take a 'snapshot in time' of individual's AVHs, 
without assessing in detail the DDP of such experiences, are poorly equipped to address 
such issues. This highhghts the need for ftiture studies of the DDP of AVHs and AHs. 
Conclusions 
A key challenge for the study of AVHs is to derive models that fit the 
phenomenology of the experience, rather than fitting models to a phenomenology that does 
not pertain to it (Woodruff, 2004). This paper has observed that although models are 
created to fit the phenomenology of AVHs, due to the diverse nature of the experience they 
inevitably end up only fitting specific types of A V H S . Whilst it is possible a grand unified 
theory of AVHs and AHs may be developed, possibly involving a neurological mechanism 
cutting across many cognitive, metacognitive, linguistic and/or perceptual capacities, at 
present no such model exists. In contrast, I have proposed that to honour the 
phenomenological diversity of the experience of AVHs, a fioiitful strategy may be 
subcategorisation. I f phenomenology can indeed give clues to the etiology of the 
experience (David, 2004), then each sixbcategory may be accounted for by a different 
model involving different neurocognitive processes. 
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Specifically, it has been argued that neurocognitive intrusive memory-based models of 
AVHs account well for AVHs that have content directly linked to verbalisations during and 
surrounding earlier traumatic experiences. Purely bottom-up ictal neurological models have 
been argued to fit other specific AHs, such as those involving crowds, noises, music, and 
brief stereotyped phrases. Finally, inner speech-based models have been proposed to 
underpin the typical form of AVHs, involving the regulation of everyday activities, which 
are engaged in the apprehension of objective reality, and have the same dialogical 
structures found in ordinary speech. A number of empirical tests have been suggested to 
test the proposal that subcategorisations of AVH exist that are underpinned by different 
neurocognitive mechanisms. I f correct, this highlights the potential for future research 
designs to not just to contain groups of'hallucinators' and 'non-hallucinators', but to group 
individuals with AVHs according to phenomenological subcategorisatiohs. 
I have also highlighted the need to study the dynamic developmental progression of AVHs, 
and how such an zmalysis opens up the possibility of synthesising of memory- and inner 
speech-based models of AVHs. Future work along these lines would likely benefit our 
understanding of the causes of AVHs. 
I f the proposal of subcategorisation of AVHs, underpinned by different 
mechanisms, can be empirically supported, this would importantly also have clear 
implications for treatment. For example, some therapeutic strategies aim to get voice-
hearers to engage in dialogues with their AVHs, in an attempt to alter the individual's 
relationship with their voices (Davies et al., 1999). Such an approach may be less 
appropriate for voices that are the result of intrusive memories, or bottom-up neurological 
factors, with instead techniques suitable to PTSD type flashbacks being more appropriate. 
The reverse would be the case for those with a phenomenology similar to inner speech. 
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Also, given that up to a quarter of patients experience ipersistent hallucinations' that are 
resistant to medication! (Shergiii, Murray, & McGuire, 1998) it may 'be fruitful to 
investigate whether ithe different phenomenologicai' subcategorisatiGns o proposed' 
here: respond' differentially to antipsychotic medication'. 
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G E N E R A L DISCUSSION 
Summary of findings 
The studies reported in this thesis were designed to investigate a number of the 
cognitive mechanisms underlying the experiences of auditory verbal hallucinations 
and persecutory ideation. A guiding assumption has been what Aleman and Larai 
(2008) have termed the continuum hypothesis, which holds that these experiences lie 
on a continuum with normal experiences. 
Persecutory ideation 
The first study (Chapter 1) built on previous work demonstrating the 
paradoxical impact of thought suppression, namely its tendency to make suppressed 
thoughts hyperaecessible and susceptible to post-suppression rebound (e.g., Wegner, 
1989; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987; Wegner & Smart, 1997). This led 
to the hypothesis that thought suppression may be involved in the development and/or 
maintenance of persecutory delusions (PDs). The results of this study provided the 
first evidence of a relation between thought suppression and persecutory delusion-like 
beliefs (PDLBs). No main effect of thought suppression was found, but instead 
thought suppression was found to interact with anxiety in predicting levels of PDLBs. 
Thought suppression only predicted levels of PDLBs when anxiety levels were high. 
This study also found that anxiety, but not negative affect, accounted for a significant 
amount of unique variance in PDLBs, supporting Freeman's (2007) contention that 
that anxiety is the key emotion in persecutory ideation. 
This second study (Chapter 2) examined interactions among factors proposed 
to be specifically associated with first- or second-stage factors of persecutoiy delusion 
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formation. Through its focus on these interactions, this study performed a test of the 
two-factor model of PDLBs. In line with this model, the jumping to conclusions 
(JTC) bias was found not to be an independent predictor of PDLBs. Also in line with 
predictions, an interaction was found between a first-stage factor, social rank—which 
has been proposed to contribute to seeding the initial implausible idea—and a second-
stage factor, the JTC bias, which is proposed to encourage the uncritical acceptance of 
such beliefs. This finding was replicated for two separate measures of PDLBs, 
strengthening confidence in the reliability of this conclusion. 
Hallucinations and intrusions 
Chapters 3 and 4 investigated the proposal that thought suppression and 
ensuing intrusive thoughts, would also be implicated in hallucinatory experiences. 
Chapter 3 began by noting that research into a little-studied form of hallucinations, 
those associated with the hypnagogic and hypnopompic (H&H) states, was limited by 
the lack of a brief, psychometrically reliable and valid self-report assessment tool. 
This study led to the development of the Durham Hypnagogic and Hypnopompic 
Hallucinations Questionnaire (DHQ) which was found to have satisfactory 
psychometric properties. This tool had a three-factor structure, indexing auditory 
H&H hallucinations, visual H&H hallucinations, and the experience of a felt 
presence. When scores on this new instrument were analysed in relation to measures 
of the tendency to experience cognitive intrusions it was found that transliminality, a 
measure of the extent to which material, typically processed unconsciously, is able to 
cross the threshold into consciousness, was positively related to all subscales of the 
DHQ. However, only auditory (not visual or felt-presence) H&H experiences were 
associated with the self-reported susceptibility to intrusive thoughts and tendency to 
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undertake thought suppression. It was proposed that this finding could be taken to 
suggest that different explanatory models are needed for each modality of H&H 
phenomena. 
Chapter 4 examined the relation between thought suppression, intrusive 
thoughts and general hallucination-proneness (i.e., not limited to the H & H states). 
Fowler et al. (2006) had proposed that rumination or inner dialogues about 
interactions with the people involved in previous traumatic events could form the raw 
material of some AVHs. This study constituted the first direct empirical test of the 
relafion between rumination and hallucination-proneness. A model was developed 
where rumination led to hallucinations due to its propensity to directly cause intrusive 
thoughts, and also to indirectly cause intrusive thoughts through the encouragement of 
thought suppression. Using path analyses it was found that the relation between 
rumination and hallucination-proneness was not direct but rather mediated by 
intrusive thoughts. These findings were consistent with a model of hallucination-
proneness that sees intrusive thoughts playing a key role, with levels of intrusive 
thoughts being influenced by ruminative and thought suppression processes. Given 
that the measure of hallucination^proneness eniployed was heavily weighted towards 
AVHs, it was suggested that this model was likely to be more appropriate for AVHs 
than visual hallucinations. 
Hallucinations and agency 
Chapter 5 turned to a consideration of how self-produced thoughts and 
ruminative inner dialogue, highlighted in the previous chapter as candidates for the 
raw material of AVHs, may come to be experienced as alien. This chapter offered an 
integration of the neurocognitive action self-monitoring system (NASS) proposed by 
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Blakemore, Wolpert, and Frith (1998), with Wegner's (2002) concept of apparent 
mental causation, and an application of this to the phenomenon of hallucinations. 
Central to this analysis was the idea of a predicted state, a prediction created by the 
brain of what wil l happen i f a motor plan is executed, which is proposed to be 
involved in the creation of the felt-emotion of causing an event (agency). A critique 
was presented of Seal, Aleman, and McGuire's (2004) proposal that an absence (or 
distortion) of the predicted state mechanism causes a cognition to be experienced as 
unintended, which is then resolved into a feeling of self or other authorship by 
preconscious attributions. Instead it was proposed, contra Seal et al., that cognitions 
involved in AVHs do not require that there be a feeling of unintendedness, the 
ambiguity of which must then be resolved into self/other authorship by preconscious 
attributions. Instead it was argued that cognitions come with a self/other label 
attached, as a result of the operation of the predicted state mechanism. The benefits of 
a Vygotskian, developmental approach to inner speech for the understanding of AVHs 
were highlighted. However, it was noted that a key problem, which Gallagher (2004) 
has termed the selectivity problem, remained unanswered. Specifically, i f inner 
speech is the raw material of AVHs, why is it only some, not all, irmer speech 
utterances in such individuals that are experienced as AVHs? 
Chapter 6 then performed an empirical test of the predictions of the model 
developed in Chapter 5. It was noted that there are at least two potential ways in 
which the predicted state mechanism could lead to a breakdown in the feeling of 
authorship. Firstly, there may be a problem upstream of the predicted state, resulting 
in a complete or partial failure to generate a predicted state. Secondly, there may be a 
problem downstream of the predicted state. In this latter case, the creation of the 
predicted state may be normal, but the individual may be unable to use this 
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information to generate the feeling of agency. The Wheel of Fortune procedure 
(Aarts, Custer, & Wegner, 2005) utilised in this study offered a way of distinguishing 
which of the above possibilities is the best explanation of passivity experiences and 
AVHs. It was proposed that that the extent to which individuals could have their 
experience of causing an event enhanced by subliminal primes could be seen as a 
proxy measure of their ability to utilise predicted states. The results of the study 
showed that there was no significant correlation between participants' susceptibility to 
having their experience of causation enhanced by subliminal primes and either their 
levels of self-reported passivity experiences or AVH-proneness. However, it was 
noted that there was a trend for women who were less able to utilise effect primes to 
be more hallucination-prone. Furthermore, a main effect of priming was found in 
women and not in men. It was proposed that this may be due to women's increased 
propensity to take the intentional stance. 
Hallucinations and inner speech 
The final section of the thesis addressed multiple issues surrounding inner 
speech and AVHs. The study reported in Chapter 7 aimed to replicate the findings of 
Ford et al. (2001) which found dampening of the N l response to auditory stimuli 
during inner speech, as compared to a silent baseline task. It was found that 
dampening of the N l response occurred in all inner speech conditions employed 
(subvocal rehearsial, dialogic inner speech, and auditory verbal imagery). However, 
the finding of a dampened N l response during mental rotation suggested that the 
dampening seen in response to inner speech tasks was not specific to the concurrerit 
performance of inner speech, but was instead due to a reduction in attention to the 
auditory stimuli. These findings were taken as evidence that caution should be taken 
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in interpreting Ford et al.'s (2001) findings as evidence of a corollary discharge 
mechanism being defective in voice-hearing patients with schizophrenia. Instead it 
was suggested that the specificity of decreased dampening of the N l response during 
inner speech by such patients may reflect underlying attentional differences in this 
group. 
Having found electrophysiological evidence in Chapter 7 which questioned 
Ford et al.'s (2001) claim to have provided evidence in support of inner speech 
models of AVHs, the final chapter of the thesis (Chapter 8) evaluated inner speech-
based models of AVHs on the basis of what was terrned an argument-fi-om-
phenomenology. Specifically, it was investigated whether AVHs were 
phenomenologically consistent with inner speech. It was firstly argued that a 
competing model, which conceived of AVHs as a failure to inhibit memories of prior 
events (Badcock, Waters, & Maybery, 2007; Waters, Badcock, Michie, & Maybery, 
2006), was only consistent with the phenomenology of a minority of AVHs, such as 
the approximately 10-20% (Fowler, 1997; Hardy et al., 2005) of individuals whose 
voices include content which can be linked directly back to memories of trauma. 
In contrast to this, it was argued that many facets of the phenomenology of 
inner speech, including its regulatory nature, its linkage to ongoing events, and its 
tendency to involve the voices and perspectives of others, were consistent with the 
phenomenological properties of a large number of AVHs. However, it was also noted 
that inner speech-based models had a number of limitations when compared to the 
phenomenology of AVHs. They did not seem appropriate for the aforementioned -10-
20% of individuals whose voices have content which can be hnked directly back to 
memories of trauma. These instead appeared better modelled as verbatim intrusions 
fi-om memory. Inner speech models could also not account for other types of AVH, 
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such as the voices of crowds, or other auditory non-verbal hallucinations, such as 
environmental noise and music. Despite these limitations, it was argued that inner 
speech-based models had the starting advantage of being in accordance with the 
phenomenology of a significant number of AVHs. 
An argument for the subcategorisation of auditory hallucinations was then 
made. The first category of A V H highlighted was that with content directly linked to 
intrusive memories of early abuse/trauma, which it was suggested were best 
understood via a neurocognitive model that saw AVHs as a failure to inhibit 
memories. The second category was auditory hallucinations involving seemingly 
random auditions, such crowds, noises, and music. It was proposed that these could be 
best explained at the neurological level, using an ictal-based (random seizure 
activation) bottom-up neurological model. Finally, a class of AVHs was identified, 
typified by novel statements that attempt to regulate the actions of the voice-hearer, 
which were linked to their ongoing activities, and that could not be linked directly to a 
verbatim memory. It was proposed that these AVHs could be best accounted for by a 
neurocognitive inner speech-based model. It was also noted that AVHs tend to evolve 
over time. This evolution of AVHs and AHs over time, currently a neglected and 
poorly understood area, was termed their dynamic developmental progression (DDP). 
Directions for future research 
Persecutory ideation 
Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis suggest a number of fhi i t f i i l avenues for future 
research into persecutory ideation, and novel interventions for those who seek 
assistance for the distress such beliefs cause. Firstly, further research is needed to 
establish whether thought suppression plays a causal role in the development and/or 
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maintena:nee of clinically relevant PDs. Such a proposal could be experimentally 
tested through an examination of levels of thought suppression in patients with PDs 
and patients with generalised anxiety disorder. The latter would be a suitable control 
group as they show comparable anxiety levels to those with PDs (Freeman & Garety, 
1999). I f thought suppression plays a causal role in PD formation, it can be 
hypothesised that patients with PDs would have higher thought suppression levels 
than patients with generalised anxiety disorder. 
Another approach would be to examine thought suppression levels 
longitudinally in individuals at high risk of developing PDs (for example those with a 
family history of psychosis), with a view to determining whether the presence of 
thought suppression predicts later onset of dysfunctional beliefs. I f a causal role for 
thought suppression could be established, then one therapeutic possibility may be to 
encourage patients to openly express the thoughts they have been suppressing. In light 
of Sparrow and Wegner's (2006) findings that intrusive thoughts may be deactivated 
by merely expressing them, this would be expected to have beneficial effects for those 
with persecutory ideation. Such a study could also help establish whether thought 
suppression does play a causal role in the maintenance of such beliefs. 
Secondly, the two-factor model requires empirical testing in those with 
clinically relevant PDs. One way in which this model could be tested would again be 
through a comparison of the presence of the JTC bias in patients with PDs, and 
patients with generalised anxiety disorder (but no persecutory ideation). The two-
factor model would predict that, although social rank and other factors associated with 
anxiety and threat perception may not differ between these two groups, greater levels 
of the JTC bias would be found in the patients with PDs. 
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Thirdly, a multidimensional model of persecutory ideation (Freeman, 2007), 
which takes into account factors such as the conviction with which the belief is held 
and the distress it causes, offers further ways of considering how factors such as the 
JTC bias may impact upon persecutory ideation. Given that the JTC bias is thought to 
be involved in converting the initial implausible ideas associated with persecutory 
ideation into uncritically accepted beliefs, it may be hypothesised that levels of the 
JTC bias will directly impact upon the convicfion with which PDs are held, but not on 
the levels of associated distress. Studies of such relations would be a first step towards 
enabling coghifive-behavioural interventions to take place at the level of specific 
dimensions of persecutory ideation. 
The finding that the JTC bias was associated with increased levels of PDLBs 
in those with low social rank, suggests that direct attempts to correct the JTC bias may 
prove beneficial. Techniques for doing this could be based around cognitive 
behavioural intervenfions or forms of mindfulness training (e.g., Baer, 2006). In 
addition to interventions which try to directly alter reasoning styles, other more 
indirect psychosocial interventions may also prove important. For example, Freeman 
(2007) has suggested that social isolation may contribute to a failure to fully review 
persecutory thoughts. This has the implication that reasoning biases may be improved 
by increased social interaction. This highlights the potential importance of service-
user led organisations, such as the Paranoia Network, which offers peer-support to 
those with severe persecutory ideation. Such service-user led groups offer those with 
PDs a route away from social isolafion, and entrenchment of such persecutory beliefs. 
This is in line with evidence that interventions based around increased social 
interaction in supportive, peer-led, non-medicalised settings may be beneficial in 
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helping individuals recover from psychotic experiences (e.g., Mosher & Meiin, 1978; 
Mosher, Vallone & Menn, 1995). 
The finding that social rank was related to levels of PDLBs, both as an 
independent predictor and through its interaction with the jumping to conclusions 
bias, is a finding that should have important implications for future research. Firstly, it 
holds out the potential that psychosocial interventions which aim to build up social 
competence (e.g., Gould, Buckminster, Pollack, Otto, & Yap, 2006), which may help 
improve perceptions of social rank, may play a valuable role in reducing persecutory 
ideation. Also, given the positive correlation between social rank and serotonin levels 
found in primates (Raleigh, McGuire, Brammer, Pollack, & Yuwiler, 1991), this 
offers the prediction that selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) may be 
effective in decreasing persecutory ideation. However, problems of treating 
persecutory ideation with SSRIs have been noted (Kantor, 2004), and psychosocial 
interventions targeted at social rank would appear to be preferable. 
Hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations 
The development of the DHQ should allow a range of hypotheses in this area 
to be tested. Firstly, due to the demohsfrated association between trauma and AVHs in 
clinical and non-clinical samples (Read & Argyle, 1999; Morrison & Peterson, 2003) 
it may be hypothesised that trauma contributes to an increased probability of 
experiencing hypnagogic and hypnopompic (H&H) hallucinations. This could be 
simply tested through an examination of the relation between levels of trauma and 
DHQ scores. However, frauma would need to be carefully assessed through detailed 
interviews using standardised tools such as the Childhood Experiences of Care Abuse 
Questionnaire (Bifulco, Bemazzani, Moran, & Jacobs, 2005) rather than simple self-
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report measures. Secondly, it may be hypothesised that H&H hallucinations constitute 
a risk factor for the development of hallucinations in clear, waking consciousness 
(Jones & Femyhough, 2008). To test this hypothesis, it would be necessary to perform 
a longitudinal study of whether early H&H experiences predict later development of 
hallucinations in clear consciousness. I f this were found to be the case, it would be 
important to attempt to pinpoint what factors lead some, but not all individuals to 
have hallucinations that make the transition into clear, waking consciousness. One 
possibility is that trauma may increase the risk of benign H & H hallucinations 
intruding into waking consciousness, although at this time such a proposal remains 
speculative. Thirdly, given that thought suppression has been found to result in greater 
numbers of intrusions in those with insecure attachment styles (Mikulincer, Dolev, & 
Shaver, 2004), it would be profitable to test the hypothesis that thought suppression is 
more likely to lead to H & H hallucinations in those with an insecure (as opposed to a 
secure) attachment style. 
Finally, an intriguing question is to what extent such experiences can be 
consciously induced. Richard Feynman, the Nobel Prize winning physicist, reported 
an ability to linger on the borders of sleep and to thus consciously induce hypnagogic 
hallucinations (Feynman, 1985). This seems to offer an intriguing method of studying 
such experiences, which are usually fragmentary and brief (Mavromatis, 1988). A 
study in which participants are trained to remain in a semi-conscious state between 
wake and sleep, to induce hypnagogic hallucinations which can then be recorded in a 
bedside diary, may offer valuable insights in the phenomenology of the experience. 
Obtaining a more detailed understanding of the phenomenology of H & H experiences 
may help us understand the relation between H&H hallucinations and those 
experienced in clear, waking consciousness. 
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Trauma and hallucinations 
Chapter 4 proposed a model in which rumination upon traumatic events may 
play a role in AVHs. This model raises a number of questions for our understanding 
of the relation between trauma and AVHs. Firstly, what factors differentiate those 
who experience traumatic events but do not later develop hallucinations, from those 
who do? At a biological level it would be valuable to examine whether there is a 
genetic predisposition for trauma to lead to later hallucinatory experiences. 
Specifically, it may be hypothesised that a gene-environment interacfion exists, with a 
specific genotype conferring a significantly greater probability of experiencing 
hallucinations following trauma. A useflil parallel can be dravra here with research 
into gene-environment interactions in the relation between cannabis and psychosis. 
Studies in this area have focussed on the COMT gene, as its product (catechol-0-
methyltransferase) is involved in the metabolism of dopamine, which has been 
implicated by many studies to play a role in psychosis (Kapur, 2003). In brief, a 
specific codon on the COMT gene may involve one of three potential combinations of 
valine (Val) and methionine (Met), Val-Val, Val-Met, or Met-Met. Those with the 
Val-Val form of the gene break down dopamine more slowly than those with the Val-
Met form of the gene, who in turn break dovra dopamine more slowly than those with 
the Met-Met form of the gene (Mannisto & Kaakkola, 1999). It has been found that a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia is significantly more likely to be received later in life in 
cannabis users who have a Val-Val combination form of the COMT gene, as opposed 
to Val-Met, or Met-Met forms (Caspi et al., 2005). The COMT gene would hence be a 
logical starting point for an examination of gene-environment interactions in the 
relation between trauma and hallucinations. Indeed, given the failure to establish clear 
235 
General Discussion 
links between specific genes and psychiatric diagnoses, a complaint-based approach 
may be expected to be more profitable (Bentall, 2003; Crow, 2007). 
Secondly, it rhay be asked what cognitive factors make trauma more likely to 
result in hallucinations. It has been argued in this thesis (Chapter 4) that rumination 
and thought suppression may play a role in encouraging the formation of 
hallucinafions. However, a range of other factors such as attributional style, 
metacognitive factors, and source-monitoring deficits are also likely to be involved 
(Chapter 4). This highlights the need for a detailed longitudinal study to establish 
what cognitive factors prospectively predict whether later trauma results in the 
development of hallucinations. It may also be considered whether a 3-way gene-
environment-cognitive style interaction may be important. It may be that those with a, 
as yet unknown, genetic predisposition to AVHs, who have experienced trauma, and 
who have a specific cognitive style which may include a tendency to ruminate, may 
be at greatest risk of developing hallucinations. 
Agency and hallucinations 
The failure to find a clear effect of subliminal priming using the Wheel of 
Fortime methodology (Aarts et al., 2005) employed in Chapter 6, suggested this 
methodology was not ideally suited to test the proposal that hallucinations result from 
a failure to utilise predicted states. This highlights the need to devise a simple, 
replicable task for assessing susceptibility to the illusion of conscious will , which can 
be shown to be reliable in a non-clinical sample before being extended to a clinical 
sample. 
A recent study by Asai, Sugimori, and Tanno (2008) found that errors in 
predicted motor movements, specifically predicting where one's hand had moved to 
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when unseen, correlated with AVH-proneness in the general population. This can be 
seen to be consistent with the model advanced in Chapter 5, which carried the 
implication that problems with predicted motor actions should be experienced with 
hallucinations. The model proposed in Chapter 5 would also predict that impairments 
in motor prediction skills (as assessed by the task employed by Asai et al.) should be 
associated with the presence of AVHs, but not persecutory ideation. Future research is 
required to test such a proposal. 
Subcategorisation of A VHs and dynamic developmental progression 
The proposal that subcategorisations of AVHs are necessary (Jones, in press; 
see Chapter 8), each involving different underlying neurocognitive mechanisms, leads 
to a number of falsifiable hypotheses. Firstly, different patterns of neural activation 
would be likely to underlie these different forms of AVHs. For example, a patient 
with an A V H identifiable as a verbatim memory of abuse would be hypothesised to 
show a different pattern of neural activation to a patient with a more dynamic AVH 
which commented oh current actions. The first type of AVH may show activation 
more similar to that seen during traumatic autobiographical memory recall. As 
Broca's area activation decreases during recall of traumatic (as compared to neutral) 
memories in patients with PTSD (Rauch et al., 1996), and increases during inner 
speech production (Shergill et al., 2001), less activation should be seen in this area 
during AVHs involving intrusive memories of abuse, than during AVHs involving 
novel comments on current actions. 
The concept of a dynamic developmental progression (DDP) also opens up a 
number of avenues for future research. For example, given that the experience of 
AVHs stretches into the healthy population (Aleman & Laroi, 2008; see General 
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Introduction), it may be fruitful to consider how (and to what degree) AVHs may 
evolve from brief, benign hallueinatory experiences that can be considered more or 
less normal, to a distressing clinically relevant experience. The identification of 
faietors that engender a transition from benign to malign AVHs would likely have 
clinical implications for management of such AVHs. There is hence the need for more 
longitudinal studies of the DDP of voices, and factors that prospectively predict the 
course that AVHs will take. 
Shared mechanisms in hallucinations and delusions 
The studies in this thesis, following a complaint-based account of psychotic 
experiences (Bentall, 2006; see General Infroduction), have focussed on studies of 
either AVHs or PDLBs. However, it is well known that levels of hallucinations 
correlate with levels of persecutory ideation in clinical and non-clinical sample (e.g.. 
Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2006). This is suggestive that such experiences and beliefs 
may share some common causal factors. For example, this thesis has already shown 
links between thought suppression and both PDLBs (see Chapter 1, Chapter 2) and 
hallucination-proneness (see Chapter 4). Other factors are also likely to be associated 
with both PDLBs and hallucination-proneness. For example, this thesis found a link 
between rumination and hallucination-proneness (Chapter 4). Given that social rank is 
associated with both PDLBs (Chapter 2), and rumination (Cheung, Gilbert, & frons, 
2004), it may be that rumination plays a role in persecutory ideation, as well as 
hallucination-proneness. Thus, when performing studies of specific complaints such 
as hallucinations, researchers may also wish to assess how other correlated 
complaints, such as persecutory ideation, can be incorporated into the model of the 
primary complaint under investigation. 
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Interventions for those with hallucinations 
A key goal of research into hallucinations is to develop interventions that can 
help individuals with such experiences. For those with hallucinations, such 
intervention may be divided into two categories based upon Romme's proposal that 
voice-hearers are in need of "liberation, not cure" (Romme, as cited in Bentall, 2003, 
p. 511). While one class of interventions may aim at eliminating hallucinations, a 
second may simply aim at helping the individual to manage and cope with the 
experience better. In terms of eliminating hallucinations, the studies reported in the 
present thesis (Chapter 3; Chapter 4) suggest that one way to help reduce 
hallucinations is to prevent attempted suppression of thoughts of trauma and related 
cognitions. It would hence be useful to trial the use of acceptance-based approaches to 
intrusive cognitions (e.g., Marcks &. Woods, 2005) with those with hallucinations. 
As noted in the General Introduction, there is a long historical tradition of 
understanding hallucinations outside the context of a mental illness discourse, and not 
as a symptom of a mental illness. Following the approach of the UK Hearing Voices 
Network, who run groups for those with AVHs aiming to normalise the experience 
and allow sharing of coping strategies, there have been some randomised controlled 
trials of group cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) based along the same lines. 
However, Wykes et al. (2005) found that group CBT did not reduce either the 
frequency of AVHs, or the distress associated with them. The arguments developed in 
this thesis suggest a number of reasons why such trials may not have been effective. 
Firstly, it may be that trauma was involved in the development of the participants' 
AVHs. A group-based intervention may not have facilitated discussion of such 
sensitive issues. This would have prevented the CBT from touching on key emotional 
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triggers behind the AVHs, and/or discouraged the introduction of alternative cognitive 
strategies, such as prevention of thought suppression. 
The present considerations thus suggest some possible improvements to this 
form of CBT. Firstly, the therapy in Wykes etal.'s study lasted only seven weeks. 
This seems a short period for the group members to identify, and gain the confidence 
to talk about, any related traumatic events, and change how the experiences were dealt 
with. Secondly, it may be that one-to-one therapy would prove more beneficial in 
detailing with complex and often emotionally sensitive precursors to the experience. 
Thirdly, the CBT facilitators were therapists from the local mental health service who 
had been trained to administer this therapy programme in a manualised format. It may 
prove more effective to have such sessions delivered by ex-service users who may 
better be able to communicate the experience of hearing voices, give more hope for 
recovery, and remove the element of medicalisation from the sessions. For such 
reasons, service-user led sessions may prove more effective than clinician led-
sessions (Mosher & Mann, 1978). This remains an issue to be addressed by ftiture 
research. 
Hope 
Throughout the course of researching the material in this thesis, I have 
encountered many reports from service-users, individuals with AVHs and PDs, of 
being told by mental health professionals that they will "never recover" (Dillon, 
2008), "never work again" (Alcock, 2009), that they "do not know what is best for 
[them]" (Dillon, 2008) and having being treated with a "total lack of hope" (Hilpem, 
2007). The evolution in our scientific and political conceptions of such experiences, 
driven by both academics (e.g., Bentall, 2003) and service-users (e.g., Romme & 
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Eseher, 1993'; James; 20O'li), means there is; reason to ibelieye such attitudes are: in ithe 
process of disappearing. Niat only is thereihppei but co«^ra Obamai(2008); it is no 
longer audacious toi hope. Hope is a reality. 
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Abstract 
Internet-based questionnaires (e-qtiestionnaires) have become widely used in psychopathology research, 
but there is currently little evidence on their rehability as compared with pen-and-paper equivalents. Data 
from separate samples of young adults completing e-questionnaires on hallucination-proneness (N = 751) 
and persecutory ideation {N= 183) were compared with data from pen-and-paper versions of the same 
questionnaires completed by a third, unrelated sample {N= 188). There was no effect of modality of pre-
sentation on mean scores on these questioimaires. Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis indicated mode 
invariance of factor structure for the persecutory ideation questionnaire. Internal reliability of both ques-
tioimaire formats was satisfactory. We conclude that the administration of traditional meastires of psycho-
pathology via e-questionnaire is a reUable method of data collection. 
© 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
Keywords: E-questionnaires; Hallucination; Pen-and-paper; Persecutory delusions; Psychopathology; Reliability 
1. Introduction 
The use of internet-based questionnaires, also known as "e-questionnaires" (Denscombe, 2006, p. 
252), as a research tool has increased significantly over the past decade. Compared with their tradi-
tional pen-and-paper counterparts, e-questionnaires are relatively inexpensive, easy to administer. 
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can easily cover wide geographical areas, and tend to have higher completion rates (Denscombe, 
2006). Furthermore, this method of data collection avoids a nimiber of the disadvantages of stan-
dard pen-and-paper administration, such as the potential for participants to fail to answer questions 
and the time-consuming need to transcribe data (Mangunkusumo et al., 2005). Responses given 
anonymously via e-questionnaires, when compared to anonymous mail-retumed pen-and-paper 
methods, have been found to result in lower scores on social desirability measures (Joinson, 
1999), and have been found to generate greater self-disclosure from participants (Stanton, 1998). 
E-questionnaires are typically on-line versions of widely used, popular questionnaires that have 
been shown to have good psychometric properties when completed by participants via pen-and-
paper methods. However, it cannot be assimied a priori that the psychometric properties of an 
internet-based version of tried and tested questionnaires will be identical to those of the pen-
and-paper version (Ritter, Lorig, Laurent, & Matthews, 2004). There may exist what has been 
termed a "mode effect", a differential pattern of responding by participants depending on the 
medium of administration of the questionnaire (e.g., Denscombe, 2006; McCabe, 2004). Richman, 
Kiesler, Weisband, and Drasgow (1999) have noted that certain properties of e-questionnaires 
such as the display of plain text on a screen, the ephemeral nature of responses, and the absence 
of social context cues may affect participant response patterns. However, preliminary evidence 
suggests that this mode effect is not significant (Richman et al., 1999). For example, studies have 
compared the data obtained from questionnaires administered both as e-questionnaires and via 
pen-and-paper format in areas such as personality (Buchanan & Smith, 1999), health assessment 
(Ritter et al., 2004), illicit drug taking (McCabe, 2004), and even library quality (Hayslett & 
Wildemuth, 2004). Such studies have not found significant differences in participant responses. 
One area in which e-questionnaires are likely to be particularly useful is in the assessment of 
psyehopathological experiences in the healthy population. The study of such experiences has been 
given a renewed momentum by findings that they exist on a continuum extending into the normal 
population (Johns «& van Os, 2001; Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004). Finding reliable self-re-
port instruments for assessing these experiences is thus likely to be important for the future devel-
opment of research in this area. Given that psychopathology questionnaires are likely to be 
particularly sensitive to social desirability effects, it is possible that e-questionnaire versions of 
standard pen-and-paper psychopathology questionnaires may result in significantly different pat-
terns of response. Investigating whether there is a mode effect for psychopathology questionnaires 
would therefore seem to be particularly timely given the number of studies that are starting to use 
this method (e.g., Allen et aJ., 2005; Berry, Wearden, Barrowclough, & Liversidge, 2006; Jones & 
Ferayhough, 2006, 2007). 
The present study set out to examine if a mode effect was present when standard measures of 
psychopathology in the healthy population were administered as e-questionnaires. Equivalence 
between the two modes of administration was to be assessed in two ways. Firstly, the means of 
the psychopathology instruments were to be compared by mode of administration. This is a pop-
ular method of estabhshing mode equivalence of questionnaires (e.g., Cronk & West, 2002). We 
hypothesized that, due to the lower social desirability scores and greater self-disclosure associated 
with e-questionnaires, self-reported proneness to these unusual experiences would be higher than 
would be expected with pen-and-paper administration. 
We also set out to examine if the factor structures of the psychopathology questionnaires dif-
fered by mode of administration. If equivalent factor structures are found for both modes of 
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administration this offers evidence that the same constructs are being measured in each mode (Bu-
chanan & Smith, 1999). This comparison was to be performed using multi-group confirmatory 
factor analysis. We hypothesized that the factor structures of the psychopathology questionnaires 
employed here would be mode invariant. Finally, it was hypothesized that the e-questionnaires 
would be as satisfactory in their internal reliabihty as their pen-and-paper counterparts. 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
2.1.1. Internet administration 
A circular e-mail was sent to undergraduates enrolled on a variety of programs at a British uni-
versity informing them of a website where they could take part in a study. Participants were not 
offered an incentive to take part in the study, and responses were anonymous with only basic 
demographic data (age, gender, and university department) being requested. As a result of this 
751 undergraduates (328 men, 423 women) completed an e^questionnaire assessing hallucina-
tion-proneness. (Note that descriptive statistics for the e-questionnaire hallucination-proneness 
data reported for this sample were previously reported in Jones & Fernyhough, 2006). The mean 
age of participants was 20.1 years (SD = 2.6). A separate sample of 183 undergraduates (107 men, 
76 women) completed an e-questionnaire assessing levels of persecutory delusion-hke beliefs. The 
mean age of these participants was 18.5 years (SD = 1.3). 
2.1.2. Pen-and-paper administration 
A convenience sample of 188 undergraduates (78 men, 110 women) enrolled on a variety of pro-
grams at a British university completed questionnaires assessing hallucination-proneness and 
delusion-proneness. The mean age of the participants was 20.6 years (SD = 3.2). Participants' re-
sponses were anonymous with only basic demographic data (age, gender, and department) being 
requested. No incentive was offered for participation. There was no overlap between participants 
in the pen-and-paper sample and the two e-questionnaire samples. 
2.1.3. Design of questionnaires 
The pen-and-paper and e-qiiestionnaire formats had identical questions, presented in identical 
orders. The e-questionnaire was designed to be as similar in appearance as possible to the pen-
ahd-paper format. As such, responses on the e-questionnaires did not involve drop-down menus, 
but simply required participants to click on a box which they would normally tick on the pen-and-
paper questionnaires. 
2.2. Measures 
2.2.1. Proneness to persecutory delusion-like beliefs 
The Persecutory Ideation Questionnaire (PIQ; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2006) is a 10-
item questionnaire designed to measure persecutory ideation in both eUnical and non-clinical sam-
ples. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "Very True" (4) to "Very Untrue" (0). 
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Total scores can range from 0 to 40. Higher scores indicate greater proneness to persecutory delu-
sion-like beliefs. This measure has been shown to have good reliability and validity (McKay et al., 
2006). 
2.2.2. Proneness to hallucinations 
The revised Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R; Launay & Slade, 1981; modified by 
Bentall & Slade, 1985) is a 12-item instrument designed to measure predisposition to hallucina-
tion-like experiences. Each item is scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "Certainly ap-
plies to me" (4), to "Certainly does not apply to me" (0). Total scores can range from 0 to 48. 
Higher scores indicate a greater predisposition to hallucination-like experiences. This measure 
has been shown to have good reliability and validity (Bentall & Slade, 1985). 
3. Results 
3.1. Mean score comparisons 
3.1.1. PIQ 
The age of the PIQ paper-and-pen group was significantly higher than the PIQ e-questionnaire 
group, ?(369) = 8.08, p < .001. there was also a significant gender difference between the two 
groups, ^ = 10.7, p < .01, with a greater proportion of females in the paper-and-pen group. Cron-
bach's alpha for the PIQ delivered as an e-questionnaire was .88, and through traditional pen-
and-paper administration it was .85. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Scores on 
the PIQ for both modes of questionnaire administration were corhparable to the mean of 9.11 
(SD = 5.95) found by previous research (using pen-and-paper administration) on undergraduate 
populations (McKay et al., 2006). 
Table 1 
Means (standard deviations) of PIQ in both modes 
E-questionnaire Pen-and-paper 
Male Female Overall Male Female Overall 
{n = 107) ( / I = 76) (A^= 183) (« = 78) (n= 110) {N= 188) 
PIQtotal 6.77 (4.35) 7.82 (6.04) 7.21 (5.13) 8.30 (6.21) 8.18(6.30) 8.23 (6.25) 
Item#l .69 (.79) .77 (.93) .72 (.85) .82 (.95) .77 (.84) .79 (.88) 
iteni#2 .76 (.65) .84 (.63) .79 (.64) .85 (.84) .91 (.91) .89 (.88) 
Itein#3 .61 (.62) .68 (.76) .64 (.68) .80 (.89) .76 (.83) .78 (.85) 
Item#4 .71 (.71) .92 (.90) .79 (.80) .91 (.84) .92 (.87) .92 (.85) 
Item#5 .32 (.54) .59 (.83) .43 (.69) .50 (.80) .53 (.79) .52 (.79) 
Iteni#6 1.34 (.84) 1.31 (1.00) 1.33 (.91) 1.17 (.83) 1.20 (.87) 1.19 (.85) 
Item#7 .68 (.70) .76 (.84) .71 (.76) 1.07 (.97) .80 (.87) .92 (.92) 
Item#8 .31 (.50) .61 (.90) .44 (.71) .55 (.73) .60 (.82) .58 (.78) 
Item#9 1.06(1.03) .97(1.10) 1.02(1.06) 1.16(1.22) 1.21 (1.01) 1.19 (1.10) 
Item#10 .25 (.55) .34 (.85) .28 (.69) .43 (.86) .41 (.80) .42 (.82) 
Note. PIQ = Persecutory Ideation Questionnaire. 
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A one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was performed with PIQ total score as the 
dependent variable, and mode of administration (e-questionnaire, pen-and-paper) as the indepen-
dent variable. Age and gender were entered as covariates. Levene's test of equality of error vari-
ances indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met, F{\, 369) = 2.55, n.s. 
Visual graphical inspection of the distribution of PIQ total scores and a Kolmorogov-Smimov 
test indicated PIQ scores deviated significantly from normality. However, as ANOVA is robust 
to deviations from normality (Field, 2005) parametric analysis was deemed appropriate. The AN-
COVA showed there was no effect of mode of administration on PIQ score, F{\, 367) = 2.98, n.s. 
A one-way multivariate analysis of covariance (M ANCOVA) was then performed with the ten 
individual PIQ items as dependent variables, and mode of administration as the independent var-
iable. Levene's test of equality of error variances indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance was met for all individual PIQ item scores, except Item #10. PIQ item scores were found 
to be non-normally distributed (as indicated by Kolmogorov-Smimov tests and visual inspec-
tion), however, as MANOVA is robust to violation of this assumption (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007) parametric analysis was performed. There was no multivariate effect of mode of administra-
tion on PIQ item score, F{\(), 353) = 1.12, n.s. However, it has been argued that using correlated 
dependent variables in a MANOVA (as was the case with the individual PIQ items) reduces its 
power to detect effects (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Hence, univariate analyses were also exam-
ined. Follow-up imivariate tests were performed with a Bonferroni correction to take account of 
the number of separate ANCOVAs performed, with alpha set as a' = .005 (.05/10). None of the 
univariate tests were significant. This was taken as evidence that the mean PIQ scores, both in 
total, and at item level, did not differ between the two modes of administration. 
3.1.2. LSHS-R 
The age of the LSHS-R paper-and-pen group was significantly higher than the LSHS-R e-ques-
tionnaire group, (^937) = 2.20, p < .05. There was also a significant gender difference between the 
two groups, = 13.3, p < .001, with a greater proportion of females in the paper-and-pen group. 
Cronbach's alpha for the LSHS-R dehvered as an e-questionnaire was .81, and through tradi-
tional pen-and-paper administration it was .78. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. 
Scores on the LSHS-R for both modes of questionnaire administration were also comparable 
to the mean of 17.72 (SD = 7.49) found in undergraduate populations (by pen-and-paper admin-
istration) by Waters, Badcock, and Maybery (2003: N = 562). 
A one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was performed with LSHS-R total score as the 
depjendent variable, and mode of administration (e-questionnaire, pen-and-paper) as the indepen-
dent variable. Again, age and gender were entered as covariates. Levene's test of equality of error 
variances indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met, F{\, 937) = 3.66, 
n.s. Visual graphical inspection of LSHS-R score distribution suggested that they were not nor-
mally distributed, as did a Kolmorogov-Smimov test. There was no effect of mode of administra-
tion on LSHS-R score, f { l , 937) = .23, n.s. 
A one-way MANCOVA was then performed with the twelve individual LSHS-R items as 
dependent variables, and mode of administration as the independent variable. Levene's test of 
equality of error variances indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met 
for all individual LSHS-R item scores, except item #8. There was a significant multivariate effect 
of mode of administration on LSHS-R item score, F{12, 924) = 1.77, p < .05, ri^ = .02. This is 
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Table 2 
Means (standard deviations) of LSHS-R in both modes 
E-questionnaire Pen-and-jpaper 
Male Female Overall Male Female Overall 
LSHS-Rtotal 17.52 (8.23) 16.67 (8.12) 17.15(8.19) 16.46 (8.27) 18.18 (7.54) 17.46 (7.87) 
Item#l 2.57 (1.29) 2.73 (1.25) 2.64(1.28) 2.41 (1.31) 2.52(1.30) 2.47 (1.30) 
Item#2 1.19(1.25) .99(1.19) 1.10(1.23) 1.06(1.38) 1.07(1.24) 1.06(1.29) 
Item#3 2.01 (1.32) 1.56(1.29) 1.82 (1.33) 1.88(1.41) 2.18(1.31) 2.05 (1.36) 
Item#4 .67(1.00) .58(1.00) .63 (1.00) .66 (1.18) .65(1.09) .65(1.12) 
Item#5 2.73 (1.15) 2.54(1.24) 2.65(1.19) 2.58 (1.28) 2.83 (1.16) 2.73 (1.22) 
Item#6 2.17(1.29) 1.93(1.34) 2.06(1.31) 1.71 (1.34) 2.30(1.22) 2.06(1.29) 
Item#7 1.28 (1.26) 1.09(1.22) 1.20(1.25) .84(1.19) 1.24(1.27) 1.07(1.25) 
Iteni#8 .16 (.60) .19 (.67) .17 (.63) .33 (.95) .17 (.67) .23 (.79) 
Item#9 1.23 (1.39) 1.50(1.52) 1.35 (1.45) 1.53(1.47) 1.30(1.39) 1.39(1.42) 
Item#10 1.04 (1.20) 1.18(1.28) 1.10(1.23) .91 (1.20) 1.47(1.35) 1.23 (1.32) 
Item#ll 1.89(1.26) 1.89(1.29) 1.89 (1.28) 2.00(1.27) 1.89(1.26) 1.93 (1.26) 
Item#12 .52(1.01) .44 (.96) .49 (.99) .50 (1.07) .51 (1.05) .51 (1.06) 
Note. LSHS-R = Revised Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale. 
classified as a small effect by Cohen's (1977) criteria. Follow-up univariate tests were performed 
with a Bonferroni correction, a' = .004 (.05/12). None of the univariate tests were significant. This 
was taken as evidence that the mean LSHS-R scores, both in total, and at item level, did not differ 
between the two modes of administration. 
3.2. Factor structure comparisons 
3.2.1. PIQ 
No previous studies have investigated the factor structure of the PIQ, and hence such methods 
have not yet been utilized to assess its psychometric properties. Initial analysis was performed on 
the pen-and-paper PIQ data set using exploratory factor analysis with principal components anal-
ysis. Inspection of the scree-plot of the eigenvalues (Cattell, 1966) suggested a one-factor solution. 
As the first two eigenvalues were 5.17 and .94, this conclusion was consistent with the number of 
factors to extract by both Kaiser's (1960) rule and, more importantly, parallel analysis. All items 
loaded (>.4) onto this factor, however, item 7 ('Some people try to steal my ideas and take credit 
for them') had a low communahty of .27. 
A confirmatory factor analysis (CPA) was performed using AMOS 6.0 to establish the fit of a 
one-factor solution to the PIQ for the pen-and-paper group. As noted in Section 3.1.2, scores on 
the PIQ deviated significantly from normality. The most common method used to estunate CPA 
model fit, maximum likelihood (ML) estimation, has been found to become increasingly impaired 
as non-normality increases (Curran, West, & Finch, 1996). With non-normal data ML typically 
leads to an increased chi-squared statistic, and is likely to lead to the rejection of accurate models 
(Ciuran et al., 1996). In response to this problem. Yuan and Bentler (1999) have developed an F 
statistic (JFYB) which is a modification of the asymptotically distribution free (ADF) estimation 
method. This has been shown to perform well with both non-normal data and sample sizes as 
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low as 90 (Yuan & Ben tier, 1999) and has hence become a recommended niethod for analysing 
non-normal data (e.g., Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). F Y B was hence utilized to assess model 
significance. 
The one-factor model of the PIQ was found be a poor fit to the pen-and-paper data, F Y B (35, 
113)= 1.88, p<.05, C F I = .93, RMSEA = . l l . Modification indices (MI) indicated that 
improvement in the model could be achieved if the errors of items 8, 9, and 10 were allowed to 
be correlated. This indicated redundancy in two of these items. Items 9 and 10 were hence re-
moved from the scale, with item 8 ('I sometimes feel I am being persecuted in some way') being 
retained. MI also indicated that the removal of item 7 would improve the model, and given its low 
communahty reported above, this was also removed. The remaining seven-item PIQ (with items 
1,2,3,4,5,6,8) was subject to CFA. This indicated a good fit to the data, FYB(35, 113) = 2.12, n.s., 
CFI = .97, RMSEA = .08. The revised seven-item PIQ (PIQ-7) was hence seen to be a preferable 
psychometric tool to the original PIQ. The PIQ-7 had a Cronbach's a = .88 for the paper-and-pen 
sample, and a = .84 for the e-questionnaire sample. 
Mode invariance of PIQ-7 factor structure was examined using a series of model comparisons 
between baseline, and increasingly constrained, models (Table 3). A non-significant change in 
model fit between models indicates that invariance exists on the new constraint (Byrne, 1998). Be-
fore multi-group analyses were performed, fit of the one-factor solution of the PIQ-7, derived 
from the pen-and-paper group, was examined for the e-questionnaire group. A good fit was found 
(see Table 3). 
Nested multi-group CPAs were then performed (see Table 3). In the baseline model (Model A), 
the validity of the one-factor structure of the PIQ-7 across the pen-and-paper and e-questionnaire 
groups was assessed. A good fit was found for this model. In Model B, factor variance was con-
strained to be equal. There was no significant difference in the goodness of fit between Model A 
and Model B, suggesting that the factor variance was equivalent between the two groups. In Mod-
el C, factor loadings, as well as factor variance, were constrained to be equal. The addition of this 
constraint did not lead to a significant change in the goodness of fit of the model. It was hence 
concluded that the factor structure of the PIQ-7 did not differ between the pen-and-paper and 
e-questionnaire administered groups. 
When the analyses performed in Section 3.1.1 examining mean scores for mode effects on the 
PIQ were performed for the PIQ-7, again no mode effect was seen on either PIQ-7 total score, 
or at an item-level analysis. 
Table 3 
CFA model Fit statistics for the FIQ-7 
Model df P Mf AFYB P CFI GH RMSEA 
Pen-and-paper group 14 2.12 n.s. - - - .97 .96 .08 
Online group 14 1.37 n.s. - - — .98 .96 .06 
Model 
A (baseline) 28 1.59 p<m - - .97 .96 .05 
B (variances) 29 1.68 1 .09 n.s. .97 .96 .05 
C (variances and loadings) 35 1.77 p<.0\ 6 .09 n.s. .96 .95 .06 
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Table 4 
Confinnatory factor analyses of LSHS-R factor structure 
Factor structure Pen-and-paper Internet 
df ^ Y B CFI RMSEA df ^ Y B CFI RMSEA 
One-factor 54 1.53* .81 .08 54 4.30" .62 .08 
Aleman et al. (2001) 53 21.53** .00 .39 53 41.57" .00 .28 
Waters et al. (2003) 52 4.56** .17 .17 52 14.75" .00 .16 
2-factor (present study) 53 1.56* .81 .08 53 4.28 .63 .08 
' p < .05. 
p<m. 
3.2.2, LSHS-R 
The only study of the factor structure of the LSHS-R in its original English form with a non-
clinical population (JV = 562; Waters et al., 2003), and hence comparable to the present study, 
concluded that this instrument had a three-factor solution. This replicated the number of factors 
found by Aleman, NieUwenstein, Bocker, and De Haan (2001) who examined the factor structure 
of a Dutch translation of the LSHS-R in a non-clinical population. However, the items that these 
two studies found to load onto these factors differed, as did the meaning of the factors themselves. 
Before mode effects of the LSHS-R factor structure could be examined it hence needed to be 
shown which of Waters et al.'s and Aleman et al's factor structures best fitted om: data. CPAs 
were performed on our paper-and-pen group data for a basic one-factor solution, and the 
three-factor structures of Aleman et al. and Waters et al. This analysis is shown in Table 4. None 
of these factor structures was found to be a good fit to our paper-and-pen group data. As an 
exploratory exercise it was also examined if any of these factor structures fitted our e-question-
naire data. They did not (Table 4), 
We hence performed exploratory factor analysis based on our paper-and-pen sample. Parallel 
analysis indicated that the extraction of 2-factors was appropriate. The only items to load onto 
the second factor were items 8 and 12, relating to experiencing the voice of the Devil and God 
respectively. A CPA was performed on the paper-and-pen data based on this two-factor structure. 
As indicated in Table 4, this model was a poor fit to the data. It was hence concluded that it was 
not meaningful to examine mode effects on factor structure as no structure could be estabhshed 
upon which any such comparison coiJd be made. 
4. DKOKsion 
The present study set out to investigate whether the administration of questionnaires measuring 
psychopathology in healthy participants via either e-questionnaires or traditional pen-and-paper 
methods led to significantly different patterns of response. No mode effect was found for the PIQ 
either on PIQ total score or through analyses of individual PIQ item scores. Through the use of 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analytic techniques with the pen-and-paper group, the origi-
nal ten-item PIQ was revised into a more parsimonious seven-item form (PlQ-7). This revised 
PIQ-7 showed satisfactory internal reliability in both modes of administration. In parallel with 
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our findings for the original PIQ, the PIQ-7 did not demonstrate a mode effect either in total or at 
item level. The one-factor structure of the PIQ-7 was found to be a good fit to both the pen-and-
paper and e-questionnaire group data. This factor structure was also found to be mode invariant, 
not differing significantly between the pen-and-paper group and the e-questionnaire group when 
factor variance and loading was constrained. We hence conclude that there is no evidence of a 
mode effect for the PIQ-7. 
There was no mode effect for LSHS-R total score. A significant multivariate effect was found 
when item level analysis was performed; however follow-up univariate tests indicated that none of 
the LSHS-R items showed a mode effect. No factor structure could be found that was a good fit to 
the LSHS-R, and hence factor structure mode invariance could not be assessed. The LSHS-R 
showed satisfactory internal reliability in both modes of administration. 
We conclude that the present study provides no evidence that the administration of traditional 
measures of psychopathology via e-qUestionnaire is an unreliable method of data collection in the 
healthy population. The present study has also higWighted a nimiber of psychometric properties 
of the PIQ and LSHS-R. We have shown the original ten-item version of the PIQ (McKay et al., 
2006) may be refined into a more parsimonious seven-item version, the PIQ-7. However, it re-
mains for future research to assess other psychometric properties of this tool (such as test-
retest vaUdity). The present study has also Weighted problems in establishing a reliable factor 
structure for the LSHS-R. This suggests that if research requires measurement of separate aspects 
of sub-clinical hallucination proneness the development of dedicated instruments may be 
required. 
A number of potential caveats need to be examined in regard to these conclusions. Firstly, the 
study was not a repeated-measures design. Although age and gender were controlled for, this still 
leaves the possibility that other differences between the groups who completed the e-question-
naires and the paper-and-pen versions could have obscured any effects of mode of administration. 
However, as convenience samples from similar demographics were used for each group, there is 
no reason to believe that this alone could account for our findings. In addition, we note that the 
use of a repeated-measures design to investigate this problem would introduce the potential con-
found of administering the two versions of the instruments at different time-points, leading to the 
risk of conflating test-retest differences in scores with any evidence for a mode effect. Secondly, 
while it is possible that individual participants may have completed the e-questionnaires more 
than once, as no incentive was offered for participation it appears highly unlikely that this would 
have occurred. 
In simunary, with their ability to produce inexpensive, complete, easily transcribed data, e-
questioimaires are likely to prove an efficient tool for data collection in the future. It is however, 
worth considering if this conclusion is likely to be generalizable to populations with clinically 
relevant psychopathology. Such populations are likely to have fewer years of formal education 
than the healthy population (e.g., Sumich, Chitnis, & Fannon, 2002) and correspondingly less 
experience of information technologies. These differences in background, in conjunction with 
clinically relevant delusional ideation, might affect such individuals' perception of the anonymity 
and privacy (or lack thereof) of e-questionnaires. Any study proposing to utilize e-question-
naires in samples with clinically relevant psychopathology (such as patients with schizophrenia 
in an out-patient setting) would hence be advised first to investigate the presence of such mode 
effects. 
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Causes of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs), the experience of perceiving speech without corresponding 
external stimulation (Stephane, Barton, & Boutros, 2001), are still not well understood. Any theoiy claiming to offer an 
explanation of AVHs must be able to explain why a voice is heard in the absence of an external stimulus. In addition, 
any such account must explain why such a voice is experienced as generated or authored by an individual other than 
one's own self. A complete theory of AVHs must further be able to account for key features of the phenomenology of 
the experience. While the phenomenology of AVHs varies widely between different voice-hearers, broad themes can be 
extracted. One issue concerns the personal identity of the voice heard. While 28% of voice-hearers in a sample 
interviewed by Leudar, Thomas, McNally, and Glinski (1997) reported hearing only incognito voices, most (64%) 
reported hearing a voice which they could clearly identify as being that of a femily member or acquaintance. Others, 
notably only those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, reported hearing voices belonging to public figures. 
Surveys of the numbers of different voices heard by voice-hearers have found an average of 2-3 voices (Leudar 
et a!., 1997; Nayani & David, 1996). Ninety-six percent of voice-hearers in Leudar et al.'s (1997) sample reported 
being the target of the voice, which spoke to them rather than addressing another voice or anodier person. This 
highlights the fact that issues of the content and pragmatics of voices must also be addressed by a complete theory. 
Voices can attempt to perform a wide range of fimctions, including advising on possible actions, requesting specific 
actions, and inhibiting actions. However, AVHs most commonly take the form of commands, for example, 'Get the 
milk' or 'Go to the hospital' (Nayani & David, 1996). These command AVHs were reported by 84% of voice-hearers in 
Nayani and David's phenomenological survey and ^pear common in the autobiographical literature too. For example, 
North (1990) recalls how, during the period of her life when she was diagnosed with schizophrenia, she heard distinct 
voices issuing commands such as, 'Be good*, 'Do bad', 'Stand up', and 'Sit down' (p. 60). 
In summary, any satisfactory account of AVHs must be able to explain the following aspects of the experience: 
(1) why the AVH-hearer experiences a voice in the absence of any external stimulus; (2) why this voice is experienced 
as generated/authored by an individual other than one's own self; (3) why the voice is often perceived as having person-
specific (e.g., acoustic) properties, distinct bova one's own; and (4) why AVHs have characteristic contents and 
pragmatics, particularly their tendency to appear as second-person assertive utterances (e.g., connmands). To date, no 
theory has been entirely successfiil in accounting for all of these aspects of the phenomenon, with the third and fourth 
criteria, in particular, rarely addressed. Our aim in this article is to present a theoretical firamework which, we suggest, is 
sufficiently broad to do justice to the rich and varied phenomenology of AVHs. In doing so, we attempt what Bentall 
(1990) recommends a scientific theory of hallucinations should do, namely, "explain the experiences of the hallucinator 
in terms of underlying cognitive mechanisms" (p. 83). 
In setting out our arguments, we will be drawing upon an assumption which has guided much thinking on AVHs, 
namely that they are a form of inner speech (Bentall, 2003; Bick & Kinsboume, 1987; Femyhough, 2004; Jones & 
Femyhough, in press; Leudar & Thomas, 2000; Maudsley, 1886; Seal, Aleman, & McGuire, 2004). A prima facie case 
for the involvement of iimer speech in AVHs concerns a basic commonality between the two kinds of experience, 
namely that both involve some fomi of internal verbal mentation, or 'voice in the head.' Furthermore, like inner speech, 
AVHs are often relevant to the voice-hearer's ongoing activities, and may attempt to comment on or regulate behavior 
(Leudar & Thomas, 2000). While other explanations of AVHs are possible (e.g., Hoffman & McGlashan, 1997; 
Lennox et al., 2000), the strong conceptual and empirical support for a relation between the two phenomena suggests 
that considering AVHs as a disorder of inner speech remains a fruitfiil line of enquiry. In this article, we propose that 
fiuther light may be shone on the puzzle of AVHs through a more careful investigation of the nature and developmental 
significance of inner speech. Our arguments will be informed by the claims of L. S V^gotsky (1934/1987) that inner 
speech can best be understood in terms of its being the endpoint of a developmental process. A guiding assumption, 
which we will argue is supported by empirical evidence from die study of children's speech, is that inner speech in 
healthy individuals is irreducibly dialogic in nature. We contend that AVHs result from an abnormality in the typical 
process of inner speech production, specifically the transition between condensed and expanded varieties of iiuier 
speech. These ideas require substantial unpacking and vnll now be more fully explicated. 
1. Neuroimaging of inner Speech and AVHs 
Those working within the cognitive neuropsychology tradition typically view experiences such as AVHs as being 
imderpinned by specific cognitive deficits or biases, which in tum must have neural instantiation. As remarked, many 
authors have proposed that the cognitive deficit involved in AVHs is a disorder of inner speech. Such a proposal is 
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supported by evidence that brain areas implicated in inner speech, such as the leA inferior frontal gyrus (including 
Broca's area) and the right temporal cortex (Huang, Carr, & Cao, 2001; Jones, in press; McGuire, Silbersweig, Murray, 
et al.. 1996) are activated during AVHs (McGuire, Shah, & Murray, 1993; Shergill et al., 2004; Shergill, Brammer, 
Williams, Murray, & McGuire, 2000). Although some have questioned whether the finding of inferior frontal gyrus 
activation during AVHs is an artifact of using a button-press to signal onset of AVHs during imaging (Hunter & Spence, 
2005), other studies which have not used a button-press to signal onset, but have instead asked post-imaging whether 
an AVH was experienced, have also shown inferior frontal gyrus activation in AVHs (Shergill, Brammer, et al., 2000). 
This said, several other imaging studies have failed to replicate the finding that inferior frontal gyrus activation is 
associated with the experience of AVHs (e.g., Lennox et al., 2000; Silbersweig et al., 1995). For the present we will 
make the working assimiption that the neural substrates underlying inner speech are implicated in the genesis of AVHs. 
We will return to offer an explanation for these seemingly contradictory findings about the involvement of the inferior 
frontal gyrus later in this article. 
Several specific proposals have been put forward within a cognitive neiunpsychological firamework to understand 
how atypical processing of inner speech may cause AVHs (Frith, Rees, & Friston, 1998; Jones & Femyhough, in press; 
Seal et al., 2004). At the base of many of these proposals is the neuropsychological mechanism originally proposed by 
Frith and Done (1988), in which faulty monitoring of iimer speech results in verbal thoughts not being recognized as 
one's own and being perceived instead as someone else's. The cognitive capacity responsible for monitoring inner 
speech is termed verbal self-monitoring (VSM). VSM has been proposed to operate through a corollary discharge 
system whereby discharges from the motor speech-producing areas in the fix)ntal lobes 'wam' the auditory cortex that 
self-produced speech is about to be produced by dampening its response (Creutzfeldt, Ojeman, & Lettich, 1989; Ford 
& Mathalon, 2005; Martikainen, Kaneko, & Hari, 2005). Such a system may signsil through the white matter tracts of 
the arcuate fasciculus which has pathways (among others) that originate in Broca's area and project to Wernicke's area 
(Hubl et al., 2004). 
VSM can also be construed as entailing the appraisal of what one has said in relation to what one intended to say 
(McGuire, Silbersweig, & Frith, 1996). McGuire et al. (1996) used a PET imaging study to attempt to pin down the 
brain regions involved in VSM, by experimentally manipulating auditory veibal feedback while participants read 
aloud, and hence inducing a disparity between what the participant expected to hear and what they actually heard. 
McGuire et al. concluded that the VSM system resides primarily in the lateral temporal cortex bilaterally. This cortical 
region has been shown to be differentially activated by dififerent tasks involving elicited verbal mentation (McGuire, 
Silbersweig, Murray, et al., 1996). Whereas silent reading does not activate this region, it is activated by participants' 
imagining speech in another person's voice (Shergill et al., 2001). While it seems plausible that generating verbal 
mentation in one's own voice will be a relatively automatic process, mentally imitating another voice pnesumably 
requires internal inspection of this imagined speech (necessary to assess whether the voice has the prosody, tone, pitch, 
and rhythms of the voice it is intended to be; McGuire, Silbersweig, Murray, et al., 1996), placing high demands on the 
VSM system. Greater demands of mentally imitating another voice are consistent with healthy participants rating such 
a task as subjectively more difficult than silent articulation (Shergill et al., 2001). The implication of the lateral temporal 
cortex in VSM accords with findings that the temporal lobe is associated with speech perception (Wise et al., 1991; 
Zatotre, Evans, Meyer, & Gjedde. 1992) and the phonological processing of heard words (Demonet et al., 1992). 
Furthermore, patients with left temporal lesions have been found to have impairments in imagining others speak 
(Zatorre & Haplem, 1993). 
In addition to imaging studies, other techniques, such as EEG studies (e.g.. Ford & Mathalon, 2005), have been 
employed to examine the neurophysiological signaling (corollary discharge) mechanisms involved in VSM. These 
techniques have also been applied to the study of individuals assumed to have a deficit in VSM, such as those who 
experience AVHs, with the result that a wide range of neuroimaging and neurophysiological smdies with normal and 
AVH-hearing populations (primarily those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia) have been published. In the first part of 
this article, we review these findings and evaluate their significance for any comprehensive theory of AVHs. 
/. 1. Neuroimaging of silent articulation 
A number of neuroimaging studies have been performed to investigate the neural correlates of silent articulation in 
healthy participants (e.g., Bullmore et al., 2000; Friedman et al., 1998; McGuire, Silbersweig, Murray, et al., 1996; 
Shergill et al., 2001). In Shergill et al.'s (2001) fMRI study, participants listened to single words, presented via 
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headphones, read out by a neutral voice at 3 s intervals. In the baseline condition subjects were simply instructed to 
listen to each word carefully. In what was termed the Inner Speech condition, participants were asked silently to 
complete sentences of the form ' I like x' or ' I like being using the presented word. Functional MRI scans of brain 
activation during the Inner Speech condition were compared to baseline, and the Iimer Speech condition was found to 
be associated wath left-sided activation, in Broca's area (BA 44), Wernicke's area (BA 22), the SMA (BA 6), and the 
insula as well as the superior parietal lobe (BA 7) and right posterior cerebellar cortex. These findings accord with those 
of an earlier fMRI smdy by Bullmore et al. (2000), which found similar neural regions to be specifically associated with 
inner speech. In this experiment, participants were presented with a word, such as 'goat', during scanning, and then had 
to decide whether it was a living or nonliving object. This decision then had to be articulated in inner speech. However, 
rather than just examining the neural correlates of this iimer speech compared to a control condition (fixating on a blank 
screen), Bullmore et al. (2000) attempted to link the activation they found in specific neural regions to the function that 
it was associated with. This led them to propose that activation in a series of connections from the prefrontal cortex to 
the left inferior frontal gyrus/Broca's area (BA 44, 45) via the SMA (BA 6) was responsible for subvocal planning and 
articulation. Inferior parietal lobule (BA 39,40) activation extending to the precuneus (BA 7) and the superior temporal 
gyrus (BA 21) was presumed to represent the monitoring of the subvocal output of Broca's area. 
The question of whether AVH-hearers have different patterns of brain activation during silent articulation as 
compared to healthy controls was first broached by McGuire et al. (1995). The psychiatric sample in this study 
consisted of patients diagnosed with schizophrenia who had consistently experienced AVHs during their illness, but 
who were in remission and had low levels of psychotic symptoms at the time of testing. PET scans were performed on 
both healthy participants and these remitting AVH-heareis as they silendy read single words presented on a visual 
display imit. Analysis of the results found no differences in the areas activated by AVH-hearers and controls during 
silent articulatioii. This result was replicated by Shergill, Bullmore, Simmons, Murray, and McGuire (2000), using the 
same paradigm as Shergill et al. (2001) described above. In one part of Shergill, Bullmore, et al.'s (2000) study, the 
presented words were used to complete sentences such as ' I like x\ or ' I like being which were silentiy articulated 
by the participants. fMRI imaging was used to compare the neural correlates of this silent articulation between healthy 
controls and AVH-hearers. It was found that patients showed no differences to controls in neurological activation when 
performing this task. 
Such findings suggest that silent recitation of sentences is not abnormal in AVH-hearers in remission. Because silent 
articulation is believed to result in low levels of activation of the VSM system (McGuire, Silbersweig, Murray, et al., 
1996), this suggests that tasks involving low levels of VSM are not performed abnormally by AVH-hearers. However, 
Shergill et aL (2003) hypothesized that, i f the VSM load involved in silent articulation could be increased, then 
differences would be found between AVH-hearers and healthy controls. Accordingly, Shergiil et al. (2003) asked 
participants to covertly articulate the word 'rest' either once every 4 s (low-VSM condition) or once every second 
(high-VSM condition). It was found that lateral temporal cortex activation (signifying higher levels of VSM) increased 
vrith the faster rate of covert generation in healthy participants. In contrast, in patients with a history of AVHs (but, at 
the time of study, iii clinical remission) less activation was shown in the right (but not left) superior temporal gyrus, the 
right parahippocampal gyrus, and the right cerebellar cortex when compared to controls performing the faster rate of 
covert generation. 
In conclusion, evidence suggests that neural correlates of iimer speech during silent recitation of sentences are not 
abnormal in AVH-hearers in remission. Because silent articulation is thought to involve low levels of activation of the 
VSM system (McGuire, Silbersweig, Mturay, et al., 1996), it seems likely that any neural differences between AVH-
hearers and healthy controls will remain obscured unless methods other than low-VSM tasks are employed. 
1.2. Neuroimaging of.first-, second-, and third-person inner speech: auditory verbal imagery 
In addition to studies of silent articulation of sentences, a number of smdies have investigated the neural correlates 
of iimer speech in the form of imagined speech, termed auditory verbal imagery (AVI). Such a study was performed by 
Shergill et al. (2001) with healthy participants, using the paradigm of completing sentences such as ' I like x', or ' I like 
being y', as outiined above. However, in addition to silentiy articulating such sentences, participants were also asked to 
imagine either the sentence being spoken in their own voice (first-person AVI), or sentences of the form 'You like x\ 
being spoken to them (second-person AVI), or sentences of the form 'He likes x\ as i f spoken about them (third-person 
AVI). When imagining the sentences being spoken to them or about them, participants were instructed to imagine the 
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voice as being the same voice that spoke the words that were played to them. Shergill et al.'s (2001) fMRI analysis 
found that auditory verbal imagery in general, as indexed by the three imagery tasks combined, was associated with 
activation typically found in 'inner speech' tasks (left inferior frontal and parietal cortex and SMA). In addition, 
activation was seen in the left precentral and superior temporal gyri, and the right homologues of all these areas. The 
involvement of the right hemisphere homologues was presumed to occur due to retrieving and processing the prosody 
of the imagined other's speech. 
McGuire et al. (1995) were the first to address the question whether, when producing auditory verbal imagery, 
patients with schizophrenia who have experienced AVHs have a different pattern of activation to healthy controls. 
Their study required participants to listen to recorded single words and then to imagine sentences of the form 'You are 
x', or 'You are a;;', being spoken to them by the voice on the recording (this study only addressed second-person AVI). 
Using the results of their PET scans, it was found that AVH-hearers in remission showed reduced activation in the left 
middle temporal gyrus (MTG), the rostral SMA, and the left medial prefi-ontal cortex compared to healthy controls. It 
was also found that AVH-hearers in remission, compared to patients with schizophrenia who did not experience AVHs, 
showed reduced activation in the left MTG, the rostral SMA, and a posterior region spanning primary and secondary 
visual areas and the adjacent cerebellar cortex. 
A difference in neural activation during AVI between patients with schizophrenia who had experienced AVHs and 
healthy controls was also found by Shergill, BuUmore, et al. (2000). As reviewed above, participants were asked 
silently to articulate sentences of the form ' I like x\ or ' I like being >>', and additionally to generate first-, second-, and 
third-person AVI. Fimctional MRI analysis of the AVI conditions, using an activation map for all three types of AVI 
combined, showed differences between patients with schizophrenia who had heard voices (but who were in remission) 
and healthy controls. Specifically, when AVH-hearers in remission imagined others speaking to them, there was less 
activation in the posterior cerebellimi, hippocan^ial complex, and lenticular nuclei bilaterally, and also the right 
thalamus, middle and superior temporal gyri, and left nucleus accumbens. 
In conclusion, evidence suggests that mechanisms imderlying the ability to silently imagine a voice speaking are 
atypical in AVH-hearers in remission. Because imagining others speak is thought to be associated with high levels of 
activation of the VSM system (McGuire, Silbersweig, Murray, et al., 1996; Shergill etal, 2001), these conclusions are 
consistent with the findings of Shergill et al. (2003) that neural activation on tasks involving high levels of VSM (in this 
instance, producing iimer speech at a high rate) may be abnormal in AVH-hearers in remission. 
7.3. Event-related potential studies of silent articulation 
Whereas scanning techniques such as PET and fMRI are able to provide indirect evidence that VSM may be atypical in 
individuals afiFected by AVHs, studies using event-related potentials (ERPs) are able more directly to test this hypothesis. 
As noted earlier, the VSM system is thought to work throu^ a corollary discharge system whereby discharges fiom the 
motor speech-producing areas in the firontal lobes 'warn' the auditory cortex that self-produced speech is about to be 
produced (Creutzfeldt et al., 1989). This is postulated to work through the motor speech-producing areas' corollary 
discharge deactivating the auditory cortex when self-produced speech is about to occur (Ford & Mathalon, 2005). 
Ford et al. have used ERPs to study the activation of such areas during inner speech in patients diagnosed witii 
schizophrenia (Ford et al., 2001). In this experiment, N l ERPs were used as a measure of engagement of the auditory 
cortex diuing iimer speech. N l is generated by the superior temporal gyrus of the auditory cortex in response to 
auditory stimuli of all kinds (ibid). Participants were asked to repeat typical halluciiiatoiy statements (e.g., 'That was 
really stupid') silently to themselves for 30 s, while brief auditory stimuli were presented via headphones. The 
instruction to participants to use silent articulation in this study would presumably have entailed a low load on the VSM 
system (as opposed to the high load that would have resulted ftom instructions to use AVI). It was foimd that, in healthy 
participants, the N l response to brief auditory soimds during 'inner speech' (construed here as repeating silently the 
hallucinatory type statements) decreased significantly as compared to a baseline condition involving silently fixatiiig 
on a point. In contrast, patients with schizophrenia showed no significant difference in N l response between these two 
conditions. Ford et al. interpreted this to show that, whereas healthy individuals dampen their auditory cortex response 
during self-produced speech, as i f to warn the auditory cortex that the sound is internally produced, patients with 
schizophrenia do not. As a consequence this may lead patients with schizophrenia to experience their own self-
produced speech as having an external source. However, Ford et al. failed to find a significant correlation between 
levels of hallucinations (as per SAPS summary score for hallucinations) and the N l effect (baseline less 'inner speech'). 
265 
Appendix B 
S.R. Jones, C. Femyhough / Clinical Psychology Review 27 (2007) 140-154 145 
suggesting that other fectors must be causally involved in AVHs beyond damping of the auditory cortex response 
during the silent recitation of sentences. 
No electrophysiological studies have been performed to examine directly whether corollary discharge is abnormal in 
AVH-hearers during high-VSM iimer speech tasks. One stiady that used overt speech rather than inner speech attempted 
to examine whether corollary discharge was abnormal in AVH-hearing patients with schizophrenia (Ford & Mathalon, 
2005, Section 6). These researchers assessed the involvement of frontal lobe speech production areas with speech 
reception areas in the temporal lobe, using measures of BEG coherence (frontal-temporal gamma synchronjr). In the 
Talking condition participants uttered aloud the syllable [a] every 1-2 s. They then heard playback of their speech 
through earphones at various degrees of distortion (no distortion, half a semitone lower, and a fiill semitone lower). In 
the Listening condition, they did not speak but simply heard undistorted pre-recorded sounds fix)m the Talking 
condition. The difference in coherence between the Talking and Listening conditions (a measure of the 
interdependence of the frontal and temporal lobes during talking), although different in participants with schizophrenia 
when compared to normal controls, did not correlate with hallucination severity (Ford & Mathalon, 2005, Section 8). 
Furthermore, the difference in coherence between the distorted and undistorted Talking conditions also did not 
correlate with hallucination severity. However, this study used overt speech rather than iimer speech, and there is 
persuasive neuroimaging evidence that different neural regions (aside from motor areas) are activated in covert and 
covert speech (Huang et al., 2001; Soltysik & Hyde, 2006). As Ford and Mathalon (2005) note, "talking may be a poor 
proxy for thoughts and voices" (p. 188). 
From this series of experiments Ford and Mathalon (2005) concluded that "we have not been able to demonstiiate a 
clear relationship between neurobiological indicators of dysfunctional corollary discharge and the extent to which a 
patient currently reports experiencing auditory verbal hallucinations" (p. 187). Thus, ERP smdies provide good 
evidence that low-VSM inner speech tasks do not q)pear to result in differential neural activation specific to the 
experience of AVHs. It still remains for ERP studies to examine nemophysiological differences between AVH-hearers 
and controls when performing high-VSM inner speech tasks such as AVI. We would predict that, on the basis of the 
neuroimaging findings reviewed above, hallucination severity would correlate with the N l effect when the participants 
are imagining others speak. 
1.4. Summing up 
The neuroimaging and neiuophysiological findings reviewed above provide evidence that the neural correlates of 
inner speech, conceptualized as the silent articulation of sentences, are not fimdamentally different in AVH-hearers in 
remission compared to healthy controls. The neuroimaging studies also show that, when one's own self or others are 
imagined talking in timer speech, there is a neural difference between AVH-hearers in remission Mid healthy controls 
without AVHs. As noted above, the silent articulation of sentences places a low load on the VSM system, whereas 
repeating single words at an increased pace or imagining a sentence being spoken place a high load on the VSM 
system. This leads to the conclusion that predisposition to AVHs is associated with abnormal neurological activation 
during tasks that involve high-VSM loads. 
An important caveat to make at this point is that the neuroimaging evidence showing abnormal neurological 
activation in remitting AVH-hearers during high-VSM inner speech tasks does not necessarily translate into different 
patterns of judgment about the authorship of externally heard voices. Using a well-established paradigm (Johns, Gregg, 
\^thelingum, & McGuire, 2003), Johns, Gregg, Allen, and McGuire (2006) examined such judgments in patients with 
schizophrenia with and without current AVHs. Participants spoke into a microphone and then had the sound played 
back to them over headphones in real time. The voice they heard played back to them could be their own voice, their 
own distorted voice, another person's voice (saying the same word), or another person's distorted voice. The study 
foimd that patients who had previously experienced AVHs, but who were currentiy hallucination-free, did not 
misattribute the source of the spoken voice any more than healthy controls. Thus, although the neurological activation 
on high-VSM tasks differs between such patients compa:red to healthy controls, this does not appear to result in a 
detectable difference in tasks that require judgments about the authorship of heard voices. In contrast, Johns et al. 
(2006) foimd that patients currentiy experiencing regular AVHs were more likely (compared both to controls and to 
remitting AVH-hearers) to misattribute the sovirce of the heard voices. 
There are at least two possible ways of accounting for this apparent discrepancy between the neural correlates findings 
and the work of Johns et al. (2006) on judgments of voice authorship. First, it may be that both remitting and current AVH-
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hearers show the same pattems of activation on high-VSM tasks, but that the deviation from typical activation on such 
tasks is greater in current AVH-hearers. The second possibility is that other factors, coupled v^th this basic neurological 
abnormality on high-VSM tasks, distinguish current fcom remitting AVH-hearers. With regard to the first possibility, one 
point that can immediately be made is that equivalents to the neuroimaging studies reviewed above have not yet been 
performed with current (as opposed to remitting) AVH-hearers. OAer methodologies, such as Ford and Mathalon's (2005) 
use of neurophysiological indicators on an overt (rather than inner) speech task, were not able to demonstrate a relation 
between the neural activation of the VSM system (dysfunctional corollary discharge) and the extent to which a patient 
currentiy reports experiencing AVHs. This suggests that it is not simply that current AVH-hearers show greater deviation 
from typical pattems of respome to high-VSM tasks compared to AVH-hearers in remission. 
At present, the balance of evidence seems to suggest that, i f impairment in VSM does play a role in causing AVHs, it 
must do so in conjunction with other factors. One potential factor is the activation level of the right anterior cingulate 
gyrus, previously found to be implicated in cognitive tasks involving mental effort (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000) 
including monitoring the predicted consequences of actions (Ito, Stuphom, Brown, & Schall, 2003) and the regulation 
of consciously detected conflicts (Dehaene et al., 2003). Anterior cingulate activity has been found to correlate with 
measures of AVHs (Silbersweig et al., 1995), and to be activated dtmng AVHs (Lennox, Bert, Park, Jones, & Morris, 
1999; Shergill, Brammer, et al., 2000). In addition, Hubl et al. (2004) found that white matter left cingulate bundle 
activation differentiated between auditory hallucinators and non-hallucinators. The anterior cingulate gyrus would 
therefore appear to be a plausible candidate for a factor that interacts with VSM deficits in the genesis of full-blown 
AVHs. 
In sum, research on the netiral correlates of AVHs supports the contention that VSM of inner speech is atypical in 
AVH-hearers, but that this difference only obtains on tasks involving high-VSM demands, such as auditory verbal 
imagery (AVI). In conti^t, paradigms involving low-VSM demands, such as silent articulation, dp not distinguish 
(neurologically, at least) AVH-hearers frova. healthy controls. And yet it is precisely these paradigms that are commonly 
held to be the best experimental analogues of normal inner speech (e.g., McGuire et al., 1995). This leads us to a 
conundrrun: i f we wish to account for the genesis of AVHs in terms of neurally instantiated VSM deficits leading to the 
impaired self-monitoring of inner speech, this cannot involve the kinds of verbal mentation (low-VSM tasks such as 
silent articulation) that are typically held to be the best experimental approximations to typical iimer speech. 
Specifically, it needs to be explained why AVH-hearers might be performing verbal mentation in inner speech 
associated with high levels of VSM. Why, during typical iimer speech, should they be performing tasks utilizing the 
same cognitive resources that are involved with imagining people speak? We suggest that this conundrum can be 
resolved through a careful examination of the nature, forms, and developmental significance of iimer speech. 
2. What is this thing called inner speech? 
We propose that at least some of the apparent contradictions that have emerged from empirical research on inner 
speech stem from two related sets of unexamined assumptions: First, about what inner speech is, and second, about 
how it can be elicited artificially. In this section, we examine these assumptions in light of contemporary empirical and 
theoretical work on inner speech and its developmental precursors. 
Many neuroimaging studies of AVHs have drawn on a conception of inner speech which derives from Levine, 
Calvanio, and Popovics (1982). In a p^)er examining the possibility of language in the absence of inner speech, Levine 
et al. defined inner speech as the "subjective phenomenon of talking to oneself, of developing an auditoiy-articulatory 
image of speech without uttering a sound" (p. 391). Some studies explicitly refer to this definition (e.g. Evans, 
McGuire, & David, 2000), while others assume it implicitly by holding the silent articulation of sentences to represent 
inner speech (e.g. Shergill et al., 2001). Other studies have initially defined inner speech as "thinking in words" 
(McGuire et al., 1995, p. 596), while going on to operationalize inner speech for experimental puiposes as the subvocal 
recitation of predefined sentences. There has been a certain degree of consistency in the equation of inner speech with 
subvocal recitation. By these definitions, patients and controls are said to be performing inner speech when they 
mentally recite sentences such as "You are stupid" (McGuire et al., 1995, p. 597). 
Such a subvocal rehearsal/recitation conception of inner speech has a clear historical foundation in (Baddeley and 
Hitch's, 1974) model of working memory (Baddeley, 1986). This model proposed the existence of an articulatory loop 
consisting of a phonological store, capable of holding speech-based information, and an articulatory control process. In 
Baddeley and Hitch's model, the articulatory loop is responsible for the short-term maintenance of up to two seconds' 
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worth of verbal information in working memory. It thus cpnesponds to the part of the phonological information-processing 
system that Baddeley (1986) described as the "voice in the head", or inner speech. The large body of empirical support for 
Baddeley and Hitch's working memory model (e.g., Baddeley, 2001) may be one reason why the subvocal rehearsal/ 
recitation conception of iimer speech has influenced experimental attempts to elicit inner speech in neuroimaging studies. 
A second, related reason is that the elicitation methodologies that derive fiom this conception are relatively straightforward 
and thus appropriate for the considerable practical constraints associated with neuroimaging studies. 
Baddeley and Hitch's conception of inner speech as resulting fi-om activation of the articulatory loop is not, 
however, the only conception of inner speech to have proved valuable to cognitive scientists. In Vygotsky's (1934/ 
1987) theory, inner speech rq)resents the endpoint of a developmental process in which external discourse gradually 
becomes internalized to form verbal thought. Generally speaking, Vygotsky's hypoflieses about the development of 
inner speech (and its semi-covert precursor, private speech) have been supported by empirical research (Berk, 1992; 
Winsler, 2004). Of particular interest for our purposes is the finding that private speech fi-equently reflects the dialogic 
structure of interpersonal verbal exchanges (e.g., Ramirez, 1992; Wertsch, 1980). 
Vygotsky's (1934/1987) ideas about inner speech form part of a broader theory of the social origins of higher mental 
processes. This theory is encapsulated in his well-known claim that every mental function appears twice in 
development: First on the interpsychological plane, as a function distributed between individuals, and second on the 
intrapsychological plane, as an internalized version of that previously external function (Vygotsky, 1931/1997). In the 
case of the developmental transition fi-om external speech to inner speech, this internalization can be seen at work, for 
example, in a mother and child solving a jigsaw puzzle. Initially, the puzzle-solving process will involve an external 
dialogue between mother and child, with the mother typically asking tiie child questions about which piece should be 
placed where, the child answering, and so on. Later on this dialogic pattern of exchange is internalized as inner speech 
(Femyhough, 2004). Mental dialogue is, therefore, an internal version of the interplay of perspectives that takes place 
between individuals on the external plane (Femyhough, 1996). 
For \^gotsky, internalization of previously external verbal activity was an essential component in children's 
developing self-regulation of behavior and cognition. Accordingly, studies of children's private speech have shown 
that it often contains utterances that have a self-directive fimction (Luria, 1961). The dialogic nature of private speech 
(and, by extensiorv, inner speech) guarantees that children become able to take the role of the questioner, advisor, and 
director in the regulation of their activity. As Vygotsky (1930-1935/1978) put it, the use of veibal mediation means that 
humans are able to "control their behavior fix>m the outside" (p. 40). 
Central to the "V^gotskian conception of inner speech is die assumption that, like its developmental precureor private 
speech, it will retain certain characteristics of the external discourse fi-om which it is derived. Several authors (e.g., 
Wertsch, 1980) have noted that one implication of V^gotsky's theory is that inner speech will have a dialogic structure. 
In arguing against a view of iimer speech as a homogeneous phenomenon, one of us (Femyhough, 2004; submitted for 
publication) has previously suggested that at least two distinct forms of dialogic inner speech might be predicted on the 
basis of'S^gotsky's theory. These are expanded inner speech, where the flow of verbal mentation retains the give-and-
take quality of external dialogue, and condensed inner speech, where the linguistic accoutrements of dialogue become 
jettisoned and inner speech becomes a process of "thinking in pure meanings" (Vygotsky, 1934/1987). 
Femyhough's (2004) four-stage model of the development of iimer speech is represented diagrammatically in 
Fig. 1. At Level 1 (external dialogue), the child and caregiver engage in verbally mediated reciprocal exchanges such as 
might arise in the collaborative solving of a jigsaw puzzle. At Level 2 (private speech), children conduct these 
dialogues in overt self-directed speech. This linguistic activity gradually becomes internalized, leading to the creation 
of expanded dialogic inner speech (Level 3). Finally, the syntactic and semantic abbreviation processes described by 
\Vgotsky effect its transformation into condensed dialogic inner speech (Level 4), corresponding to Vygotsky's stage 
of "thinking in pure meanings". 
This account entails that thinking retains the dialogic, semiotically mediated qualities of interpersonal discourse 
even when, phenomenologically speaking, it does not share the give-and-take character of external dialogue. To put it 
another way, the conversation that we have with ourselves does not cease when it ceases to be conducted in explicit, 
syntactically expanded questions and answers. One of the present authors (Femyhough, 1996, 2004, 2005, submitted 
for publication) has previously examined the implications of a dialogic view of the higher mental processes for our 
understanding of a range of different cognitive processes, including executive fimctioning and social understanding. As 
Carruthers (2002) notes, most members of the cognitive science community endorse a purely communicative 
conception of language, which sees language as an input-output system for central cognition, with thinking undertaken 
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Level 4: Condensed Inner Speech 
INTERNAL 
Level 3: Expanded Inner Speech 
EXTERNAL 
Level 2: Private Speech 
Level 1: External Dialogue 
Normal process of internalization 
' Re-expansion / rc-extemaliiation 
Fig. I. Femyhough's (2004) four-stage model of the developmrat of inner speech. 
in some other form of representation. For example, Fodor (1975) proposed that we think, not in natural language, but in 
what is commonly termed mentalese. At the other end of the spectrum exist views, such as those held by early 
behaviorists, which equate thought with inner speech, claiming thought to be merely speech without sound (e.g., 
Watson, 1920). Treading a midtile path between these two poles, a \^gotskian account of inner speech fits with 
cognitive conceptions of language which see it as having a constitutive role in cognition that goes beyond the 
straightforward communication of information (e.g., Carruthers, 2002). 'V^gotsky (1934/1987) proposed that thought 
and speech could be visualized as two intersecting circles. The overlapping region of thought and speech represents 
what may be termed verbal thought or inner speech. Such a conception allows that, while thought may occur in the 
medium of inner speech, nonetheless "[t]here is a large range of thinking that has no direct relationship to verbal 
thinking" (\^gotsky, 1934/1987, p. 115). This position is consistent with evidence of the need for verbal thought in 
some forms of cognition (Hermer-Vazquez, Spelke, & Katsnelson, 1999), as well as the possibility of thought without 
language (Weiskrantz, 1988). In line with this conclusion, an elegant neuroima^g experiment performed by Dehaene, 
Spelke, Pinel, Stanescu, and Tsivkih (1999) has demonstrated the involvement of language in performing exact 
mathematical calculations in one's head, but not in the performance of proximate arithmetic. We thus adopt a 
Vygotskian position that inner speech (bodi expanded and condensed versions) fomis a subset of human thought 
processes. 
We argue that Femyhough's (2004) extension of Vygotsky's conception of iimer speech has at least two important 
implications for our understanding of AVHs. First, the distinction between condensed and expanded inner speech 
allows us to imderstand the dynamic relation between AVHs, where inner speech is experienced with ite fiill 
complement of acoustic properties, and much of regular human mentation, where the acoustic properties of the voices 
in inner dialogue are less apparent In expanded inner dialogue, which we suggest forms the raw material of AVHs, 
human thought incorporates a multiplicity of internalized voices. I f such expanded dialogues do indeed form the raw 
material of AVHs, it is unsmprising that the existing thoughts and ideas of voice-hearers may come to be reflected in 
part or much of the content of the AVHs (Leudar & Thomas, 2000). In terms of the neural correlates evidence discussed 
above, the dialogic conception of iimer speech consequently allows us to see how different forms of inner speech entail 
different levels of VSM demands. Specifically, conducting expanded inner dialogues will require high levels of VSM, 
while condensed inner speech (where the acoustic properties of inner speech are attenuated) does not make such 
demands on the VSM system. 
A second implication of this conception of inner speech is that it predicts the characteristic pragmatic qualities of 
AVHs. Specifically, it allows us to understand how AVHs fi-equently take the form of commands. As inner speech is 
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developmentally linked with the control of action (Luria, 1961; \^gotsky, 1934/1987), we should not be surprised that 
AVHs frequently have a similar regulatory quality. 
3. Neural correlates of inner dialogue: testing a Vygotskian model 
We turn now to the question of how the paradigms used to elicit inner speech in neuroimaging and neuro-
physiological studies relate to this alternative, dialogic conception of inner speech. Recall that the majority of such 
studies have elicited inner speech by asking participants to repeat sentences (such as ' I like swimming') subvocally. At 
first glance the resulting subvocal speech would appear closer in form to Level 3 (expanded) inner speech than Level 4 
(condensed) inner speech. Crucially, though, the dialogic quality of typical spontaneous inner speech is absent in such 
experimentally elicited utterances. I f our \^got5kian characterization of inner speech is accurate, we would have to 
conclude that the methods used for eliciting subvocal speech in typical neuroimaging studies do not lead to the 
generation of anything resembling naturally occurring spontaneous inner speech. 
Furthermore, \^gotsky's ideas about the semiotic mediation of higher mental processes entail that verbal mentation 
should continue even when inner speech loses its explicit linguistic form. Specifically, Femyhough's (2004) extension 
of Vygotsky's ideas on this issue suggest that, with the exception of episodes when inner speech is temporarily 
expanded to form Level 3 (expanded) inner speech, verbal mentation should consist of ongoing Level 4 (condensed) 
itmer speech. The implications of this for neuroimaging studies are, we suggest, profound. In a study such as that of 
Shergill et al. (2001), the neural correlates of inner speech are examined by comparing a baseline condition (subjects 
listening to single words presented at 3 s intervals) to a condition where they are silently articulating sentences. 
However, what such studies treat as a baseline condition is likely to involve ongoing condensed inner speech. The 
results of such studies would therefore appear to be contaminated by the persistence of a form of inner speech even into 
the baseline condition. 
The dialogic conception of inner speech has value, however, beyond pointing up possible methodological 
limitations of existing neural comelates studies. One of the present autiiors (Femyhough, 2004) has put forward a 
theory of AVHs that draws on V^gotskian ideas about the developniental significance of inner speech. According to 
this hypothesis, AVHs result from the temporary re-expansion of Level 4 (condensed) inner speech into Level 3 
(expanded) iimer speech, particularly under conditions of stress and cognitive challenge. Such movement between 
forms of irmer speech is held to be a typical feature of human mental life. In individuals who report AVHs, in contrast, 
the re-expansion of condensed inner speech interacts with pre-existing source monitoring and other cognitive biases to 
result in the expanded dialogue being experienced as involving an alien voice. Femyhough (2004) further proposed 
that such hallucinations in psychiatric patients may be shaped (in terms of their content and structure) by the experience 
of trauma. 
Femyhough (2004) suggested that the re-expansion model of AVHs could be tested (and distinguished from other 
possible hypotheses drawn from a Vygotskian account of inner speech) in four main ways. First, the re-expansion 
model entails that AVH-hearers should experience normal Level 4 (condensed) inner speech. To date, this issue has not 
been investigated enqjirically. Second, the re-expansion model would predict that AVH-hearers should not experience 
normal Level 3 (expanded) inner speech, as such speech would typically be experienced as having an alien quality. 
Again, this prediction awaits empirical examination. Third, the model would predict that AVHs would be associated 
with stress and cognitive challenge, a finding that receives support from a range of sources (e.g., Cooklin, Sturgeon, & 
Leff, 1983), Finally, the model holds that previously unaffected individuals should occasionally experience AVHs 
under conditions of very great stress, a prediction that is supported by reports of auditory hallucinations following 
bereavement and extreme stress (Balan et al., 1996: Reese, 1971). 
Much more empirical research needs to be done before the re-expansion model of AVHs can be properly evaluated. 
In the meantime, several resulting hypotheses about the neural correlates of iimer speech and AVHs can be assessed in 
light of the neuroimaging and neurophysiological evidence reviewed above. 
Hypothesis 1. Neural correlates of condensed inner speech in AVH-hearers will be identical to those in healthy 
controls. 
Femyhbugh's (2004) re-expansion model holds that AVH-hearers should experience normal condensed inner 
speech. The prediction can thus be made that the neural correlates of this speech should not differ ftom those observed 
in healthy controls. One way of making sense of this prediction is in terms of our earlier distinction between tasks 
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involving low and high levels of VSM demands. The attenuation of the acoustic characteristics of speech in Level 4 
(condensed) inner speech is, we suggest, likely to result in a reduced VSM load in inner speech of this kind. One would 
therefore expect to see Broca's area activation accompanied by only minor corresponding activation in the VSM 
system (i.e., bilaterally in the lateral temporal cortex) in both AVH-hearers and non-AVH-hearers. The testing of this 
hypothesis would require a task that elicits condensed inner speech, with no expanded (Level 3) component. Currently 
no ecologically valid procedures exist for examining condensed iimer speech, although the procedure employed by 
Ford et al. (2001) might be construed as offering an approximation to such a condition. Recall that, in Ford et al.'s 
baseline condition, participants had to fixate on a screen, while auditory stimuli (speech sounds, noises, etc.) were 
played to them. As Ford et al. themselves note, "spontaneous inner speech" (p. 1914) could occur during this baseline 
condition. From a Vygotskian perspective, we would expect condensed (Level 4) inner speech to be occurring during 
this part of the task. Thus, we would predict no N l activation differences between AVH-hearers and healthy controls 
during this condition. In line with our prediction. Ford et al. found that N l responses during the baseline condition, 
although being slightly (but not significantly) lower in patients than in controls, were not related to the presence of 
AVHs. 
Hypothesis 2. Neural correlates of inner speech in AVH-hearers will differ fi-om those of controls in tasks involving 
the re-expansion of condensed inner speech. 
The central proposal of the re-expansion model is that AVHs stem from the re-expansion of condensed inner speech. 
AVH-hearers are suggested to differ from their unaffected counterparts in their experience of Level 3, but not Level 4, 
inner speech. To date, no neural correlates studies have examined the transition between these forms of iimer speech. 
The ps^ igm that would lend itself most easily to being adapted to such an investigation is that of Bullmore et al. 
(2000). In this study, participants viewed a word on a screen, then had to articulate internally a semantic judgment about 
the stimulus. We speculate that the semantic judgment process might involve Level 4 (condensed) inner speech, with a 
transition to Level 3 (expanded) iimer speech during the subvocal articulation of the judgment. In Ime with our first 
hypothesis, we would predict that the neural activation of AVH-hearers would not differ from controls up to the point 
when condensed iimer speech stops and the conclusion becomes subvocally articulated. In contrast, the transition to 
Level 3 inner speech during the subvocal articulation of the semantic judgment should lead to observable differences 
between AVH-hearers and controls. In addition to typical patterns of activation associated with high-VSM tasks 
(corresponding here to the occurrence of Level 3 inner speech), one might also expect AVH-hearers to show greater 
levels of parietal cortex activation, representing the experience of alienness (Spence et al., 1997). Time-sequenced 
fMRI studies might be best placed to detect any such group differences in neural correlates of inner speech in the 
traonsition between Level 3 and Level 4 inner speech. 
Hypothesb 3. Neural correlates of elicited expanded inner speech should differ between AVH-hearers and controls. 
As noted above, die re-expansion model entails that AVH-hearers should not experience typical Level 3 inner speech. 
To date, this prediction has been tested neither by examination of subjective reports of AVH-hearers' inner speech, nor 
by the attempted experimental elicitation of expanded inner speech. We have noted that no existing neural correlates 
studies have included explicit instructions to generate expanded dialogic inner speech. The closest approximations in the 
existing literature would appear to be the studies of McGuire et al. (1995) and Shergill, Bullmore, et al. (2000), where 
second-person AVI has indeed been shown to be associated with neural differences between AVH-hearers and controls. 
In contrast, no such group differences are found in the neural correlates of silent (non-dialogic) articulation. Our 
hypothesis here could be tested simply by asking participants to conduct an expanded dialogue in their heads while 
undergoing imaging. We would predict that such a condition would lead to similar differences in neural activation to 
those predicted by Hypothesis 2. We would also predict, in line with the re-expansion model, that the experience of 
expanded inner dialogues, even when experimentally elicited, should, subjectively, have some of the hallucinatory 
quality of the AVHs held by the re-expansion model to result from the re-expansion of condensed inner speech. 
Hypothesis 4. Neural correlates of the experience of an AVH should be similar to patterns of activation in healthy 
individuals undertaking expanded inner speech. 
We noted above (Hypothesis 3) that approximations to the elicitation of expanded inner speech exist in studies that 
have required participants to undertake AVI. A pertinent observation in this respect is one made by Shergill, Bramineri 
et al. (2000). Reporting their use of fMRJ scanning of patients with schizophrenia while they were experiencing AVHs, 
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Shergill, Brammer, et al. commented that "The pattern of activation we observed during auditory hallucinations is 
remarkably similar to that seen when heajthy volunteers imagine another person talking to them (auditory verbal 
imagery)" (p. 1036). Specifically, they observed common activation of the bilateral frontal and temporal gyri, along 
with right-sided precentral and inferior parietal gyri. One important difference between patients hearing AVHs and 
healthy participants generating AVI, however, is that the latter is associated with increased SMA activation, while this 
region is only weakly activated during AVHs. We can therefore conclude that Hypothesis 4 receives some support from 
studies that involve approximations to expanded inner speech (through the elicitation of AVI in healthy controls), but 
that the involvement of the SMA may differ between AVH-hearing patients and healthy controls generating AVI. 
Finally, we suggest that the re-expansion hypothesis may be able to resolve the controversy about the involvement 
of the inferior frontal gyrus (Broca's area) in AVHs. While a number of studies have found increased left inferior frontal 
cortex activation (compared to baseline) in AVH-hearers experiencing hallucinations (Shergill et al., 2004; Shergill, 
Brammer, et al., 2000), others have failed to find such an increase in activation during AVHs (Lermox et al., 2000; 
Silbersweig et al., 1995). These negative findings on the involvement of Broca's area activation in AVHs have been 
interpreted as providing "no support to the theory that auditory hallucinations arise from abnormalities of inner speech" 
(Lennox et al., 2000, p. 19). 
We would argue that these contradictory findings may be accounted for by the persistence of Level 4 (condensed) 
inner speech into baseline conditions in typical neuroimaging studies. Given that the re-expansion model predicts that 
AVH-hearers will experience normal Level 4 (condensed) inner speech, this would result in continued activation of 
Broca's area even when patients are being scanned at rest, without any current experience of hallucinations. Broca's 
area activation will also be a feature of the experience of hallucinations, held by the re-expansion model to involve 
Level 3 (expanded) iimer speech. Thus, the difiference in Broca's area activation between the AVH and non-AVH states 
will depend on how much condensed irmer speech patients have been performing during their non-hallucinating rest 
period in the scanner. If patients are undertaking continuous condensed inner speech at rest, this would be likely to lead 
to no difference in Broca's area activation between AVH and non-AVH phases. In contrast, i f low levels of condensed 
iimer speech are being performed at rest, then an increase in Broca's area activation is likely to accompany AVHs. In 
order to resolve this question, we recommend that future neuroimaging studies incorporate post-scaiming self-report 
measures of the thinking and iimer speech that occurred during participants' time in the scanner. I f such subjective 
reports are taken into account, it should be possible to determine the relative contributions of condensed and expanded 
inner speech to Broca's area activation in both hallucination and rest phases of such imaging studies. 
4. Conclusions 
At the start of this paper we set out certain key features of AVHs that we believe a comprehensive account of the 
phenomenon must explain. We reviewed the neuroimaging and neurophysiological evidence that has to date been used 
to study neural correlates of iimer speech in AVH-hearers and healthy controls. We proposed that an apparent 
conimdnmi posed by this research, namely that differences between these groups only obtain on tasks involving high 
levels of VSM, can be resolved by considering the different possible forms that inner speech can take. Femyhough's 
(2004) re-expansion model of AVHs was used to generate testable hypotheses for future studies of the neural correlates 
of inner speech in both AVH-hearers and healthy controls. 
Before drawing any final conclusions about the value of the theoretical ideas considered here, we return to our earlier 
caveat about the assumed, but not proven, involvement of inner speech in AVHs. It has previously been argued that 
research showing that neither the articulatory loop (David & Lucas, 1993; Haddock, Slade, Prasaad, & Bentall, 1996) 
nor the inner-voice/inner-ear partnership is impaired in patients with schizophrenia means that, i f any relationship exists 
between AVHs and inner speech, it is not simplistic or direct (Evans et al., 2000). While this conclusion E^ipears sensible, 
we note that it assiunes that working memory conceptions of inner speech (as silent articulation/rehearsal) map precisely 
onto those derived from \^gotsky's theory. Rather, we have argued that spontaneous inner speech has varieties of forms, 
as well as syntactic and semantic properties, that make it a richer phenomenon, both in its subjective qualities and its 
neural instantiation, than the subvocal articulation of external utterances. Lack of any strong evidence for articulatory 
loop deficits in schizophrenia caimot therefore be taken to invalidate the re-expansion model, as both condensed and 
expanded iimer speech will be reliant on a functioning phonological apparatus. 
We now return to the four key challenges for any comprehensive account of AVHs. The first task is to explain why 
AVH-hearers experience a voice in the absence of any external stimulus. Our answer to this question, in line with those 
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of many other authors (e.g., Bentall, 2003; Bick & Kinsboimie, 1987), is that the raw material of AVHs is internally 
generated inner speech. We go beyond these existing accounts, however, in claiming that inner speech is inherently 
dialogic. Two specific forms of dialogic inner speech are identified: Level 3 (expanded) inner speech, requiring high 
levels of VSM, and Level 4 (condensed) inner speech, associated with low-VSM demands. Specifically, it is Level 3 
(expanded) inner speech that forms the raw material for AVHs. Such an account can accoimt for the paradoxical 'alien-
yet-self quality of AVHs (Femyhough, 2004), as well as fitting with the evidence from neural correlate studies that 
AVH-hearers diflFer from healthy controls only on tasks involving high levels of VSM. 
The second challenge for any comprehensive account of AVHs is to explain why they are experienced as authored 
by a persori other than one's self. Following Frith and Done (1988) and others, we attribute this feature of AVHs in part 
to a failure in a neurocognitive action self-monitoring system (Jones & Femyhough, in press), which is put imder 
particular pressure in high-VSM conditions, such as the generation of expanded inner speech. Beyond explaining errors 
of judgment about authorship, however, a comprehensive account of AVHs must meet a third challoige, namely to 
explain why voices are often perceived as having person-specific acoustic properties, distinct from those of the AVH-
hearer. The Vygotskian approach to inner speech allows us to account for this third feature of AVHs with reference to 
the dialogic nature of inner speech. That is, human mentation involves the dialogic interplay of semiotically manifested 
perspectives on reality, such that our thinking is literally shot through with other voices. When combined with atypical 
VSM, of the kind that we and others propose to characterize AVH-hearers, in addition to fiirther potential factors such 
as anterior dngulate and parietal cortex activation, these voices are perceived as having an alien quality. 
The fourth challenge for a comprehensive theory is to explain why AVHs have characteristic contents and pragmatics, 
particularly their tendency to appear as second-person assertive utterances (e.g., commands). We have suggested that the 
developmental foimdation of inner speech in private speech and external dialogue, where children gradually acquire 
linguistic means for regulating their own behavior, can account for the specific pragmatic qualities of AVHs. 
We have set out a number of suggestions for how future studies involving AVH-hearers and healthy controls might 
test these hypotheses. We propose that further light may be shed on these issues through the use of a neglected 
population in AVH research. Many voice-hearers do not attract a clinical diagnosis such as schizophrenia and are able 
to deal with the experience of hearing voices in living nomial lives (Romme & Escher, 1993). To our knowledge this 
population has not yet been invited to participate in neuroimaging studies. Our hypotheses would predict, for 
example, that neural correlates of expanded inner speech in healthy voice-hearers would be similar to those of AVH-
hearers diagnosed with schizophrenia. In terms of existing neiu-oiinaging paradigms, we would predict less SMA and 
temporal lobe activation than healthy controls when generating (particularly second-person) AVI. In addition, we note 
the need for much more research on the neural correlates of the experience of AVHs, to complement the rich body 
of research conducted with AVH-hearers in remission. There is also an urgent need to devise ecologically valid 
procedures for eliciting both forms of dialogic inner speech. Inner speech is, we suggest, a rich and heterogeneous 
phenomenon, and empirical studies of it are weakened by a continued reliance on unexamined assumptions about its 
form and nature. 
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Scale for assessment of passivity experiences in tlie general 
population (SAPE-GP) 
1. Do you ever feel as if you are under the control of some force or power other than 
yourself? 
2. Do you ever feel as if you are possessed by someone or something else? 
3. When making movements (such as reaching for something) do you ever feel as if 
someone else inside you caused you to move? 
4. Do you ever feel as if you are a robot or zombie without a will of your own? 
5. Do you ever feel as if your feelings or actions are not under your control? 
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Participant Information Sheet 
Electrophysiological investigations of inner speech 
I am a PhD student at Durham University where I am trying to find out more about 
what happens in the brain when we perform inner speech in our head. You have 
received this Information Sheet as part of an invitation to take part in a study. Before 
you decide whether to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research 
is being done and what it will involve. If there is anything that is not clear, or that you 
would like to discuss further, please let me know. Take as much time as you like to 
decide whether you would like to take part. Thank you. 
Why have I been chosen? 
Participants are being recruited randomly fi-om the student population. 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you 
will be asked to sign a Consent Form before the start of the experiment. All your data 
will be kept strictly confidential. If you decide to take part you are still fi-ee to 
withdraw at any time without having to give your reasons, and your data will not be 
used. 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
The following information sets out what will happen if you agree to take part in the 
study. Please read it carefully and ask me if you need any more information. The 
experiment consists of one approximately 1 hour session which will take part in the 
Durham Psychology Department. Firstly, we need to give you a special cap to wear. 
Like the picture below. This cap contains equipment that can sense what electrical 
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activity is happening in your brain. It does not send any signals into your brain but 
just measures the electrical activity on its way out, so your brain won't be interfered 
with in any way. This is a completely safe and non-invasive procedure. Once you've 
put the cap on we w i l l need to squirt some gel into it through some holes in the top. 
This gel just contains water and salt and its purpose is to increase the contact to your 
scalp. Although the gel w i l l wash out o f your hair easily, it may look a little messy 
afterwards. Given this potential messiness, testing can be done at a time that suits you, 
e.g. after lectures in the afternoon before you head back to halls / home. Once the cap 
is on, you w i l l be asked to perform a number o f simple tasks, whilst a range o f sounds 
are played to you via headphones. These w i l l involve repeating a number o f sentences 
to yourself, silently in your head, and imagining objects rotating. The total time for 
the experiment w i l l be 1 hour, and you w i l l be paid £7 for participating. 
What are the possible advantages and disadvantages of takins part? 
There w i l l be no direct benefits o f taking part, except for the chance to advance our 
knowledge o f the neural activity associated with inner speech. There are no risks or 
side-effects o f participating and the study has been approved by the Psychology 
Department Ethics Committee. 
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I f you think you would like to take partiin this experiment, pleaseidrop me^ ^^ ^ 
(s.r;jones(§durham.aG.uk) andi we can arrange a time eonvenient for you to eoitie into 
the iDepaftnient ito paftieipate; in ithe experiment. 
Many thanks 
Si Jonesi (e-mail at sir, jones(S!durhaitivac.uk 
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Visual stimuli utilised in mental rotation task 
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